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Abstract
In this dissertation, I present three methods of evaluating local populations’ interactions
with their natural environments using household-level data from Tanzania. To date, little
effort has been made to evaluate the non-market benefits of natural resources for local pop-
ulations and this dissertation makes important contributions to this budding research area.
First, I apply a travel cost model and estimate that households in Kagera, Tanzania are
willing to pay approximately $200 per year (2012 U.S. dollars) for local community forests
access, a value equal to roughly 25 percent of annual total household expenditures. Sec-
ond, using a long-term panel data set I estimate that an additional hour required to collect
firewood when a child is young translates into $475 (2010 USD) in lost earnings over 30
years, roughly 1.7 percent of income. Finally, I show evidence of significant interdependen-
cies between a household’s agricultural production and food consumption decisions. This
inter-dependency implies that programs aimed at environmental conservation through agri-
cultural intensification may have important unintended consequences on a household’s food
consumption and subsequent micronutrient levels. In sum, the results in this dissertation
indicate that households in Tanzania interact with their environments in complex ways and
receive significant non-market benefits from natural resources.
iii
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Dedication ii
Abstract iii
List of Tables vii
List of Figures ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Measuring the Welfare Effects of Forests in Tanzania: An Application of
the Travel Cost Model 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Travel Cost Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.1 Perfectly Functioning Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.2 Constrained Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.3 Corner Solutions in the Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.4 Aggregate Household Demand model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.1 Estimating Shadow Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.2 Estimating Household Demand for Firewood Collection Trips . . . . . 27
iv
2.6 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.1 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6.2 Community Forest Valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.7 Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.8 Policy Implications and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Forest Access and Human Capital Accumulation 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.1 Putting Kagera in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Short-Term School Attendance Effects in 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4.4 Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Long-Term School Completion Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5.3 Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.4 Quantifying the Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4 Food Market Constraints and Households’ Food and Nutrient Consump-
tion: Evidence from Tanzania 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Household Food Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.1 Food Market Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4.1 Nutrient Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
v
4.4.2 Food Group Price Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.3 Market and Agricultural Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.5 Empirical Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.6.1 Agricultural Input Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.6.2 Household Expenditures and Measurement Error . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6.3 Household Nutrient Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5 Conclusions 139
References 141
Appendix A. Perfect Labor Market Separability Test 151
Appendix B. Becketti et al. (1988) Pooling Tests 153
Appendix C. Household Food Demand with Hired Labor 158
Appendix D. GMM 3SLS: First Stage Results 161
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Household Firewood Use Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 Sample Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 Description of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Household Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5 Travel Cost Summary Statistics Using Reported and Estimated Wages . . . . 45
2.6 Household Travel Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Household Travel Cost Estimates: Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8 Estimated and Observed Wages and Incomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1 Kagera Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 Education Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3 Sample Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Two-Way Tabulation: Firewood Collection and Other Household Work . . . . 81
3.5 Short-Term School Attendance Effects: Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6 Short-Term School Attendance Effects: Sample Size Robustness Checks . . . 84
3.7 Short-Term School Attendance Effects: Source of Variation Robustness Checks 85
3.8 Cross-Correlation: Firewood Collection Trip Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.9 Attrition Probit Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.10 Long-Term School Completion Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.11 Quantifying the Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.1 Daily Per Capita Food and Nutrient Consumption and Prevalence of Nutri-
tional Deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.2 Price Index Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
vii
4.3 Cross-Correlation: Daily Per Capita Nutrient Consumption . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4 Sample Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5 Food Demand Models: Kilocalories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.6 Net buyers vs Net Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.7 Food Demand Models: Kilocalories with Agricultural Input Prices . . . . . . 132
4.8 Food Demand Models: Kilocalories with Household Expenditures Instrumented134
4.9 Household Nutrient Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.1 Perfect Labor Market Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.1 Becketti et al. (1988) Pooling Test (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B.2 Becketti et al. (1988) Pooling Test (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
D.1 Household Expenditures Instrument: First Stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
viii
List of Figures
2.1 Kagera Region, Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 Weekly Household Firewood Collection Trips by Month of Interview . . . . . 51
2.3 Weekly Household Firewood Collection Histogram and Density . . . . . . . . 52
3.1 Kagera Region, Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.1 Food Group Kilocalorie Consumption by Source of Food . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
The welfare of rural households in developing countries is dependent upon both the local
natural environment and local markets. Not only does the local natural environment and
local markets affect the welfare of these households but, these households also affect the
environment, and global public goods, with their actions. For example, forests absorb 25
percent of annual global carbon dioxide emissions (Gillis, 2011). But, in Africa, 90 percent
of the continent’s population uses firewood for cooking and, in contrast to other parts of
the world, human activity is the leading cause of deforestation (Agyei, 1998). Effective
management of the natural environment requires that we measure benefits and understand
how the ways in which these rural households interact and rely on their local environments.
These benefit estimates are key inputs into cost-benefit analyses of conservation and climate
mitigation policies, such as payment for ecosystem services programs.
Despite many policymakers’ understanding of these different interests, very few economic
studies have used household socio-economic data to quantify the local non-market benefits
that households in developing countries derive from natural resources. Indeed, the need for
more economic papers addressing this research topic was recently recognized in the working
paper by Greenstone and Jack (2013). In this dissertation, I use household-level data to
estimate the ways in which local populations interact with their natural environments. In
Chapters 2 and 3, I estimate two non-market dollar value benefits of forest access: (1) the
consumptive value of forests and (2) the loss in human capital that results from reduced
forest access and increased firewood collection time. In Chapter 4, I show that food market
1
2imperfections affect households’ food consumption decisions. Ultimately, an understanding
of the varying ways in which local populations interact and use their natural environment
is important for promoting sustainable development policies that manage both the current
and future stock of natural resources.
In the first essay, I estimate the benefit that households in Kagera, Tanzania, derive from
access to local community forests. Specifically, I combine an environmental economics travel
cost framework with a traditional agricultural household model to derive household demand
for weekly firewood collection trips in the presence of constrained labor markets. I then
estimate household demand for weekly firewood collection trips as a function of the time costs
associated with firewood collection. My results show that households would be willing to pay
approximately $200 per year for access to their local community forests, or roughly 25 percent
of their total annual expenditures. This empirically-derived benefit is, on average, twice
as large as the household-reported annual value of firewood consumption, which indicates
that direct cost estimates may undervalue the full opportunity costs associated with forest
conservation programs like United Nations’ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation program. That is, the welfare loss to households when conservation
programs restrict their use of local ecosystem services may be greatly underestimated.
In the second essay, I test for the effects of forest access, measured as firewood collection
trip time, on human capital formation in both the short- and long-run. Tanzania’s heavy
reliance on forests (95 percent of households report using firewood as their primary source
of cooking fuel) coupled with Tanzania’s high rate of deforestation (the country has lost
81,000 km2 of forests over the last 20 years (World Bank, 2010)) implies that children could
be forced to compromise their school attendance as access to local forests becomes more
limited. In the short-term, I find that a one hour increase in firewood collection trip time
results in a child spending 25 minutes less in school a week, regardless of whether the child
is collecting firewood him or herself. Over the long-term, this reduction in weekly school
attendance due to a one hour increase in firewood collection time when the child is young
translates into a child completing one-fifth fewer grades 19 years later. Previous studies
have estimated an 8 percent annual return to education in Tanzania (Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos, 2004) and, using this rate, a one hour increase in firewood collection time implies
3a 1.7 percent reduction in annual income when the child is older, or a net present value of
$475 in 2010 USD over the course of 30 years. Even though the human capital costs of forest
conservation are not as large in magnitude as the consumptive values estimated in the first
essay, they are still non-trivial amounts when aggregated to the population level– 3 million
cumulative years of lost education if all 15 million rural children in Tanzania were affected.
Finally, in the third essay, I change focus from forest access and forest use to a household’s
food consumption and agricultural production. Agriculture accounts for 10-12 percent of
total greenhouse gas emissions (Stocker et al., 2013) and scientists estimate that agricultural
production will need to double in order to meet the needs of a growing population (Foley
et al., 2011). The most popular method of increasing agricultural production is through
agricultural intensification, particularly in Africa where agricultural production is below
its estimated potential (Foley et al., 2011). Indeed, agricultural development programs
emphasize agricultural intensification, the commercialization of crops and, consequently,
the income generated from agricultural sales (Barrett, 2008). But, if food markets are
imperfect then any change in a household’s agricultural production will also affect its food,
and subsequent nutrient, consumption. Consequently, the recognized productivity gap in
African agriculture may not be so much a gap as much as a rational response by households
to local markets and a need to meet household nutrient needs.
To study this relationship between household food consumption and production, I test
whether household demand for food is affected by cash crop prices. If food markets work
perfectly, an increase in the price of cash crops indirectly affects household food consumption
through a positive effect on household income; as the price of cash crops rises, farmers will
produce more cash crops and less food crops. But, because food markets work perfectly,
home produced food and purchased food are perfect substitutes and households can supple-
ment any drop in home-consumed food with purchased food. With imperfect food markets,
however, home-produced food and purchased food are no longer perfect substitutes. In this
scenario, an increase in the price of cash crops affects food consumption both indirectly,
through an increase in household agricultural profits, and directly, through a decrease in
home-produced food. In this essay, I provide evidence for the presence of food market
constraints in Tanzania and their effects on a household’s food and nutrient consumption.
4Together, these three essays shed light on the ways in which households in Tanzania
affect and are effected by their local environments and local markets. All three essays provide
insight into how rural households value their natural environment and have implications for
how policy-makers can effectively manage the natural environment. While the effects of
climate change are global, mitigating climate change comes from altering local decisions.
And though much attention has been paid to the global need to conserve natural resources
and mitigate climate change, less effort has been made to understanding local populations’
interactions with their environments. Importantly, the previous literature on this topic was
scarce and thus each essay makes an important and timely contribution. I discuss more of
the specific contributions and policy implications of each study in their respective chapters.
Chapter 2
Measuring the Welfare Effects of
Forests in Tanzania: An Application
of the Travel Cost Model
2.1 Introduction
Societies have long relied on forests to meet their daily needs – in the form of either firewood
for fuel or timber for building construction. Currently over 350 million people, the majority
of them poor, live in or near forests (Klugman, 2011), and 57 countries experience firewood
shortages (Perlin, 2005). The value of forests is also reflected in the vast resources currently
being spent to reduce climate emissions through forest conservation; Denmark, Japan, Nor-
way, and Spain have pledged over US$170 million in funds to support the United Nations’
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (UN-REDD) programme that has
been implemented in 47 different countries (UN–REDD Programme, 2009). Similarly, the
Nature Conservancy has its own suite of forest conservation-based climate mitigation pro-
grams in Brazil and Indonesia (Nature Conservancy, 2013).
These two benefits of forests unavoidably conflict with each other; conserving forests
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions reduces the amount of firewood and timber that can
be obtained from forests. Ultimately, an accurate monetary estimate of the costs of forest
5
6conservation programs from reduced procurement of firewood and timber depends not only
on the market benefits associated with these uses of forest resources but also on the non-
market uses. Household well-being derived from firewood collection, however, is difficult to
measure because this service is rarely exchanged in markets. To date, very few economic
studies have attempted to use household socio-economic data to quantify the benefits that
households in developing countries derive from local community forests. Indeed, the need
for more economic papers addressing this research topic was recently recognized in the
working paper by Greenstone and Jack (2013). In this paper, I attempt to fill this gap in
the literature and contribute to the growing micro-level literature on the impact of climate
change programs on households in developing countries. I estimate the demand for household
firewood collection trips and derive a measure of household-level willingness to pay for local
community forest access in the Kagera region of Tanzania.1
Tanzania has lost approximately 80,760 square kilometers of forest over the last 20 years
(World Bank, 2010), an area the size of South Carolina, and, over the next 40 years, de-
forestation in sub-Saharan Africa is predicted to occur at a faster rate than anywhere else
in the world (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Tanzania joined the UN-REDD
programme in 2008 and, to date, international donors have pledged over four million dollars
to support, in part, forest-conservation programs (UN–REDD Programme, 2009). Tan-
zania is still developing and assessing the costs of possible forest conservation programs,
including participatory forest management and payment for ecosystem services (UN–REDD
Programme, 2009), and the costs evaluated include opportunity costs, implementation costs,
transaction costs, and institutional costs (UN–REDD Programme, 2012). Most notably, op-
portunity costs are defined as the difference in household net earnings from agriculture,
timber, or charcoal production between a forest conservation regime, where forest access
and use is limited, and the status quo, where forests can be freely used by local populations.
In both of the previous cost analyses (Fisher et al., 2011; UN–REDD Programme, 2012),
however, opportunity costs are defined only in areas where markets for forest products exist
and thus neglect households’ opportunity costs associated with reduced firewood collection.
1The correct welfare measure is compensating variation but throughout this paper I rely on the results
in Willig (1976) and use willingness to pay as a proxy for compensating variation.
7These non-market opportunity costs associated with forest conservation are especially im-
portant in Tanzania, where recent estimates show that approximately 40 million people (out
of a total population of 43 million) rely on biomass for cooking fuel (Mushi, 2012), with wood
being the most common type of biomass (Mwampamba, 2007). I contend that commonly
used opportunity cost measurements fall short of measuring the full costs borne by local
households associated with these forest conservation programs.
In this paper, I estimate the household-level welfare, measured as willingness to pay
(WTP), associated with firewood collection in Kagera, Tanzania. I adapt traditional envi-
ronmental economics techniques, in particular travel cost models, to a developing country
setting and use these revealed preference estimates to derive WTP welfare estimates. I es-
timate that households in Kagera, Tanzania are willing to pay, on average, approximately
$200 per year (2012 U.S. dollars) for access to local community forests. This WTP estimate
is twice as large as household-reported values of firewood consumption, which suggests that
households significantly underestimate the value of firewood. This paper is one of the first
papers to derive estimates of households’ willingness to pay for forest access in sub-Saharan
Africa and one of only a few studies using a revealed preference approach to natural resource
valuation in a developing country.
A second, more methodological contribution of this paper is that I estimate WTP values
in the presence of constrained labor markets and limited wage data, an important feature
of many developing countries (Greenstone and Jack, 2013). Travel cost models estimate
the demand for local community forests by estimating the number of firewood collection
trips households make as a function of households’ opportunity costs of the time devoted
to firewood collection trips. If household members are unable to freely choose how many
hours they work outside of the home, then local wage rates are unlikely to represent these
households’ true opportunity costs of time. To account for this constraint, I use a house-
hold profit function to estimate household-specific shadow wages. In addition, I construct a
household-specific travel cost index that accounts for intra-household differences in shadow
wages and firewood collection participation levels. Finally, in contrast to previous research
that relied on cross-sectional data (Pattanayak et al., 2004; Baland et al., 2010), I employ
8a household fixed effects estimation strategy that controls for unobserved household char-
acteristics that affect household travel costs and that would otherwise lead to inconsistent
coefficient estimates.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, I review the literature and further high-
light the contributions made by this paper. In Section 2.3, I describe the data source used
in this study, the Kagera Health and Development Survey, and present descriptive statistics
of the sample population. In Section 2.4, I combine a travel cost model with an agricultural
household production model and derive the relevant demand functions to be estimated. In
Section 2.5, I describe the estimation strategy and the construction of the travel cost vari-
able. I present the estimation results in Section 2.6, as well as robustness checks and a
discussion of the resulting household welfare estimates associated with community forest
access. Finally, I discuss drawbacks and caveats of my results in Section 2.7, and provide
concluding remarks in Section 2.8.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper extends the small but growing subset of literature that considers the degree
to which agricultural households in sub-Saharan Africa rely on forest resources, and the
effects that proposed reductions in forest access would have on these households. The “other
energy crisis” (Eckholm, 1975), firewood shortages, has long been a focus of research, but the
majority of previous studies have focused on the crisis in the context of southeast Asia.2 As
noted by Cooke, Köhlin and Hyde (2008), more empirical studies from Africa are needed to
compare results from Southeast Asian studies and thus provide more reliable generalizations.
In particular, the two recent studies that provide monetary welfare estimates for household
forest access are both estimated for Southeast Asian countries (Pattanayak et al., 2004;
Baland et al., 2010). To the best of my knowledge, no comparable studies exist with similar
estimates for households in sub-Saharan Africa.
2See Amacher, Hyde and Joshee (1993); Bluffstone (1995); Amacher, Hyde and Kanel (1996); Cooke
(1998a,b); Amacher, Hyde and Kanel (1999); Adhikari, Falco and Lovett (2004); Baland et al. (2010);
Baland, Libois and Mookherjee (2013) for studies relating to Nepal, Heltberg, Arndt and Sekhar (2000);
Foster and Rosenzweig (2003); Kohlin and Amacher (2005); Gupta and Köhlin (2006); Gundimeda and
Kohlin (2008) for studies relating to India, Shively and Fisher (2004) for studies relating to the Philippines,
and Pitt (1985); Pattanayak et al. (2004) for studies relating to Indonesia.
9To date the majority of relevant studies have focused on observable consumption- and
labor-based household responses to the economic scarcity of firewood (Dewees, 1989; Helt-
berg, Arndt and Sekhar, 2000). Consumption-based measures have focused on estimating
household firewood consumption, measured through either firewood expenditures or firewood
collected, as a function of household, village, and environmental characteristics (Amacher,
Hyde and Joshee, 1993; Amacher, Hyde and Kanel, 1996; Chen, Heerink and Van Den Berg,
2006), or in relation to household consumption of substitutes such as coal and kerosene in
a demand systems approach (Pitt, 1985; Gupta and Köhlin, 2006; Gundimeda and Kohlin,
2008). The majority of these studies find that own-price elasticities for firewood fall between
negative one and zero. Income elasticities are more ambiguous: some studies find a negative
income elasticity (Amacher, Hyde and Joshee, 1993; Heltberg, Arndt and Sekhar, 2000)
and others a positive income elasticity (Amacher, Hyde and Joshee, 1993; Cooke, 1998b;
Amacher, Hyde and Kanel, 1999).3 In contrast with this paper, none of these studies makes
the link between household demand for firewood and the welfare loss that may result from
lost forest access for households.
Labor-based outcome measures have focused on the effects of forest scarcity on two
dimensions of labor supply: First, who in the household collects firewood (men, women, or
children), and, second, firewood collection time relative to other household activities such as
agriculture. Most results indicate that scarcity measures (such as firewood price, firewood
collection trip time, and firewood distance) are not correlated with increased total collection
time for specific household members (Amacher, Hyde and Joshee, 1993; Cooke, 1998b; Cooke
et al., 2000; Amacher et al., 2004; Palmer and MacGregor, 2009) though Amacher et al.
(2004) did show an increased burden for children.4 Finally, both Amacher et al. (2004) and
Cooke (1998b) find little evidence of any effects of firewood scarcity on agricultural labor
but, Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) find the opposite results. For a complete review of these
studies see Cooke, Köhlin and Hyde (2008).
The studies listed above are important and provide insights into the ways in which
3For a more complete, albeit somewhat dated, review of studies on firewood consumption see Hyde,
Kohlin and Amacher (2000). The authors review the income elasticities across seven different studies.
4It is worth pointing out that four of the five studies cited here relied on less than 200 observations
(Amacher, Hyde and Joshee, 1993; Cooke, 1998b; Cooke et al., 2000; Palmer and MacGregor, 2009) so their
power to detect a significant change was likely very low.
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households physically respond to changes in forest scarcity but they all fall short of linking
observed household behavior to an estimate of the welfare benefits derived from local com-
munity forests. Only five studies explicitly discuss the effects of a change in forest access
on household welfare, and only two of these studies, neither of which examines an African
country, measure welfare in monetary terms. In Southeast Asia, Kohlin and Amacher (2005)
estimate annual time saved from access to a community forest (250 hours per household)
while Baland et al. (2010) estimate the welfare loss to a household associated with a one
hour increase in collection time per trip (503.2 rupees/year). In Africa, Fisher (2004) ex-
amined the reduction of observed inequality if firewood income (a proxy for forest benefits)
is explicitly included in account measures (12 percent reduction in the Gini coefficient) and
MacDonald, Adamowicz and Luckert (2001) estimate the caloric value associated with a
change in the forest resource base. To date, only Pattanayak et al. (2004) has used travel
cost estimation to measure WTP for forest access, doing so for Manggarai households in
Indonesia.
This paper extends the previous wood fuel literature by providing an estimate of agri-
cultural households’ willingness to pay for forest access in Tanzania. This paper is the first
to estimate households’ willingness to pay for forest access in sub-Saharan Africa. Previous
studies on African countries have examined firewood consumption in Ethiopia (Amacher
et al., 2004), Malawi (Fisher, 2004; Fisher, Shively and Buccola, 2005; Fisher, Chaudhury
and McCusker, 2010), Namibia (Palmer and MacGregor, 2009), and Uganda (Khundi et al.,
2011), but none has estimated local households’ willingness to pay for forest access.
This paper extends the travel cost model employed by Pattanayak et al. (2004) by
developing a household model with different types of household workers. More specifically,
I use a generalization of Pattanayak et al. (2004) household production model of firewood
collection that is placed in the context of the household agricultural model developed by
Jacoby (1993) in which the household has two distinct labor types. I also allow for the case
of constrained labor markets, where household shadow wages are derived from estimates of a
household profit function (Jacoby, 1993; Baland et al., 2010) as well as corner labor markets
(Bockstael, Strand and Hanemann, 1987).
This paper is one of the few in the literature that employs panel data (others include
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Cooke, 1998a,b; Shively and Fisher, 2004; Baland, Libois and Mookherjee, 2013). Most
previous studies rely on cross-sectional data to estimate the impact of forest scarcity; they are
potentially biased because they do not account for unobservable variables such as household
collection efficiency. I employ a household fixed effects estimation approach to control for
these unobservable household characteristics.
2.3 Data
The ideal data for travel cost estimation would include information on household firewood
collection trips for all household members over the past year for a representative sample.
The most recent Tanzanian household survey is the National Panel Survey (NPS), collected
in both 2008 and 2010, but the survey collects information only on firewood collection
trips made the previous day. A one-day recall period loses much of the variability in the
distribution of weekly firewood collection trips across households; households that normally
collect firewood but that did not collect firewood yesterday are recorded with zero firewood
collection trips and all households that collected firewood yesterday are recorded as collecting
firewood at least seven times in the last week. In contrast, the four rounds of the Kagera
Health and Development Survey (KHDS), a regionally representative longitudinal household
survey, collected information on firewood collection trips made over the previous week. This
more refined firewood collection trip question allows for more variability in the frequency of
household firewood collection trips. Indeed, 47.5% of households report making between one
and six weekly firewood collection trips in the KHDS - responses that would be recorded as
either zero or one in the NPS.
Although the KHDS data used in this paper are about 20 years old, household firewood
use in Tanzania has been largely unchanged over the last twenty years. According to the
2010 NPS, approximately 93% of rural households in Kagera report firewood as their cooking
fuel compared to 99% of rural households in the KHDS. Recent estimates suggest that in
2011, natural forests in Tanzania could produce an annual supply of about 18 million cubic
meters of wood products but that the annual wood harvest is over 50 million cubic meters
(Mushi, 2012). This relatively small adoption of firewood substitutes in Kagera and small
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change in deforestation patterns in Tanzania over the last 20 years means that the observed
firewood collection patterns in the KHDS are still relevant today. Consequently, I rely on
the KHDS for this paper to take advantage of the data set’s more refined firewood collection
data.
The KHDS surveyed over 800 households in the Kagera Region of Tanzania four times
between September 1991 and January 1994.5 The Kagera region (40,838 km2) lies in the
northwest corner of Tanzania on the western shore of Lake Victoria and borders Uganda,
Rwanda, and Burundi. Kagera is one of the farthest regions in Tanzania from the country’s
capita, Dar es Salaam (see Figure 2.1 for a map showing the geographical placement of
Kagera in Tanzania). This study uses an unbalanced panel with 3,375 observations (840 in
round 1, 849 in round 2, 858 in round 3, and 828 in round 4). The household attrition rate
is low: between the 1991 and 1994 survey rounds the annual household attrition rate was
0.88 percent and only 0.70 percent after excluding deaths (Outes-Leon and Dercon, 2008).
Survey rounds were conducted six to seven months apart and households were surveyed from
50 different villages across all five districts of Kagera. The KHDS used a two-stage stratified
random sample based on the 1988 Tanzanian Census. Communities were stratified based on
agroclimatic zone and adult mortality rates. The KHDS questionnaires were adapted from
the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Study questionnaire, with questionnaires
administered to households, communities, local markets, local medical centers, and local
schools.
In Tanzania, most households have access to community forests and rely on them as a
major source of firewood. Specifically, all land in Tanzania is owned by the government but
is divided into three categories: general land, reserved land, and village land (i.e. community
land) (Carpano, 2010; Rurai, 2014). General land is either privately managed and used at the
discretion of the owner or held by the government. Reserved land includes game reserves and
forest reserves, is used at the discretion of the national government, and is not available for
private household use. Finally, community land is managed by the village council, includes
grazing land and village forest reserves, and is available for use by all households in the
village; a village may even allow specific individuals to manage a piece of the community
5A household was defined as “a person or group of persons who live in the same dwelling and eat together
for at least three of the twelve months preceding the date of the survey” (Ainsworth, 2004).
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land. Each village also creates a Forest Management Plan that designates different areas
of the village forest for different uses. Usually the plan forbids the cutting of fresh wood
but may allow collection of dead woods (Rurai, 2014). Liversage (2004) estimates that as of
2004 general land comprised 29 percent of all land, reserved land 2 percent, and community
land 69 percent.
An additional benefit of using data collected in the early 1990s is that there is little
self-selection into households that do and do not have tree nurseries and do and do not
sell firewood. To accommodate declining firewood availability on community forest land,
more households in recent years have allocated some of their personal land to tree nurseries
and have begun selling firewood. Thus, without data on firewood collection sites, using
the 1991–1994 data allows me to credibly assume that the majority of households collected
firewood on community forest land. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics from the KHDS
on the proportion of households that collect firewood, own tree nurseries, and sell firewood.
Approximately 95 percent of households report using firewood in all four survey rounds
with over 85 percent of households collecting firewood in each round. Additionally, virtually
no households have income from firewood sales in rounds 1 and 2 and only two percent of
households in round 3. Very few households have firewood in stock but approximately 23
percent of households do report having firewood crops, most likely in the form of a tree
nursery.
In the KHDS all household members seven years and older were asked “How many hours
did you spend collecting firewood in the last seven days?” I use this question to construct
a measure of the number of firewood collection trips that each individual made in the last
week. The number of individual collection trips last week is the number of days that a certain
household member reported non-zero collection time. This trip frequency is accurate under
the assumption that a certain household member is not making more than one firewood
collection trip on any given day. I also use this question to construct a measure of the
average time per trip across all household members. An individual’s trip time is measured
as the total number of hours that she or he spent collecting firewood in the last week divided
by the number of trips she or he made. Exact construction of the travel cost variable is
explained in more detail in Section 2.5.
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The number of household firewood collection trips is used as a proxy variable for a
household’s annual number of firewood collection trips. Weekly household firewood collec-
tion trips are a good proxy for annual firewood collection trips as long as firewood collection
trips do not vary significantly with the season. Few households store firewood (see Table
2.1) mostly because firewood collection is predominately done by hand, which implies that
a significant amount of time would be required for a household to build up a firewood stock.
In addition, households use firewood to cook throughout the year so they have a continuous
need to collect firewood. Figure 2.2 displays weekly household firewood collection trips by
the month of interview. The plot shows that the median number of weekly firewood collec-
tion trips varies little across the 12 months, corroborating my statement that seasonality is
not a major factor in household firewood collection decisions. The upper extreme of firewood
collection trips, however, is smaller during the middle of the two rainy seasons (April and
December) but, between the upper and lower quartile (where most of the data lie), there is
little variation in weekly trips across the twelve months.
For the analysis in this paper I drop households that report any firewood sales in the last
six months (38 households) because these households are assumed to use local community
forests for commercial purposes and the interest here is in private non-market forest use.
This restriction leaves a total sample of 3,337 observations. Only one household in round
1 and 17 in round 4 report any firewood sales so dropping these observations should have
minimal effects on the results. If households with firewood sales are assumed to have a more
inelastic demand with respect to own-price for firewood collection trips then any resulting
bias would be downward which implies that WTP estimates are underestimated.
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics for the sample of interest. Prices and monetary
variables are all presented in real terms with round 1 as the base year. These variables are
deflated using a Laspeyre’s price index that is measured at the village level. Households,
on average, cultivate approximately four acres of land and tend to have more valued assets
in the form of livestock than they do in the form of non-farm business assets. The average
household has between five and six individuals and a little more than a quarter of households
are female-headed. The price of charcoal is relatively constant across the four survey rounds
while the price of kerosene increases across the four rounds. Finally, Table 2.2 shows that,
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on average, households make between six and seven firewood collection trips per week.
To further investigate the distribution of weekly firewood collection trips I present both
histogram and kernel density estimates by round in Figure 2.3. Weekly firewood collection
trips appear highly skewed with spikes in the observed frequency at zero, two, four, and seven
weekly firewood collection trips. In the next section I describe the theoretical foundations
of the travel cost model before empirically estimating the model in sections 2.5 and 2.6.
2.4 Travel Cost Model
In traditional single-site travel cost demand models (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005) household
utility, u, is a function of household trips to the forest, y, and household consumption of
some aggregate good, z.6 I start with this traditional single site model but adapt it to
allow trips to the forest to be an input into a household firewood production process, an
approach similar to that taken by Pattanayak et al. (2004) and Baland et al. (2010). I also
assume that households earn income from both marketed labor and household agricultural
production, similar to the household model laid out in Jacoby (1993).
In this adapted model, household utility, u, is a function of firewood f ≥ 0, an aggregate
good z ≥ 0, leisure ` ≥ 0, and a vector of household taste-shifters ζ. I assume that the
utility function is concave in all of its arguments, that ∂2u/∂z∂f ≥ 0, and that there
are diminishing returns of income on the maximized utility level. Both Pattanayak et al.
(2004) and Baland et al. (2010) assume identical household workers with a single household
measure of leisure. More realistically, household workers choose different amounts of leisure,
firewood collection trips, home and market labor hours, and different firewood collection
and agriculture productivity levels. I incorporate this intra-household differentiation into
my model and allow for two types of household members.7
Household firewood production, f = g(y1 + θy2, δ), is a function of the total number of
6Throughout this theoretical section, I rely on a unitary household model that is a derivation of the
traditional agricultural household model (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). The unitary household model relies
on the assumption that either utility is transferable (Alderman et al., 1995) or that household resource
allocation is driven by one altruistic household member (Becker, 1993). I maintain this assumption because
firewood is consumed jointly within the household.
7For notational simplicity I only consider the case of two distinct household members but the model can
easily be extended to include n different household members.
16
firewood collection trips that a household makes, y = y1+θy2 (y, y1, y2 ≥ 0), where θ ∈ [0, 1]
captures differences in firewood collection productivity and δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes environmental
quality. The firewood production function, g(·, ·), is assumed to have increasing but di-
minishing marginal returns to firewood collection trips which implies that ∂g/∂yj > 0 and
∂2g/∂y2j < 0 for j = 1, 2. Given the same environmental quality, household members of the
same type are assumed to collect the same amount of firewood per trip across households.8
Finally, time per trip, tf , (including travel and collection time) is assumed to be the same
for both household member types but varies across households.
Household revenue (agriculture, home business, livestock, and fishing profits), measured
in local currency units, are a function of household fixed assets, Afi, household variable
assets, Avi, household labor, Laj , and hired labor, L
h: F (Afi, Avi, La1, La2, Lh). Household
marketed labor is given by Lmj , and household members are endowed with E
L
j total units of
labor.
In full, the household problem can be written as:
max
y1,y2,z,`1,`2,Lm1 ,L
m
2 ,L
a
1 ,L
a
2 ,L
h
u
(
g(y1 + θy2, δ), z, `1, `2; ζ
)
subject to:
pz = F (Afi, Avi, L
a
1, L
a
2, L
h)− wLh + w1Lm1 + w2Lm2
EL1 = `1 + L
m
1 + L
a
1 + y1t
f
EL2 = `2 + L
m
2 + L
a
2 + y2t
f
where the aggregate good’s price is p, wj is the market wage rate for household member
of type j, and w is the market wage rate for hired labor. The household problem can be
8This assumption implies that some households do not use carts or animals in order to help individuals
carry more firewood per trip. This assumption seems plausible since carrying firewood on one’s back or
shoulders remains the dominant form of firewood transport in the region.
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rewritten as (Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986):
max
y1,y2,z,`1,`2,Lm1 ,L
m
2 ,L
a
1 ,L
a
2 ,L
h
u
(
g(y1 + θy2, δ), z, `1, `2; ζ
)
subject to:
pz +
∑
j=1,2
yjwjt
f +
∑
j=1,2
wj`j = F (Afi, Avi, L
a
1, L
a
2, L
h)− wLh −
∑
j=1,2
wjL
a
j +
∑
j=1,2
wjE
L
j .
Household member type j’s travel cost associated with one firewood collection trip is denoted
as wjtf .
2.4.1 Perfectly Functioning Labor Markets
If labor markets are perfectly functioning then households are indifferent between hiring
labor, providing labor at home, and working in the market. In this case, household con-
sumption and agricultural production decisions are separable and household characteristics,
such as household size and gender of household head, do not affect the level of household
production. Household home labor is determined by the first order condition:
∂F (Afi, Avi, L
a
1, L
a
2, L
h)
∂Laj
= wj for j = 1, 2.
The optimal number of household firewood collection trips for person j, y∗j , is a function of
travel costs and other exogenous variables:
y∗j = yj(w1t
f , w2t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ) ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2 (2.1)
where pi = F (Afi, A∗vi, L
a∗
1 , L
a∗
2 , L
h∗) − w1La∗1 − w2La∗2 − wLh∗ denotes household profit.
It is straightforward to show that ∂yj/∂(wjtf ) < 0 so that as household member type j’s
travel cost, wjtf , increases, that member type j will make fewer firewood collection trips.
In contrast, ∂yj/∂(wktf ) > 0 for j 6= k so that as the travel cost increases for household
member type k then type j will make more trips, ceteris paribus. Additionally, firewood
collection trips will increase as income rises, ∂yj/∂pi > 0 for j = 1, 2, because fuel is assumed
to be a normal good.
Estimates for this case of perfectly functioning labor markets rely on observed household
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wages. These estimates are the least robust because they do not allow for any imperfections
in the local labor market, a common feature in many developing countries.9 In the next
subsection I relax the assumption of perfectly functioning labor markets.
2.4.2 Constrained Labor Markets
If hired and own-farm agricultural labor are not perfect substitutes, or if local labor markets
have transaction costs such as limiting the amount of hours a household member can work
outside the household, then household production and consumption decisions are no longer
separable (Jacoby, 1993). For example, if both household members work in home-production
and are unable to find jobs in the local labor market so that Lm1 = Lm2 = 0 then household
production is affected by household characteristics. In this case, each household member’s
individual shadow wage, wˆj , is given by:
∂u/∂`j
∂u/∂z
· p = ∂F (Afi, Avi, L
a
1, L
a
2, L
h)
∂Laj
= wˆj for j = 1, 2
where the shadow wage is equivalent to the price of leisure. These shadow wages can be
estimated from a household profit function and, in the presence of constrained labor markets
or missing or poor wage data, are a good measure of household members’ opportunity costs
of time (Jacoby, 1993).
The optimal number of firewood collection trips for household member j is now written
as a function of shadow wages and not market wages:
y∗j = yj(wˆ1t
f , wˆ2t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ) for j = 1, 2 (2.2)
where profit is pi = F (Afi, A∗vi, L
a∗
1 , L
a∗
2 , L
h∗)− wˆ1La∗1 − wˆ2La∗2 −wLh∗. Household member
type j’s travel costs still negatively affect the number of firewood collection trips that type
j makes and positively affect the number of firewood collection trips that type k 6= j makes.
With constrained labor markets, however, an increase in household profits now positively
affects type j’s travel costs and the effect of household profits on the number of type j’s
firewood collection trips is ambiguous. In particular, increased profits raise the demand for
9See Jacoby (1993); Skoufias (1994); Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar (1997); Abdulai and Regmi (2000);
Grimard (1997); Le (2010) for studies that all reject the separation hypothesis.
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firewood but also raise the opportunity cost of collecting firewood.
In the case of constrained labor markets, shadow wages and household profit both be-
come choice variables and are endogenous in any cross-sectional estimation. Both Jacoby
(1993) and Baland et al. (2010) instrument for shadow wage using the number of house-
hold workers and for household profit using household potential income, the predicted profit
from a household profit estimation. In my analysis I do not use instrumental variables but
instead include household fixed-effects, thereby controlling for all unobserved time-invariant
household characteristics, such as ability and location, that affect both shadow wages and
profits.
Travel cost estimates from this case of constrained labor markets are more robust to
unobserved constraints in local labor markets and to misreporting in the observed wage
variable. In the discussion of the empirical results, estimates from this case are taken as
the most robust and realistic travel cost estimates. In the next section I consider a third
possible labor market condition.
2.4.3 Corner Solutions in the Labor Markets
Finally, it may be possible that household labor market decisions are at a corner solution.
At a corner solution household member j = 1, 2 cannot work additional hours in the labor
market for wage wj and there are little or no productivity gains from working at home,
i.e. wˆj ≈ 0 (Bockstael, Strand and Hanemann, 1987). In this case Laj and Lmj for j = 1, 2
are fixed and the household only chooses z, `1, `2 , y1, and y2. Consequently, the optimal
number of firewood collection trips for type j is given by:
y∗j = yj(t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ). (2.3)
This case eliminates the need to consider wage measurement or construct shadow wages.
And, as in the case of perfectly functioning labor markets, household income positively
affects the number of firewood collection trips made by person j, as long as there is decreasing
marginal utility of income.
This case of corner solutions in the labor market is predominately estimated as a ro-
bustness check. Under the assumption that home production exhibits increasing returns to
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home labor (i.e. ∂F/∂Laj > 0 for j = 1, 2) then wˆj > 0 for all L
a
j > 0. Estimates from this
case are straightforward, do not rely on any wage construction, and travel cost coefficients
are easily interpreted in terms of firewood collection travel time.
2.4.4 Aggregate Household Demand model
Equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) express household member type j’s demand for firewood
collection trips, but household WTP estimates for forest access are derived from total house-
hold demand for firewood collection trips. To obtain household level firewood collection trip
demand I aggregate up the member-based demands solved for in equations (2.1), (2.2), or
(2.3). Household members’ firewood collection travel costs are assumed to be multicollinear
over time. Because travel time is assumed to be the same for all household members this
assumption holds as long as household members’ observed wages and shadow wages are pos-
itively correlated. Under this assumption, Hicks’ generalized composite commodity theorem
applies to household members’ firewood collection trips and demand for firewood collection
can be aggregated to the household level (Hicks, 1946; Lewbel, 1996).
The construction of aggregate household demand for firewood collection trips is difficult
for both the case of perfect labor markets and constrained labor markets because in each
case trip demand for household member type j is a function of both the travel costs for
type j and the travel costs for type k 6= j. To see why, consider the case of perfect labor
markets (the case of constrained labor markets is analogous, simply replace w with wˆ). Total
household firewood collection trips is an aggregate household good composed of the firewood
collection trips of household members 1 and 2:
y∗ = y∗1 + y
∗
2 =
2∑
j=1
yj(w1t
f , w2t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ).
In order to write this aggregate model as a function of a single travel cost variable a price
index is needed. I create a price index that weights both member 1 and 2’s travel costs:
w¯tf =
2∑
j=1
yj
y1 + y2
× wjtf =
 2∑
j=1
yj
y1 + y2
× wj
 tf . (2.4)
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The travel cost index is a weighted average of the travel costs for all household member
types where the weight for type j is the share of firewood collection trips made by type j.
Total household demand for firewood collection trips can now be written as:
y∗ = y(w¯tf , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ). (2.5)
Similarly, in the case of constrained labor markets aggregate household demand for firewood
collection trips is:
y∗ = y( ¯ˆwtf , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ). (2.6)
In contrast to other demand models, the price index, equation (2.4), used in equations
(2.5) and (2.6) is now a function of the endogenous variables y∗1 and y∗2. In empirical
estimation this endogeneity will generally lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates. A fixed
effects estimation approach will control for endogeneity that results from correlation of y∗1
and y∗2 with any unobserved time-invariant household characteristics, such as bargaining
structure.
Aggregation of equation (2.3) is trivial because trip demand for any given household
member is a function of a single travel time measure. This case does not require the con-
struction of a price index and total household demand for firewood collection trips is given
by:
y∗ =
∑
j=1,2
yj(t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ) = y(t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ). (2.7)
Equations (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) all represent demand equations and, consequently, wel-
fare valuations can also be applied to each equation. Specifically, household-level WTP for
forest access is measured as the area under the Marshallian demand curve (Bockstael et al.,
1990; Haab and McConnell, 2002):
WTP(forest access) =
∫ (wtf )1
(wtf )0
y(wtf , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ) d(wt
f ) (2.8)
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where (wtf )0 is the current household-level travel cost and (wtf )1 is the choke price (the
travel cost at which households make zero firewood collection trips). For the cases of perfect
and constrained labor markets WTP is measured in local currency units. For the case of
corner labor markets WTP is measured in hours and the conversion to currency units is
more difficult because wages and shadow wages are not good representations of opportunity
costs of time.
2.5 Estimation Strategy
In this section, I estimate household demand for firewood collection trips under the three
labor market scenarios presented in equations (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7). I use the number of
household collection trips as the outcome variable and the indexed travel cost as the main
explanatory variable of interest for the purpose of welfare analysis. In the case of equation
(2.5), the estimated demand equation is of the form:
y∗kvt = y(w¯t
f , θ, δ, p, pi, EL1 , E
L
2 , ζ) = y(x
′
kvtβ, ηk, εkvt)
= y(β1(w¯t
f )kvt + βθθkvt + βδδkvt + βppvt + β2pikvt + βhζkvt, ηk, εkvt) (2.9)
for household k in village v at time t. The term ηk represents unobservable time-invariant
household characteristics and εkvt is an independent and identically distributed error term. I
allow for the possibility that ηk is correlated with some of the regressors in xkvt. Specifically,
unobservable household characteristics, such as women’s bargaining power, may affect which
household members collect firewood, which, in turn, affects a household’s travel cost measure
and the number of collection trips taken. In the estimation, I use a fixed effects model and
avoid bias due to correlation of ηk with xkvt by differencing it out of the regression. A
description of all the variables used in the estimation is provided in Table 2.3.
The vector of prices, p, includes the prices of firewood substitutes – charcoal and kerosene
– and a food price index where prices are collected at the village level in each survey round.
Observed household taste-shifters, ζ, include household size, a dummy equal to one if the
reported household head is female, average household adult education years, and the number
of household members with restricted activity in the last seven days. Unfortunately, data
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limitations prevent any precise measurement of firewood collection trip substitutability (θ)
and environmental quality (δ). These two variables are partially controlled for in both the
travel cost measure and the household fixed-effects term.
Household net income, pi, is measured as reported household expenditures.10 Household
income data, especially data on household business income, may have a large amount of
measurement error. Household expenditures, on the other hand, suffer from less misreporting
and are strongly correlated with household income, making that variable a good proxy for
household income (Deaton, 1997).
Household travel cost values are created by indexing adult male, adult female, teenager,
and child travel costs. Adults are categorized as individuals 16 years or older, teenagers are
12 to 15 years, and children are 7 to 11 years. Consequently, the travel cost for household
k in village v at time t is indexed as:
travel costkvt =
∑
j=male,female,teen,child
yjkvt∑
i=male,female,teen,child
yikvt
(
wjkvt × tfkvt
)
(2.10)
The weight used in this index varies across households and, consequently, is potentially
correlated with unobservable household characteristics. The fixed effects estimation strategy,
however, will remove all bias resulting from correlation between a household’s indexed travel
cost and time-invariant unobservable household characteristics.
Travel cost values are created by using survey information on both firewood collection
travel time and wages. For travel time construction, I continue to assume that firewood
collection travel time varies across, but not within, the household. I calculate travel time
as the average time per trip across all household members (i.e. total number of collection
hours divided by the total number of trips). Travel time has substantial within and between
household variation (travel time has a mean of 1.5 hours with a between standard deviation
of 0.77 and within standard deviation of 0.67) indicating that there are changes in forest
access within households over time. I control for any changes in forest access that may
be related to technological changes and not environmental changes by including separate
10Household expenditures include food expenditures, consumption of home production, non-food con-
sumption expenditure, remittances sent, and wage income in kind (Ainsworth, 2004).
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asset ownership dummies for bicycles, cars, and motorcycles. Households with no reported
firewood collection trips are assigned their village average travel time at time t (402 of the
3,295 observations). This assignment is reasonable as long as households are not overly
dispersed within a village.
I use three wage constructions to account for the three different labor market scenarios
evaluated in Subsections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3: the observed wage (equation (2.5)), the estimated
shadow wage (equation (2.6)), and travel time (equation (2.7)). For the case of perfectly
functioning labor markets, I rely on a survey question asked to each community leader about
how much an agricultural laborer earns for a day’s work. This question is asked separately
for men, women, and children. Unfortunately, this variable has a large number of missing
observations (as many as 35 of the 50 villages in some of the survey rounds have missing
child wages), and it also does not allow for any intra-village variation in wages. Second, in
the case of constrained labor markets, I use an estimate of the marginal product of labor as
a proxy for household shadow wage rates, as proposed by Jacoby (1993). This shadow wage
construction has the additional benefit that it allows for sample variation in opportunity
costs of time both within and across households. Finally, in the case of corner solutions I
set the wage equal to one and estimate travel cost as travel time. In the next subsection I
discuss estimation and construction of the shadow wage estimates.
2.5.1 Estimating Shadow Wages
Household-specific male, female, teenager, and child shadow wages are derived from their
corresponding labor hour coefficients in a household profit function. Estimation follows the
approach laid out in Jacoby (1993) and adapted by Baland et al. (2010). Initially, profits
are assumed to follow a Cobb-Douglas functional form:11
ln profitkvt = α0 + α1 ln landkvt + α2 ln livestockkvt + α3 lnhh educationkvt (2.11)
+ α4 ln businesskvt + α5 ln variable inputskvt + αm lnmale laborkvt
+ αf ln female laborkvt + αt ln teen laborkvt + αc ln child laborkvt + µkv + kvt.
11A log transformation is used on all outcome and explanatory variables in the shadow wage estimates.
All observations, except for adult male and adult female labor hours, are replaced with one if they are equal
to zero. Results are robust to a hyperbolic sine transformation (results not reported).
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Variable descriptions are provided in Table 2.3 and the inclusion of these variables is based
on the theoretical household profit function in Section 2.4. The error term µkv denotes
unobservable time-invariant household characteristics that are correlated with household
labor hours and kvt is a serially independent, identically distributed error term that is
assumed to be uncorrelated with all regressors.
A Cobb-Douglas functional form is advantageous because of its intuitive interpretation
and simple calculation of shadow wages. On the other hand, such a profit function may not
be appropriate because it assumes strong separability and requires that the marginal rates
of transformation between any two household labor inputs do not depend on any other input
(Jacoby, 1993). To test these assumptions, I estimate both a Cobb-Douglas and translog
profit function that includes squared labor terms and interaction terms between adult female
and child labor hours.
Both Jacoby (1993) and Baland et al. (2010) use cross-sectional data and instrument for
the household labor hour variables using the number of working age household members as
instruments. Specifically, Jacoby (1993) claims that variable inputs (i.e. labor hours) must
be instrumented in order to remove correlation between labor inputs and household fixed
effects such as management ability. I use panel data with household fixed effects to control
for unobserved household managerial ability and so avoid the need for any instrumental
variables.
Household profit estimates are reported in Table 2.4. Column (1) reports results from
the Cobb-Douglas profit function presented in equation (2.11) and shows a positive and
significant effect of both male and female annual labor hours on household profit, a posi-
tive but insignificant effect of teenage annual labor hours, and an unexpected significantly
negative effect of child annual labor hours. A Wald Test fails to reject the null hypothe-
sis that the elasticity of male and female labor hours are equal in column (1) (p-value of
0.680) and rejects the null that the elasticity of teenage and child labor are equal at the 5
percent level (p-value of 0.016). Consequently, I re-run regression (1) with a single coeffi-
cient for adult labor hours; these results are presented in column (3). As expected, annual
adult labor hours is positive and statistically significant in column (3). The corresponding
translog profit function estimates are presented in columns (2) and (4). With the exception
26
of business assets in column (2) all coefficients on fixed assets are insignificant; limited within
household variation in these variables could increase their standard errors and reduce the
power to detect an effect.
The coefficient estimates on adult, teenage, and child labor hours are used to estimate
group-level shadow wages (mean shadow wage estimates are reported at the bottom of Table
2.4). The translog profit function produces shadow wage estimates that are notably differ-
ent from those of the Cobb-Douglas profit function, with the largest difference in teenage
shadow wage estimates. The translog profit function also has the disadvantage that it yields
negative shadow wage estimates for a significant portion of the sample whereas the Cobb-
Douglas profit function will yield negative estimates only if coefficient estimates are negative.
Consequently, I use the estimated shadow wages from column (3) in estimates of household
demand for firewood collection trips; these estimates are also more in line with the observed
wages (see Table 2.5). Finally, all four profit function estimates yield a child shadow wage
that is less than zero. This negative coefficient could be related to a surplus labor story
(Sen, 1966)12 but could also be the result of sample selection into which households do and
do not use child labor, of the 3,375 total observations only 909 have non-zero child labor
hours. I interpret these coefficients as saying that households earn no additional profit from
children working an additional hour at home. Thus, children are assumed to be at a corner
solution in the labor market, which is equivalent to having a wage of one.
Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics for community wage rates, shadow wages (from
column (3) in Table 2.4), and all other variables used in the construction of the indexed
household-level travel cost. Adult males make the largest proportion of firewood collection
trips in rounds 1 and 2, while there is no significant difference in the proportion of trips made
by adult males and adult females in rounds 3 and 4. Adult shadow and sample wages are
similar in all four rounds and, in contrast, teenage shadow wage estimates are, on average,
much lower than the observed sample average wage rate. Finally, travel cost estimates differ
substantially depending on the method of wage measurement used; estimates based on the
sample average wage are, on average, higher than travel cost estimates based on the shadow
12Sen (1966) defines surplus labor as as labor that can be removed from, in this case, agricultural produc-
tion, without reducing household profits. Surplus labor requires labor costs (i.e. wages) are not sensitive to
the omission of children from the labor force.
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wage. This discrepancy could be largely accounted for by the much lower estimate of the
opportunity cost of time for teenagers based on shadow wages compared to reported wages.
2.5.2 Estimating Household Demand for Firewood Collection Trips
Because firewood collection trips are always discrete non-negative values, count data models
are used for estimation (Haab and McConnell, 2002). I estimate both Poisson and nega-
tive binomial models with household fixed effects.13 The Poisson model is preferred to the
negative binomial model because Poisson fixed effects estimates are consistent under much
weaker distributional assumptions than those required for consistent estimation of the neg-
ative binomial model with fixed effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Consistency of the
coefficient estimates with the Poisson model requires only that the conditional mean, given
by:
E[ykvt | xkvt, ηk] = ηk exp(β1travel costkvt + β2incomekvt (2.13)
+ βppricesvt + βhhh characteristicskvt
+ β3bikekvt + β4carkvt + β5motorcyclekvt),
be correctly specified; it does not require that any full distributional assumption holds.14
As discussed in Section 2.4, the coefficients on travel cost are expected to be negative
and, for the case of perfectly functioning labor markets and corner solutions, the coefficient
on income, measured as household expenditures, to be positive. Ex ante, the effect of
income on household firewood collection trips is ambiguous in the case of constrained labor
markets. In particular, an increase in income increases household demand for fuel and
13For a Poisson model with household fixed effects the probability that household k in village v at time t
takes ykvt firewood collection trips is:
Pr[Y = ykvt | xkvt,β, ηk] = exp(−ηkλkvt)(ηkλkvt)
ykvt
ykvt!
. (2.12)
where λkvt = exp(x′kvtβ + εkvt).
14This conditional mean requirement contrasts with the conditional mean requirement in the negative
binomial model:
E[ykvt | xkvt, ηk] = ηk exp(x
′
kvtβ)
φkv
where φkv represents the overdispersion parameter. If the overdispersion parameter is misspecified then
estimates from the fixed effects negative binomial model will be inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
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household members’ opportunity costs of time. As mentioned earlier, previous literature
remains inconclusive on the sign of firewood income elasticities (Amacher, Hyde and Joshee,
1993; Amacher, Hyde and Kanel, 1999; Cooke, 1998b; Heltberg, Arndt and Sekhar, 2000).
Conditional maximum likelihood is used to obtain estimates of β (conditional on household-
specific totals, T y¯kv =
∑T
t=1 ykvt). For count data panel models there is no incidental param-
eters problem, so the coefficient estimates will be consistent as long as the conditional mean
assumption, equation (2.13), holds (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Estimates for the perfect
labor market scenario and for the corner labor market scenario are displayed with clustered
standard errors at the village level to account for heteroskedasticity in the error term. Es-
timates for the constrained labor market scenario are displayed with block-bootstrapped
standard errors where I block-bootstrap (500 replications) over both the first-stage shadow
wage estimates and second-stage demand estimates.
2.6 Estimation Results
I now proceed to estimation of equations (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7). The perfect labor market
scenario, equation (2.5), is estimated using the observed sample wage to construct travel
cost, the constrained labor market scenario, equation (2.6), using estimated household-level
shadow wages, and the corner labor market scenario, equation (2.7), using firewood collection
trip time. All three estimates include household fixed-effects and use observed household
expenditure as a proxy indicator of household income.
Travel cost estimates are presented in Table 2.6. The travel cost, household size, and
household expenditure coefficients are significant in all three regressions. Most notably, the
sign on travel cost is negative in all three regressions, indicating that households in Kagera
behave rationally in deciding how many firewood collection trips to make; an increase in
household travel costs reduces the number of weekly firewood collection trips made by a
household. Additionally, the coefficient on household expenditures is positive providing
support for a positive firewood income elasticity. Surprisingly, the coefficients on price of
kerosene, price of charcoal, and the food price index are insignificant in all three regressions,
indicating that households may not have a substitute for firewood.
29
Coefficient estimates can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. Using the average shadow
wages and weights in Table 2.5, a one hour increase in travel time is correlated with, on
average, a 14 shilling increase in travel cost.15 From the estimates in column (1), holding
all else constant, a one hour increase in travel time corresponds to, on average, a 25 percent
decrease in the weekly number of household firewood collection trips. In column (2), a
one hour increase in travel time, holding all else constant, corresponds to, on average, a 17
percent decrease in household firewood collection trips over the previous week. Finally, in
column (3), a one hour increase in travel time corresponds to a 39 percent decrease in total
household trips holding all else constant. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the Poisson
fixed effects estimates, it is impossible to estimate the marginal effects of travel cost on
weekly household firewood collection trips because the marginal effects are a function of the
unobserved household characteristics captured by ηkv.16
2.6.1 Robustness Checks
In this sub-section I focus on alternative specifications of the aggregate household travel
cost model. I look at the effects of a change in the construction of the indexed travel
cost, a change in sample, and changes in the distributional assumptions of weekly firewood
collection trips.
First, I compare my results to Pattanayak et al. (2004) travel cost estimates for Indonesia.
Their analysis relied on a simpler household travel cost aggregation method. The authors
had information only on a household’s “typical trip to collect firewood” so they could not
estimate an indexed travel cost that accounts for the distribution of collection trips across
household members, as done in equation (2.10). I replicate a similar analysis. Households
where adults make the largest share of firewood collection trips are assigned a travel cost
equivalent to an adult’s travel cost (65.4 percent of observations), households where teenagers
make the largest share of firewood collection trips are assigned a travel cost equivalent to
15The average increase in travel cost for a one hour increase in travel time was calculated as: 19.24 ×
0.34 + 19.24× 0.29 + 7.19× 0.21 + 1.00× 0.11 = 13.74.
16For example, the marginal effects for adult travel costs, travel costakvt, are given by:
MEtravel costakvt =
∂E[ykvt]
∂travel costakvt
= ηkv exp(xkvtβ)βa
and ηkv is unobservable.
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a teenager’s travel cost (15.6 percent of observations), and households where children make
the largest share of firewood collection trips are assigned a travel cost equivalent to travel
time (8.1 percent of observations). Households where two groups make the largest share
of firewood collection trips are randomly assigned one of the two group’s travel costs (10.8
percent of observations).
Estimation results are presented in column (1) of Table 2.7. The coefficients on travel
cost, household expenditures, and household size remain statistically significant and in the
same directions as the coefficients reported in Table 2.6. Travel cost estimates are smaller in
absolute value when this new household majority travel cost measure is used. The difference
in the coefficient estimates between column (2) in Table 2.6 and column (1) in Table 2.7 is
not large but the corresponding per trip willingness to pay estimates are almost 20 percent
higher when the household majority travel cost is used. These results do not show strong
bias when a non-indexed travel cost is used but they do show evidence of potentially different
WTP estimates when household travel costs do not account for variations in the opportunity
costs of time across household members. More specifically, WTP estimates increase when
this simpler travel cost aggregation method is used suggesting that the indexed method used
in this paper produces more conservative WTP estimates.
In column (2) of Table 2.7 I estimate a Poisson fixed effects count model dropping
households that report having a firewood crop. These households are dropped in order to see
whether there is a differential impact of travel cost on firewood collection trips for households
that have fewer choices in where to go to collect firewood. Again, travel cost coefficient
estimates are smaller in absolute value compared to column (2) in Table 2.6. The difference
between these two estimates is in the expected direction because households without a
firewood crop have no alternative firewood sources and are likely to be less responsive to
travel costs. For example, a household that has a firewood crop may choose to collect
firewood in the local community forest if travel costs are low but when travel costs increase
the household will switch to collecting firewood from its own crop.
In columns (3) through (7) of Table 2.7, I re-run the original model assuming different
distributional and demand form assumptions. In column (3), I estimate a negative binomial
count model with household fixed effects; travel cost coefficients differ substantially from the
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original Poisson fixed-effects estimates. Because the Poisson fixed effects estimates are more
robust to distributional assumptions, the negative binomial results may be inconsistent due
to a misspecified variance.
Finally, in columns (4) through (7) I estimate household demand for firewood collection
trips as a linear function using both ordinary least squares (OLS) with household fixed effects
and ordered multinomial choice models. The ordered probit and logit models allow weekly
firewood collection trips to be a proxy for unobserved household use of forests and model
firewood collection trips on an ordinal scale, as compared to the cardinal scale modeled with
the count models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). The ordered probit and logit models are
both run as cross-sectional estimates with additional household elevation, urban dummy,
and round and village fixed-effects. The coefficient on travel cost remains significant and
negative in columns (5) and (6) but is insignificant in column (4). In the OLS fixed effects
model a 14 shilling increase in travel cost, holding all else constant, corresponds to a 0.28
decrease in weekly household firewood collection trips. In the ordered probit model a 14
shilling increase in travel cost, holding all else constant, corresponds to, on average, a 0.35
decrease in weekly household firewood collection trips, equivalent to a five percent decrease.
For the ordered logit model, the same increase in travel cost translates to a 0.71 decrease
in weekly household firewood collection trips, or an 11 percent decrease.17 Even though the
percent changes associated with these three regressions are all smaller than the estimates in
Table 2.6 they do provide further evidence that households respond rationally to firewood
collection travel costs and reduce the number of weekly firewood collection trips they make
as their travel cost increases.
2.6.2 Community Forest Valuation
One of the main advantages of travel cost models is that they provide a revealed preference
approach to measuring the value of a natural resource. The value of the natural resource
17The average change in weekly household firewood collection trips is calculated as:
E[∆trips] =
N∑
n=0
n×∆Prob[trips = n]
where N denotes the maximum number of weekly firewood collection trips made by a household in the
sample (50 trips). I hold all explanatory variables constant except travel cost, which is increased by 14
shillings.
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is measured as the consumer surplus (willingness to pay) associated with a household’s
demand for the natural resource, measured in frequency of visits. The general equation
for consumer surplus is given in equation (2.8). The exponential demand function used in
estimation can be plugged into the general household demand function y(wtf , ·) in equation
(2.8). The choke price associated with the exponential demand function is infinity and the
corresponding willingness to pay estimates (per trip) are calculated as −1/βˆ1 where βˆ1 is
the estimated coefficient on travel cost from the Poisson fixed effects count data model (Yen
and Adamowicz, 1993; Haab and McConnell, 2002).
Expected willingness to pay estimates (per trip) derived from the travel cost coefficient
estimates are given at the bottom of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 along with the 95% confidence
interval. The 95% confidence intervals are calculated from a Monte Carlo simulation using
10,000 draws from the multivariate normal distribution.18 For the main estimation results
in Table 2.6, expected WTP estimates range from 55 shillings per trip in column (1) to 84
shillings in column (2). WTP for annual access to the community forest is estimated as
the WTP per trip multiplied by the sample mean number of household firewood collection
trips.19 In this section, I discuss the welfare benefits of community forest access using
the travel cost estimates given in column (2) of Table 2.6. These results are the most
robust because they allow for the possibility of constrained labor markets and variability in
household opportunity costs of time. A test for separability (see Appendix) also rejects the
null hypothesis that observed sample wages and estimated shadow wages are equivalent at
the one percent level. The confidence interval on the WTP per trip measure also suggests
that the two estimates are different with the WTP measure from the constrained labor
market scenario almost certainly being larger than the WTP measure from the perfect labor
market scenario.
Estimates for annual household WTP (measured in 1991 shillings) for local community
18I follow Creel and Loomis (1991) and Yen and Adamowicz (1993) and use a Monte Carlo simulation
that relies on the asymptotic normality of the coefficient estimates under the assumption that the estimation
given model is the true model. I make 10,000 draws from the multivariate normal distribution with a mean
vector given by the coefficient estimates and a covariance matrix given by the estimated covariance matrix.
The Monte Carlo simulation is advantageous because the estimated confidence intervals are accurate even
if the distribution of βˆ1 is asymmetric.
19Because the unobserved household fixed effect is not estimated I cannot estimate annual WTP estimates
using the predicted number of household collection trips.
33
forest access are given in Table 2.8. The value of annual forest access to households ranges
from 24,400 shillings in round 3 to 30,100 shillings in round 1. On average, these annual
benefits translate to approximately $200 a year (2012 U.S. dollars) with a 95% confidence
interval of $140 to $356, suggesting that the benefits of forest access are always positive and
significant.20
I compare these values against household-reported values of firewood consumption. All
households in the survey were asked to value the amount of firewood that they used over
the last two weeks, including both purchased and household collected firewood. These val-
ues were then aggregated to an annual number. These two values will be equivalent if
firewood is correctly valued in the household and households are predominately using local
forests for firewood collection. Table 2.8 displays summary statistics for the annual house-
hold value of firewood consumption across all four rounds. Household-reported values of
firewood consumption are consistently lower than estimated WTP values and these differ-
ences are significant at the one percent level across all five columns. More importantly,
estimated WTP values, on average, are over twice as large as household-reported firewood
consumption values. Anecdotal evidence suggests that community forests are predominately
used by households for firewood collection – little hunting or foraging takes place on these
lands – suggesting that the majority of the benefits of local community forest access can
be attributed to its effects on firewood collection. Thus, I hypothesize that most of the
difference between the estimated benefits of forest access and firewood consumption value
can be attributed to an undervaluation of firewood on the part of households and in the
local markets. The WTP estimates associated with local community forest access appear
to provide additional information on a household’s use of local community forests that is
not captured directly in the firewood consumption survey question. This comparison also
suggests that using household-reported firewood consumption values as an estimate of the
benefits of local forests to households will lead to an undervaluation of the benefits derived
by households from forest access.
Finally, Table 2.8 includes the estimated travel cost elasticity of household firewood
20To convert 1991 Tz shillings to 2012 U.S. dollars I first use the Tanzanian consumer price index from
the International Financial Statistics to convert 1991 Tz shillings to 2012 Tz shillings (CPI index of 11.94
with a base year of 1991). I then use the average annual exchange rate for 2012 (1,583 shillings per U.S.
dollar) from the World Development indicators to convert this value to 2012 U.S. dollars.
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collection trips.21 The corresponding elasticity estimates are approximately -0.20 and add
to the growing body of literature showing that firewood consumption in many rural areas is
inelastic with an own-price elasticity between negative one and zero.
2.7 Caveats
There are two main caveats in my estimation that merit attention. First, I have no direct
measure of the relative firewood collection productivity across household members, nor of
environmental quality, so these variables are excluded from the estimation. Most obviously,
environmental quality, measured as biomass or total number of trees, is time-variant which
means that it is not fully captured by the household fixed-effect, and failure to include it
in my analysis may lead to biased coefficient estimates. Future analyses would benefit from
direct and reliable estimates of environmental quality but no such data exist for Tanzania
in the early 1990s.
Second, I estimate a regional travel cost model where the dependent variable is the total
number of household firewood collection trips independent of the site visited. Consequently,
I could not measure the benefits of any particular forest site or the effects of changing forest
quality on firewood collection trips. As mentioned earlier, community forests in Tanzania
are becoming much less dense, and even disappearing, because of poor management and
over use due to increased agricultural pressures from a growing population. These changes
have potentially profound effects on the local ecosystem and household welfare. A more
detailed multi-site travel cost estimation would allow for the analysis of different environ-
mental quality characteristics on household firewood collection decisions and provide more
information on which forest qualities households value most.
21The coefficient on travel cost represents the semi-elasticity, or:
E[ykvt|xkvt] ∂E[ykvt|xkvt]
∂travel costkvt
= β1
so an elasticity estimate is obtained by multiplying travel cost coefficient estimates by the average household
travel cost.
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2.8 Policy Implications and Conclusion
My findings show that households derive significant welfare benefits from local community
forest access for firewood collection, a predominately non-market activity. Households in
Kagera, Tanzania are willing to pay approximately 25 percent of their annual household
expenditure, or $200 (2012 U.S. dollars) a year, for access to local forests. In addition, this
WTP estimate is over twice as large as household-reported values of firewood consumption.
Most importantly, these estimates are the first set of forest access welfare estimates to be
derived for agricultural households in Tanzania. Greenstone and Jack (2013) recently recog-
nized the need for more econometric papers of this type that focus on household willingness
to pay estimates for environmental quality in developing countries.
For policy makers, these values suggest that recent opportunity cost estimates associated
with the UN-REDD programs in Tanzania may be significantly underestimated because they
do not incorporate the costs of forest conservation associated with non-market forest use.
With data on households’ firewood collection sites, including area and density of forest, which
unfortunately are not in the Kagera survey, one could estimate the average household’s WTP
for a hectare of local community forest and, consequently, per Mg of CO2. For example,
suppose, for the sake of illustration, that the average forest area in Tanzania is 100 hectares.
Using the estimates from this paper, a local household would be willing to pay approximately
$200 per year to maintain access to this forest, or $2 per year per hectare of forest. Assume
that with forest conservation the 100 hectares of forests store 207 Mg of CO2 per hectare and
that without forest conservation 100 Mg of CO2 are lost per hectare.22 Then, the average
local household would be willing to pay approximately $0.02 per Mg of CO2. If there are 100
households in the village, this village would be willing to pay a total of $2 per Mg of CO2, an
opportunity cost that represents a 16% increase from current UN-REDD opportunity costs
estimates (Fisher et al., 2011). Additionally, this same forest conservation program would
need to make carbon storage payments of $200 per household per year (i.e. payments for
ecosystems services) to all 100 local households to fully compensate the village for its loss
22This carbon storage figure accounts for the above ground carbon stored in an open woodlands land cover
class (Fisher et al., 2011).
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of forest access, which amounts to an increase in program costs of $20,000 per year.
To further evaluate the range of costs associated with forest conservation programs, fu-
ture research and data collection should also focus on the effects of changing community
forest landscapes. The disappearance and change in community forest landscapes is moti-
vating many households to begin to develop local tree nurseries. The most common forest
nursery is planted with Eucalyptus trees, an exotic tree species in Tanzania. Eucalyptus
trees are preferred for tree nurseries because they are one of the fastest growing hardwood
trees in the world. Eucalyptus trees, however, have a considerably higher moisture extrac-
tion rate compared to other crops and have been shown to lower neighboring crop yields
(Malik and Sharma, 1990). Consequently, future research should investigate any potential
negative effects of Eucalyptus plantations on local crop yields. Attention should also be
paid to the distributional consequences of tree plantations on the landless households and
households that lack adequate land to establish a tree plantation.
Second, the decision of who collects firewood in a given household is one that deserves
further exploration. Specifically, empirical tests can be done to see if the allocation of labor
within the household is Pareto efficient. Firewood collection labor is allocated efficiently if
the relative marginal products of firewood collection are equal for all collecting household
members. In addition, future analyses should focus on the effects of increased collection time
or increased collection trips on children’s labor hours and schooling. Previous literature has
focused on the potentially adverse effects of increased collection time on agriculture output
or children’s collection burden (see Cooke, Köhlin and Hyde, 2008, for a list of relevant
studies), but very little research has focused on the effects on children’s time in school.
The travel cost model employed in this paper estimates the effects of a change in a
household’s travel cost to reach a local community forest on the number of weekly household
firewood collection trips; this demand model is a revealed preference estimation approach
that allows for the estimation of the consumer surplus associated with local community forest
access for households in Kagera, Tanzania. The travel cost construction used in my analysis
is based on an agricultural household model for which collection trips are an input into
firewood production, a household produced good. Unlike previous studies, I allow for three
distinct types of household labor, adult, teenager, and child, and show how a household level
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travel cost index can be created to estimate household level collection trips. Additionally,
I allow for the possibility of constrained labor markets and estimate household wages using
a household profit function, similar to the approach laid out in Jacoby (1993). My analysis
also takes advantage of four rounds of panel data and the ability to control for time-invariant
unobserved household characteristics. Ultimately, this paper highlights the importance of
revealed preference tools for measuring the benefits of non-market environmental services to
households in developing countries.
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Table 2.1: Household Firewood Use Summary Statistics
Survey Round
1 2 3 4 Total
Household uses firewood 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Household collects firewood 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.87
(0.30) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.33)
Household has firewood crops 0.16 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.23
(0.37) (0.44) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Household has income from firewood sales 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11)
Household has firewood in stock 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Observations 840 849 858 828 3375
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Sample Summary Statistics
Survey Round
1 2 3 4 Total
Household profit, TSh (log)a 11.76 10.87 10.72 10.52 10.97
(2.03) (1.62) (1.51) (1.59) (1.76)
Land acres (log) 0.94 0.99 1.03 1.03 1.00
(0.91) (0.89) (0.86) (0.93) (0.90)
Value of livestock, TSh (log)a 5.77 6.25 5.96 6.15 6.03
(4.63) (4.49) (4.55) (4.40) (4.52)
Average household education (log) 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.33 1.33
(0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (0.73) (0.71)
Business assets, TSh (log)a 2.01 2.38 2.73 2.58 2.42
(3.87) (3.98) (4.00) (4.04) (3.98)
Value of variable inputs, TSh (log)a 8.95 8.26 7.61 7.15 8.00
(2.72) (2.12) (2.21) (2.68) (2.54)
Adult male annual labor hours (log) 7.24 6.98 6.96 6.86 7.01
(0.95) (0.96) (0.93) (0.99) (0.96)
Adult female annual labor hours (log) 7.27 6.97 6.98 6.98 7.05
(0.83) (0.90) (0.87) (0.84) (0.87)
Teenager annual labor hours (log) 2.62 2.79 2.99 2.80 2.80
(3.26) (3.20) (3.23) (3.16) (3.21)
Child annual labor hours (log) 1.25 1.55 1.87 1.69 1.59
(2.54) (2.68) (2.86) (2.73) (2.71)
Household firewood collection trips 6.90 6.06 5.60 6.15 6.18
(6.31) (5.84) (5.38) (5.44) (5.77)
Household expenditure, TSh (log)a 12.51 11.66 11.60 11.53 11.83
(0.77) (0.83) (0.77) (0.82) (0.89)
Price of kerosene, TSha 79.59 75.01 81.40 101.83 84.29
(15.85) (15.57) (17.42) (22.64) (20.73)
Price of charcoal, TSha 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Food price index, TSha 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.16
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Household size 5.79 5.69 5.71 5.68 5.72
(3.08) (3.01) (3.12) (3.22) (3.10)
Female household head 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
Average household education 4.47 4.57 4.61 4.60 4.56
(2.82) (2.85) (2.78) (3.03) (2.87)
Members with restricted activity 0.58 0.67 0.69 0.60 0.64
(0.78) (0.81) (0.88) (0.77) (0.81)
Household owns bicycle 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.33
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
Survey Round
1 2 3 4 Total
(0.50) (0.54) (0.60) (0.66) (0.58)
Household owns car 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21)
Household owns motorcycle 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Observations 838 848 840 811 3337
Standard deviation in parentheses. Sample does not include households that report selling wood, 38 obser-
vations.
a Values normalized to 1991 Tanzanian shillings.
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Table 2.3: Description of Variables
Variable Variable name Variable description
Household profit estimates
Profit (pi) profit Sum of profits from agriculture and non-farm
self-employment.
Fixed assets (Af )

land Number of acres of household land in cultiva-
tion.
livestock Value of household-owned livestock (TSh)a.
hh education Average years of education for adults 15 years
and older.
business Non-farm business assets (buildings, vehicles,
and tools).
Variable inputs (Av
and Lh)
variable Total cost of purchased inputs for crop pro-
duction – includes land, seed, hired labor, fer-
tilizer, pesticide, transportation, and process-
ing costs.
Household labor (Laj ) j
′s labor Member j’s (child, teenager, adult female,
or adult male) annually aggregated hours on
agriculture, livestock, fishing, and household
business activities.
Household demand for firewood collection trips
Household firewood
collection trips (y)
trips Sum of firewood collection trips in last week
across all household groups.
Travel cost (w¯tf )

sample wagej Community reported agricultural laborer day
rate for j for each round (day rate is divided
by eight to obtain hourly rate).
shadow wagej Member j’s marginal product of labor esti-
mated from household self-income function.
travel time Average time (in hours) per trip across all
household members.
Income (pi) hh expenditure Annual household expenditure (TSh) - proxy
for pi.
Prices (p)

price kerosene Price per beer bottle of kerosene (TSh) in vil-
lage v - varies across community and time.
price charcoal Price per small quantity of charcoal (TSh) in
village v - varies across community and time.
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – continued from previous page
Variable Variable name Variable description
price food Food price index using Stone price index and
mean budget share in village v - varies across
community and time.
Taste-shifters (ζ)b

hh size Household size (unweighted)
hh head Dummy variable equal to one if household
head is female, zero otherwise.
restrict Number of household members with restricted
activity in the last 7 days due to own illness
Additional controls

bike Dummy variable equal to one if household
owns bicycle, car, or motorcyle.car
motorcycle
Trip substitutability
(θ) and environmental
quality (δ) –
No direct measurement. Partially accounted
for in shadow wage estimates (θ), travel time
values (δ), and the time-invariant components
of both variables are absorbed into the house-
hold fixed effects.
Total labor (ELj ) – Accounted for in household size and house-hold fixed effects.
a Household livestock includes cattle, sheep, goats, chickens, pigs, other poultry, and rabbits.
b Household education is also included as a taste-shifter variable in the firewood collection estimates.
c TSh denotes Tanzanian shillings. All prices are expressed in terms of 1991 prices (survey round 1).
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Table 2.4: Household Profit: Ordinary Least Squares with Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Log of profit from self-employment (business and agriculture)
Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land acres (log) −0.101 −0.048 −0.100 −0.046
(0.072) (0.124) (0.073) (0.121)
Value of livestock, TSh (log) 0.009 −0.001 0.008 0.001
(0.014) (0.047) (0.014) (0.047)
Average household education (log) −0.043 −0.058 −0.051 −0.045
(0.116) (0.166) (0.119) (0.162)
Business assets, TSh (log) 0.010 −0.032* 0.010 −0.026
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020)
Variable inputs, TSh (log) 0.224*** −0.083 0.223*** −0.082
(0.026) (0.086) (0.026) (0.086)
Adult male annual labor hours (log) 0.080** −0.219
(0.039) (0.359)
Adult female annual labor hours (log) 0.110** −0.877***
(0.054) (0.290)
Adult annual labor hours (log) 0.217*** −1.475**
(0.067) (0.729)
Teenager annual labor hours (log) 0.024 −0.061 0.023 −0.063
(0.018) (0.074) (0.018) (0.073)
Child annual labor hours (log) −0.028** 0.180 −0.028** 0.209
(0.011) (0.137) (0.011) (0.182)
Adult male labor (log) squared 0.021
(0.027)
Adult female labor (log) squared 0.075***
(0.021)
Adult labor (log) squared 0.110**
(0.049)
Adult female × Child 7-11 labor −0.017
(0.012)
Adult × Child 7-11 labor −0.020
(0.018)
Teenage labor (log) squared 0.012 0.013
(0.010) (0.010)
Child labor (log) squared −0.013 −0.012
(0.012) (0.012)
Land acres squared (log) −0.017 −0.016
(0.045) (0.044)
Livestock value squared, TSh (log) 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – continued from previous page
Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household education (log) squared 0.016 0.006
(0.065) (0.065)
Business assets squared, TSh (log) 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Variable inputs squared, TSh (log) 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904
R2 within 0.183 0.222 0.185 0.222
P-value for Wald test αˆf = αˆm 0.680
P-value for Wald test αˆc = αˆt 0.016 0.019
Adult male shadow wagea 15.014 7.792
Adult female shadow wagea 16.590 15.317
Adult shadow wagea 17.243 9.944
Teenage shadow wagea 8.944 29.070 7.793 26.910
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
Note: Both estimates include additional dummies for interview month (coefficients not reported). Regres-
sions include households with reported firewood sales. Sample used for this regression is based on direct
estimates of net revenue for home-business and excludes households with negative reported incomes (141
observations total). A one is added to reported-zeros for household income, teenage labor hours, child labor
hours, non-farm business assets, household education, livestock value, land acres, and variable inputs. Only
1,904 observations have non-zero female and male labor hours.
a Shadow wages are calculated as wˆj = ∂E[ln profit]∂ lnLaj ×
ˆprofit
Laj
for j = m, f, t. Thus, for the case of the
Cobb-Douglas production function the shadow wage estimates are equivalent to wˆj = βˆj × ˆprofitLaj where βˆj
is the estimated coefficient on group j’s annual labor hours variable. Sample means reported over all 3,337
observations. In columns (2) 516 adult male, 631 adult female, and 97 teenage shadow wages are dropped
because they are estimated to be negative and, similarly, in column (4) 1,026 adult and 15 teenage shadow
wages were dropped. Child shadow wages are omitted because they are always estimated to be negative.
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Table 2.5: Travel Cost Summary Statistics Using Reported and Estimated Wages
Survey Round
1 2 3 4 Total
Adult male weight 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.34
(0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Adult female weight 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.29
(0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Child weight 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11
(0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Teenage weight 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Travel time (hours) 1.70 1.56 1.45 1.37 1.52
(1.11) (1.08) (0.90) (0.91) (1.01)
Adult shadow wage 20.11 16.86 17.31 14.61 17.24
(20.25) (21.55) (16.58) (20.38) (19.86)
Adult sample wagea 17.88 20.24 22.27 23.20 20.88
(5.72) (6.53) (8.19) (8.26) (7.52)
Teenage shadow wage 9.98 7.68 6.69 6.72 7.77
(10.83) (6.57) (5.79) (6.85) (7.88)
Teenage sample wagea 13.63 19.38 15.22 21.12 17.31
(3.76) (5.20) (4.70) (9.03) (6.70)
Travel cost (shadow wage) 23.93 16.86 15.53 13.48 17.48
(30.26) (25.81) (20.09) (48.11) (32.83)
Travel cost (sample wage) 25.05 28.21 25.27 27.04 26.39
(20.74) (24.32) (22.52) (27.09) (23.78)
Observations 838 848 840 811 3337
Standard deviation in parentheses. a Values normalized with round 1 as base prices.
Note: Predicted profits were obtained for the entire sample population by replacing the 257 households
with zero reported adult labor hours with a value of one (64 households in round 1, 68 in round 2, 62 in
round 3, and 63 in round 4). Finally, shadow wages could not be predicted for households with
reported adult or teen labor hours of zero.; these households were assigned values equal to their village
average shadow wage in a given round. This assignment resulted in the same 257 adult shadow wages
as above being replaced and 1,868 teenage shadow wages (503 households in round 1, 473 in round 2,
445 in round 3, and 447 in round 4) being replaced. In addition, there are 418 observations (82
households in round 1, 102 in round 2, 113 in round 3, and 121 in round 4) with zero reported weekly
firewood collection trips. These households receive weight, trip time, and travel cost values equal to the
village average in a given round. Sample does not include households that report positive firewood sales
(38 observations).
a Villages with missing reported wage data are given a wage equal to the sample mean for the relevant
survey round.
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Table 2.6: Household Travel Cost Estimates: Poisson Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Weekly household fire collection trips
Perfect labor
markets
Constrained labor
markets
Corner
markets
(1) (2) (3)
Travel cost (sample wage) −0.018***
(0.001)
Travel cost (shadow wage) −0.012***
(0.003)
Travel time (hours) −0.392***
(0.022)
Household expenditure, TSh (log) 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.180***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.035)
Price of kerosene 0.005 0.004 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Price of charcoal −2.267 −0.758 −4.423
(5.944) (6.804) (6.001)
Food price index 1.366 1.651 2.836
(1.936) (2.132) (2.027)
Household size 0.072*** 0.063*** 0.070***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Female household head −0.151 −0.155 −0.167
(0.131) (0.155) (0.120)
Average household education 0.013 0.001 0.008
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Members with restricted activity −0.006 −0.008 0.001
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Household owns bicycles −0.072 −0.025 −0.060
(0.052) (0.062) (0.051)
Household owns car −0.259 −0.226 −0.339
(0.308) (0.435) (0.344)
Household owns motorcycle 0.881*** 0.982 0.920***
(0.308) (1.926) (0.342)
Observations 3170 3337 3170
Log-likelihood −6200.12 −6181.72
Chi-squared 411.23 534.29
WTP per trip (Tz shillings) 55.38 83.87
WTP per trip confidence interval (95%) 50.68 – 61.30 58.89 – 147.40
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses for the perfect and
corner labor market scenarios. For constrained labor markets, standard errors are block-bootstrapped
over both the first stage (household profit function) and second stage (travel cost).
Note: Willingness to pay measures reported in local currency units (Tanzanian shillings). Households
with zero firewood collection trips in all periods were dropped from the estimation (35 households and
120 observations total) and households with only one observation (42 households) were dropped.
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Table 2.7: Household Travel Cost Estimates: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: Weekly household firewood collection trips
Poisson FE Negativebinomial FE OLS FE
Ordered
Multinomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HH
majority
No wood
crop Probit
a Logita
Travel cost (shadow wage) −0.010** −0.007*** −0.020 −0.005** −0.019***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005)
Travel cost (HH majority) −0.009***
(0.003)
Value of HH expenditure (log) 0.154*** 0.116** 0.097** 0.701*** 0.024 0.018
(0.041) (0.051) (0.045) (0.245) (0.056) (0.098)
Price of kerosene 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.017 0.013 0.023
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.031) (0.010) (0.018)
Price of charcoal 1.742 3.661 9.104* 18.847 −15.175 −31.259
(6.235) (7.518) (4.961) (42.310) (12.289) (22.349)
Food price index 0.867 0.896 −0.848 3.968 −0.260 −0.842
(2.017) (2.458) (1.159) (12.721) (4.502) (8.160)
Household size 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.017 0.459*** 0.114*** 0.196***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.097) (0.013) (0.023)
Female household head −0.175 −0.018 −0.116 −1.110 0.099 0.205*
(0.141) (0.182) (0.110) (0.945) (0.065) (0.107)
Average household education −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.030 −0.035*** −0.060***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.060) (0.011) (0.019)
Members with restricted activity −0.007 −0.011 −0.003 −0.129 0.020 0.049
(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.170) (0.027) (0.046)
Household owns bicycle −0.019 0.005 −0.062 −0.337 −0.169*** −0.237***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7 – continued from previous page
Poisson FE Negativebinomial FE OLS FE
Ordered
Multinomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HH
majority
No wood
crop Probit
a Logita
(0.060) (0.073) (0.060) (0.355) (0.048) (0.081)
Household owns car −0.206 −0.018 −0.545 −1.288 −0.318** −0.411
(0.462) (0.469) (0.451) (1.342) (0.131) (0.251)
Household owns motorcycle 0.983 0.790*** −0.318 2.813* −0.231 −0.620
(2.367) (0.212) (0.626) (1.461) (0.242) (0.468)
Observations 3175 2390 3175 3333 2379 2390
WTP per trip (Tz shillings) 112.64 100.89 134.47 152.58
WTP per trip confidence interval (95%) 73.88 – 237.76 61.50 – 273.84 86.87 – 300.68 72.29 – 1317.53
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Two stage block-bootstrap standard errors displayed for columns (1)
through (4). Cluster robust standard errors displayed for columns (5) and (6).
Note: Willingness to pay measures reported in local currency units (Tanzanian shillings).
a Columns (5) and (6) include household elevation, urban dummy, and round and village fixed effects.
Coefficients not reported.
49
Table 2.8: Estimated and Observed Wages and Incomes
Round
1 2 3 4 Total
WTP for annual forest access (1991 TSh)a 30,125.35 26,424.70 24,408.35 26,835.52 26,925.55
(27513.65) (25477.18) (23472.51) (23700.74) (25172.24)
Annual firewood consumption (1991 TSh)b 15,055.69 8,611.59 7,241.44 6,882.98 9,460.59
(13567.99) (7801.93) (5526.08) (5348.78) (9331.24)
Elasticity of trips with respect to travel cost -0.29 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.21
(0.36) (0.31) (0.24) (0.57) (0.39)
WTP as proportion of household expenditure (%) 13.62 28.86 26.14 32.70 25.27
(17.28) (37.29) (30.78) (46.67) (35.29)
Observations 835 848 840 810 3337
Standard deviation in parentheses.
a Statistic calculated as −ykvt/βˆ1. Standard deviations come from variations in ykvt in the sample population.
b Values normalized with round 1 as base prices.
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Figure 2.1: Kagera Region, Tanzania
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Figure 2.2: Weekly Household Firewood Collection Trips by Month of Interview
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Figure 2.3: Weekly Household Firewood Collection Histogram and Density
(a) Survey Round 1
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(b) Survey Round 2
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(c) Survey Round 3
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(d) Survey Round 4
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Note: Histogram and kernel density plots drop the 10 households that report more than 30 firewood
collection trips per week (3 households in round 1, 1 in round 2, 4 in round 3, and 2 in round 4).
Chapter 3
Forest Access and Human Capital
Accumulation
3.1 Introduction
Forests provide important ecosystem services to many people in Africa. Approximately
90 percent of the continent’s population uses firewood for cooking (Agyei, 1998) and 90
percent of wood used is for firewood or charcoal production (Hassan, Scholes and Ash, 2005).
Firewood is predominately collected and used outside of the formal market system with
households collecting firewood by either chopping down entire trees or particular branches.
Despite this high level of forest use in Africa, the continent is currently experiencing a decline
in its forest cover. The most recent Millennium Ecosystem Assessment estimates that Africa
accounts for over 50 percent of current global deforestation (Hassan, Scholes and Ash, 2005);
in particular, Tanzania has lost 81,000 square kilometers of forests over the last 20 years,
a 19 percent decline in forests that is equivalent to 9 percent of the country’s total area
(World Bank, 2010). Deforestation and forest degradation reduce a household’s access to
firewood and force households to devote more of their time to collecting firewood. But, time
is a limited resource, more time devoted to firewood collection makes less time available for
other household activities.
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In this paper, I test for the effects of a reduction in access to natural capital on hu-
man capital investment, human capital accumulation, and an individual’s long-term earning
potential. Specifically, I test for the effects of forest access on human capital formation
in Kagera Region, Tanzania using the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS).
Forest access may affect school attendance and human capital formation through the influ-
ence it has on time needed for firewood collection. As in the rest of the country, firewood
collection is an important component of household welfare in Kagera. Between 1991 and
1994, 95 percent of households report using firewood as the primary source of cooking fuel,
while 90 percent of households collect firewood themselves. On average, households spend
approximately eight hours per week collecting firewood and children ages 7 to 15 account
for roughly two-thirds of all household firewood collection trips. This heavy reliance on the
natural resource coupled with Tanzania’s high rate of deforestation implies that children
could be forced to compromise their school attendance as access to local forests becomes
more limited.
I use a sample size of over one thousand children ages 7 to 15 to empirically link forest
access to both school attendance and long-term human capital formation. In the short-run,
I find that a one hour increase in firewood collection trip time results in a child spending 25
minutes less in school per week, regardless of whether the child is collecting firewood him or
herself. Over the long-term, this reduction in weekly school attendance due to a one hour
increase in firewood collection time when the child is young translates into a child completing
one-fifth fewer grades 19 years later. Previous studies have estimated an 8 percent annual
return to education in Tanzania (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004), and using this rate a
one hour increase in firewood collection time implies a 1.7 percent reduction in annual income
when the child is older, or a net present value of $475 in 2010 USD over the course of 30
years. These figures are the first to attempt to quantify the impact of forest access on human
capital formation. Together they imply that there is a significant effect of reduced forest
access on educational achievement with large aggregate costs to the Tanzanian economy –
3 million cumulative years of lost education if all 15 million rural children in Tanzania were
affected.
By using a long-term panel survey, this paper also benefits from data that explicitly
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links children’s access to forests when they are young with their long-term education levels.
Most retrospective studies that look at school attendance and school achievement use cross-
sectional data sets and fail to control for unobserved individual characteristics that are likely
to lead to omitted variable bias (Glewwe, 2002). In addition, ascertaining the long-term
effects of reduced forest access on human capital accumulation is much more difficult with
cross-sectional data because the researcher only knows an individual’s forest access level (for
children 7 to 15) or the number of years of education completed by an individual (for adults).
Thus, making a causal statement about the effects of forest access when children are young
and attending school on long-term education levels is difficult empirically. I use a panel data
set covering 19 years with detailed information on children both when they are young (7 to
15 years) and when they are older (26 to 34 years) and have completed their education. For
the analysis, I track the same individuals across their lifetimes and observe how educational
outcomes differ solely based on variation in early childhood firewood collection time.
Ultimately, this paper is one of the first papers to empirically link reduced access to
natural capital with lower human capital accumulation and to quantify the magnitude of
the effects. This paper also takes advantage of a rare long-term panel survey to show that
reduced forest access at a young age has long-term effects on an individual’s education level.
A reliable derivation of this dollar-value estimate can then be used in policy development and
provide more information on the non-market costs of deforestation and forest degradation.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2, I review the literature and further high-
light the contributions made by this paper. In Section 3.3, I describe the data before
proceeding to the short-term analysis in Section 3.4 and the long-term analysis in Section
3.5. Finally, in Section 3.6, I summarize my results and provide concluding remarks.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper draws on the firewood collection and the child labor literature; there is almost
no literature that directly links forest access with school attendance and human capital
formation. The one exception is a recent paper by DeGraff, Levison and Dungumaro (2014)
that estimates the link between a child’s times fetching water or firewood and their school
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attendance. I extend on this paper by also analyzing the effects of increased firewood
collection time on long-term school completion levels.
There is a relatively large set of literature on the relationship between household labor,
firewood collection, and the environment. While much of the early literature focused on
firewood collection in South Asia, specifically Nepal, where there is a formal market for
firewood sales, more recent literature examines firewood collection labor in sub-Saharan
Africa. In what follows, I explain how this broad set of literature motivates and substantiates
two important claims that I make in this paper: First, that firewood collection time is
negatively correlated with forest access and, second, that time spent collecting firewood
affects intra-household time allocation.
In this paper, I am interested in measuring the extent to which forest access, and changes
in forest access, affect human capital formation. Forest access can be measured in two ways:
one, by directly observing the distance from a household to the nearest community forest
and the quality of that forest and, two, by observing a household’s relative use of each forest.
I measure forest access using the latter of these two methods; for each household, I measure
the amount of time a single firewood collection trip takes. Previous studies provide evidence
that better access to forests reduces firewood collection time (Cooke, 1998b; Amacher et al.,
2004; Kohlin and Amacher, 2005). But, the magnitude of a household’s response to a
change in forest access depends on whether substitute fuels are available in the local market
(Cooke, 1998b; Heltberg, Arndt and Sekhar, 2000; Chen, Heerink and Van Den Berg, 2006)
and whether there are strong off-farm labor markets (Bluffstone, 1995; Shively and Fisher,
2004; Fisher, Shively and Buccola, 2005). Thus, by measuring forest access using firewood
collection trip time I not only capture information on the quality of the forests but also
capture critical information on local markets and the availability of cooking fuel substitutes.
Second, this paper tests whether forest access, measured as firewood collection trip
time, negatively impacts school attendance and human capital formation. This hypothesis
is motivated by previous literature that has estimated the effects of increased firewood
collection time on household agricultural labor. If an increase in firewood collection time
negatively affects household agricultural labor then there is reason to believe that an increase
in firewood collection time will also negatively affect school attendance. Unfortunately, the
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evidence on the direction of the relationship between firewood collection and agricultural
labor is mixed: both Cooke (1998a,b) and Amacher et al. (2004) show that there is no effect,
while Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) show a negative effect. A second subset of literature,
however, has shown that children are more likely to leave school as local labor market
conditions improve (Duryea, 2003; Edmonds, 2007; Kruger, 2007).
An increase in firewood collection trip time may affect a children’s school attendance
regardless of whether or not the child collects firewood. There is substantial evidence that
many households in developing countries employ children in home labor activities, including
firewood collection but also fetching water, tending to livestock, and cleaning (Amacher,
Hyde and Joshee, 1993). Even though education has large social gains, it may still be
individually optimal for parents to employ a child at home in order to free up parents’
time to work in other income-earning activities (Basu and Van, 1998; Baland and Robinson,
2000). Consequently, even if children do not collect firewood themselves an increase in
firewood collection time may trigger an increase in firewood collection time for their parents.
As parents devote more time to firewood collection they may shift additional home work
onto the child so that the parents can maintain the time they devote to income-earning
activities. Thus, this study contributes to this current debate by providing an additional
piece of empirical evidence on the effects of firewood collection labor on intra-household time
allocation and school attendance.
3.3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the 1991-1994, 2004, and 2010 survey rounds of
the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS). The Kagera region (40,838 km2) lies
in the northwest corner of Tanzania on the western shore of Lake Victoria and borders
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi (see Figure 3.1). The first four survey rounds of the KHDS
were conducted once every six or seven months, between October of 1991 and January of
1994. The 2004 survey round was conducted between January and August of 2004 and the
2010 survey round between April and December of 2010. In both 2004 and 2010, the KHDS
tracked as many initial respondents as they could that had moved both within Tanzania
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and to neighboring Uganda.
For the analysis, I need a sample of children who were of school age in the initial four
survey rounds, so I focus on children who were between 7 and 15 years old during the first
survey round (October 1991 to May 1992). These children were in primary school (ages 7 to
13, grades 1 to 7) or had just started secondary school (ages 14 to 17, forms 1 to 4). Summary
statistics for this sample are presented in Table 3.3. Roughly half the sample is female with
the majority of children living in rural areas. On average, children spent approximately
15 hours per week in school in the first four survey rounds and had completed seven years
of education by 2010. By 2010, roughly 40 percent of the observed sample had moved to
another village within Kagera and roughly 20 percent have moved outside of the Kagera
region, either within Tanzania or to another country.
Firewood collection trip time is approximately one and a half hours in all of the first four
survey rounds. Trip time is measured as the average time (in hours) spent collecting firewood
per day across all household members with non-zero firewood collection trips.1 I use average
household trip time to minimize any potential measurement error in an individual’s trip time.
Children that do not collect firewood themselves but reside in a household that does collect
firewood are then assigned this average household trip time. Only 50 percent of the children
in the sample report non-zero firewood collection trips, so without this imputation I would
be forced to drop roughly 700 individuals from the analysis. In addition, households that did
not make any firewood collection trips are assigned a hypothetical trip time equal to their
village average trip time.2 As long as households that collect and do not collect firewood are
randomly located throughout the village this village average replacement will adequately
represent forest access for non-collecting households. Consequently, variation of firewood
collection trip time is at the household and time period level.
In total, there are 1,442 individuals from 621 different households in the sample, but with
1The exact survey question used to derive household trip is “How many hours did you spend collecting
firewood for each of the last seven days?” that was asked to all household members 7 years and older. Trip
time is then measured as the total number of hours an individual reports collecting firewood divided by the
number of days an individual collects firewood. Assuming individuals make only one firewood collection trip
per day, the number of trips made is equal to the number of days an individual spent collecting firewood.
2In total, 90 percent of children in each survey round have a trip time equal to their household average
trip time and only 10 percent of children live in households that make no firewood collection trips and have
a trip time equal to the village mean (9.6 percent in round 1, 5.5 percent in round 2, 11.1 percent in round
3, and 10.4 percent in round 4).
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attrition this number decreases throughout the survey rounds to a low of 881 individuals in
2004. Attrition in the first four survey rounds is low with only seven percent of individuals
leaving the survey by round four. By the 2004 survey round, however, 39 percent of the
sample was not interviewed and 30 percent by 2010, both attrition rates are relative to the
initial sample size of 1,442.3 The reduction in attrition between the 2004 and 2010 survey
rounds is largely a result of higher re-interview rates among children initially 10 to 19 years
old; only 77 percent (1,453 individuals) of surviving 10 to 19 year olds were re-interviewed
in 2004 but 84 percent (1,523 individuals) were re-interviewed in 2010 (Weerdt et al., 2012).
Attrition in the first four survey rounds is unlikely to bias coefficient estimates, but attrition
could lead to bias in the last two survey rounds, by which time over a third of individuals were
not re-interviewed had attrited. In the long-run, attrition will cause bias from self-selection
if it is non-random and correlated with long-term education levels (Baulch and Quisumbing,
2011). In the empirical analysis, I adjust for attrition with selection on observables by using
inverse probability weights (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1998).
3.3.1 Putting Kagera in Context
As described above, the data used in this paper only contain individuals that initially lived
in the Kagera region of Tanzania. Kagera is a remote area of Tanzania but households
in Kagera are comparable to the rest of the country. As shown in Table 3.1, roughly 80
percent of households in the survey live in rural areas compared to national rural population
estimates of 81 percent for the same time period (World Bank, 2010). The vast majority of
households participate in agriculture and livestock herding; over 90 percent of households
report spending time on agriculture activities in the last week and almost two-thirds of
households report spending time on livestock herding. These rates are only slightly higher
than the 1991 World Development Indicators’ estimate that 84 percent of individuals were
employed in agriculture. Most pertinent to this analysis, over 95 percent of households
report firewood as their primary source of cooking fuel in all four survey rounds and almost
90 percent of households collect firewood themselves.
Second, I compare education levels and school attendance levels in Kagera during the
3Of the 460 individuals that were not interviewed in round 4 and 2004, 51 of the cases were due to death.
There were an additional 8 deaths between the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds.
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initial four survey rounds to national education levels. As shown in Table 3.2, approximately
60 percent of sample children were enrolled in school in the first four survey rounds and
enrollment rates were almost identical for girls and boys. These estimates are slightly higher
than the primary school net enrollment rate of 50 percent estimated by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization but are not implausibly far off. In the
initial survey round, the sample of 1,442 children had completed, on average, 2.6 years of
education and this number rises to 2.9 by the fourth survey round. Across all four survey
rounds children are spending approximately 2 days a week in school totaling 14 weekly hours
(or about 6.5 hours a day in school on average). There is also little difference between males
and females in terms of the number of grades completed, hours spent in school a week, and
days spent in school a week.
These statistics demonstrate that Kagera is only slightly more agricultural than the rest
of Tanzania but school attendance is similar to the rest of country. In the initial four survey
rounds, education levels were relatively low with less than three completed grades but this
figure does rise substantially by the final survey round in 2010 (specifically 7 years, see
Table 3.3). These statistics provide evidence that the results found in this paper may be
generalizable to all of Tanzania.
In what follows, I first investigate the short-term effects of firewood collection trip time
on weekly school attendance using the 1991 to 1994 survey rounds. The empirical strategy
and results for this short-term estimation are presented in Section 3.4. I then investigate the
long-term effects of firewood collection trip time in 1991 on school completion levels using
the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds. The empirical strategy and results for this long-term
estimation are presented in Section 3.5. In both estimations, I exploit spatial and temporal
variation in firewood collection trip time (in hours) across households. Trip time is positively
correlated with a household’s distance to the forest and the greater a household’s distance to
the forest the more scarce the forest resource. Trip time could be affected by a household’s
mode of transportation to collect firewood. In Kagera, however, walking is the dominant
method of collecting firewood – less than two percent of households own cars or motorbikes
and only thirty percent of households own bicycles.
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3.4 Short-Term School Attendance Effects in 1990s
In the short-term, I investigate the extent to which an increase in firewood collection trip
time affects the number of hours each week that a child spends in school using data from the
initial four survey rounds, 1991 to 1994. An increase in time spent collecting firewood could
negatively affect weekly school attendance for both children that are and are not currently
collecting firewood. For children that are currently collecting firewood, increased collection
time forces the child to spend more time each week collecting firewood and less time each
week in school. For children that are not currently collecting firewood, increased collection
time increases the time that other household members have to spend collecting firewood
which, consequently, could cause these children to participate in additional household chores
and reduce the amount of time each week that they spend in school. As shown in Table
3.4 it is quite common for children that do not collect firewood to participate in other
household chores; over 30 percent of children do not collect firewood but do participate in
other household chores and the majority of children that do collect firewood participate in
other household chores.
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In the short-term estimation, I specify the number of hours in the last week that a child
was in school as the outcome variable. I also use a set of explanatory variables to control
for individual, village, and household characteristics that affect weekly hours a child spends
in school. Individual-level variables include current age and gender of the child. I include
village-level fixed effects to control for all time-invariant observed and unobserved village
characteristics, including whether or not the village is urban, the number of primary schools
in the village, and unobserved environmental and school access characteristics.4 I also in-
clude survey round dummies and interview month dummies for the lean season (February),
harvest season (June and July), post-harvest season (August), and school break (Decem-
ber).5
4I also ran the analysis with controls for the price of kerosene and the price of charcoal but the coefficient
on trip time was not affected by the inclusion of these variables.
5I also ran the analysis using interview month dummies for all twelve months but the coefficient on trip
time was also not affected by the inclusion of these variables.
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Household-level variables include firewood collection trip time, gender of household head,
mother’s education, father’s education, household size, and annual household expenditures
(log). Both mother’s and father’s education levels are measured using two mutually-exclusive
dummy variables. First, there is a dummy variable equal to one if the parent has some years
of primary education, but did not finish primary schooling. Second, there is a dummy
variable equal to one if the parent has either completed primary school or been educated
beyond primary school. The base category for each of the parents’ education variables is
parents who have not completed any years of schooling or have missing data. Household
size is measured as the (unweighted) number of individuals living in the same dwelling and
eating together three-quarters of the time in the last year (Ainsworth, 2004).6 Lastly, I
use annual household expenditures in the analysis as a proxy for household income because
annual expenditures are strongly correlated with annual income but have less measurement
error (Deaton, 1997).7
The general short-term model that I estimate for individual i in village v at time t has
a conditional mean given by:
E[school hoursivt|trip timeivt,xivt] = g
(
β0 + β1trip timeivt + xivtα+ γv + δt
)
. (3.1)
where xivt is vector of the individual characteristics, household characteristics, and interview
month dummies, γv denotes village fixed-effects, and δt denotes survey round fixed-effects.
The function g(·) is a general function and the form it takes will vary by the type of esti-
mation method. In this short-term analysis, I am interested in the coefficient estimate on
trip time. Specifically, if environmental access has a negative effect on school attendance
then β1 will be negative.
In choosing the appropriate estimation strategy, I need to account for not only the
censored nature of the data (no child reports spending less than zero hours per week in
6The analysis was run with separate coefficients for the number of female children, male children, female
adults, male adults, female elders, and male elders in the household but the coefficient on trip time was not
affected by the inclusion of these more expansive household size variables.
7Annual household expenditures includes food expenditures, consumption from home production, non-
food consumption, remittances sent, and wage income in kind (Ainsworth, 2004).
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school) but also for the fact that the data are highly skewed; almost 50 percent of chil-
dren report not attending school in each of the four survey rounds. Thus, the distribution
of weekly school hours is not normal but the log of weekly school hours better approx-
imates a normal distribution. In general, there are two ways to estimate a lognormally
distributed outcome variable: estimating the relationship log school hours = x′β or esti-
mating school hours = exp(x′β), where x is the set of of explanatory variables described
above. I focus my estimation on a generalized linear model with log-linear relationship using
the Poisson distribution (GLM-LL) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Nichols, 2010) that esti-
mates the relationship school hours = exp(x′β). Robustness checks are done using Tobit,
trimmed least absolute deviations (LAD), and ordinary least squares (OLS) model estimates
that model the relationship log school hours = x′β.
With the GLM-LL Poisson estimation I am estimating a special case of (3.1) where the
conditional mean follows an exponential function:
E[school hoursivt|trip timeivt,xivt] = exp
(
β0 + β1trip timeivt + xivtα+ γv + δt
)
.
The GLM-LL Poisson estimation strategy is advantageous for a number of reasons. First, by
estimating an exponential function I allow the actual realized value of weekly hours in school
to be zero (1 = e0). This result does not hold when I estimate log school hours = x′β using
an OLS or tobit model. Because the natural log of zero is undefined for these models, I must
replace zero observations with small positive numbers, η, so that they are not dropped from
the estimation. The GLM-LL Poisson estimation avoids any sensitivity of the results to the
choice of η because no transformation of the outcome variable is needed (Nichols, 2010).
Second, the GLM-LL Poisson estimation strategy produces consistent coefficient esti-
mates under a wide variety of realized distributions. Although the Poisson distributional
assumption must hold for estimates to be efficient, consistency of coefficient estimates re-
quires only that the exponential conditional mean assumption holds. A Poisson distribution
assumes that E[school hoursivt] = Var[school hoursivt], and even though the failure of this
assumption will not lead to inconsistency, it will affect standard errors (Gourieroux, Monfort
and Trognon, 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Consequently, the final estimation strategy
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that I employ in this paper is a quasi-maximum likelihood estimate (QMLE). I estimate the
model by maximizing the log-likelihood function:
logL(β) =
T∑
t=1
V∑
v=1
N∑
i=1
(
school hoursivt − exp(β0 + β1trip timeivt + xivtα+ γv + δt + ivt)
− ln school hoursivt!
)
with the assumption that the mean and variance of weekly school hours are not equal
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Practically, this estimation is done by first estimating the
Poisson model assuming a Poisson density and then calculating Eicker-White robust stan-
dard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In contrast, the tobit model requires school hours
to be lognormally distributed in order for coefficient estimates to be consistent (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2005).
Finally, because the GLM-LL Poisson estimation strategy estimates the conditional
mean, I can calculate the magnitude of the partial effect of firewood collection trip time
on the mean. While the trimmed least absolute deviation model also does not require
school hours to be lognormally distributed for consistent coefficient estimates, it only es-
timates the conditional median (Powell, 1984).8 Because the median and mean number of
hours spent in school a week are not the same, the marginal effects of these two coefficient
estimates will not be comparable. In addition, the median number of weekly school hours is
zero for two out of the four initial survey rounds so it is unclear how to interpret the effects
of an increase in firewood collection trip time on the median when the median is zero. For
these three reasons listed above, I rely on GLM-LL Poisson estimates of equation (3.1) as my
preferred estimates but also estimate tobit, trimmed LAD, and OLS models as robustness
checks; all three of these alternative models use log school hoursivt as the outcome variable.9
8As mentioned above, the tobit model requires school hours to follow a lognormal distribution in order
for consistent estimates. In addition, if school hours follows a lognormal distribution then tobit and trimmed
LAD coefficient estimates will be equal. I assume that school hours follows a log-normal distribution and
transform the variable by taking its natural log. The trimmed LAD estimates will not be affected by this
transformation because the trimmed LAD is not sensitive to outliers but the tobit and OLS estimates will
be affected by how observations of zero hours are replaced.
9Children that report spending no time in school are given a value equal to one ten-millionth less than
the minimum non-zero value.
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3.4.2 Results
Results from estimating the short-term school attendance indicate that an increase in travel
time for firewood collection leads to a reduction in the number of hours a week a child
spends in school. Results from the Poisson, tobit, trimmed LAD, and OLS estimation are
all reported in Table 3.5. In all four regressions the coefficient on firewood collection trip time
is statistically significant and negative, indicating that children spend less time per week in
school as the time it takes to collect firewood increases. The marginal effects are reported
in the second column for each model estimated in Table 3.5. These marginal effects can be
interpreted directly: using the Poisson model, a one hour increase in trip time is associated
with, on average, a child spending 24.6 (60× 0.41) minutes less per week in school, holding
all else constant. The tobit and OLS model show the same direction of effect although their
marginal effects are larger (46.2 (60× 0.77) and 36 (60× 0.60) minutes respectively).
The other coefficients in the model indicate that children spend more hours in school as
they get older (although this effect is non-linear) and as their annual household expenditure
increases. Conversely, children spend fewer hours if they are female, if they were interviewed
during the harvest season (June and July) or during school break (December). Household
size is also positively correlated with school attendance. One possible explanation is that,
after controlling for annual household expenditures, households with more children are more
easily able to distribute housework among the children throughout the week so that each
child spends more time in school.
In comparing the models, although the sign of the coefficients is the same across all four
estimation approaches, the magnitude of the effect differs. First, as expected with censored
data, the coefficient estimates from the tobit model are larger than the coefficient estimates
from the OLS estimate. The tobit estimate is also different from the trimmed LAD model,
which suggests that the normality distributional assumption in the tobit model does not hold
and thus those estimates are biased. From the trimmed LAD model, a one hour increase
in firewood collection trip time is associated with a 30 minute decrease in the conditional
median of the time a child spends in school a week. Both for ease of interpretation and
for robustness to distributional assumptions, I focus on the coefficient estimates from the
Poisson model. In the next subsection, I test the sensitivity of this model to different samples
66
and sources of variation.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
In order to investigate the extent to which the above results are sensitive to the estimation
sample and the source of variation, I run an additional suite of robustness checks. To test
whether it matters if the child collects firewood or just that his or her household collects
firewood, I run the the GLM-LL Poisson model for the sample of children that live in
households that collect firewood (“households that collect”) and for the sample of children
that collect firewood themselves (“children that collect”). I also test whether it matters if the
household collect firewood by assigning households that do not collect firewood a trip time
of zero hours instead of the village mean that was used in the initial estimates (“zero hours”).
The results from these three robustness check are displayed in Table 3.6. The coefficient
estimates in all three new estimates are negative and significant, showing that the results are
not sensitive to whether the household or child collects firewood. While the magnitude of
the effect is slightly larger for children that collect firewood themselves, the difference only
translates into an additional 5 minutes of school time lost per week. The main factor driving
the results appears to be children simply living in a household that collects firewood. These
results indicate that increased firewood collection time impacts children similarly regardless
of whether they collect firewood themselves or they simply live in households where other
members collect firewood.
Next, to test whether spatial or temporal variation in forest access is more important,
I run three different GLM-LL Poisson estimations where identification is based on intra-
village, inter-village, or temporal variation in forest access. These results are displayed in
Table 3.7. Note that in the first column identification is based on variation within villages
and this specification is equivalent to the original GLM-LL Poisson model displayed in Table
3.5. In the two additional columns, identification is based on between-village variation
(column 2) and on temporal variation (column 3). To identify the coefficient on firewood
collection trip time on between-village variation, I estimate the model holding time constant,
i.e. survey round fixed effects, and transform the outcome and explanatory variables to
be village averages so that there is no within-village variation. To identify the coefficient
67
on firewood collection trip time on temporal variation, I estimate the model holding all
individual-level variables constant, i.e child fixed effects.
Although the coefficient on firewood collection time is negative in all three columns it is
only significant in the first column (p-values of 0.99 and 0.16, respectively, for inter-village
and temporal variation) using intra-village variation. These results indicate that the biggest
driver of a child’s school attendance is the variation in trip time within a village. Changes
in trip time both across villages and across time do not lead to children spending less time
in school. I cannot, however, definitively rule out the possible significant effects of changes
in firewood collection both across villages and across time because both columns 3 and 4
suffer from omitted variable bias. The intra-village variation estimates in column 1 of Table
3.7 include both village and survey round fixed-effects and, consequently, also control for
school quality characteristics. If school quality characteristics are significant drivers of the
number of hours a child spends in school per week then the omission of these controls in
columns 2 and 3 could explain why firewood collection trip time becomes insignificant.
3.4.4 Caveats
Estimating the determinants of weekly school attendance using retrospective data in de-
veloping countries is notoriously difficult to do because of endogeneity, measurement error,
and unobservable child, household, and school characteristics (Glewwe, 2002; Glewwe and
Kremer, 2006). In this section, I discuss these three estimation problems and the potential
effects that each of them could have on my coefficient estimates.
The school that a child attends is potentially an endogenous decision that can lead to
selection bias in coefficient estimates. For example, children that are more motivated may
be able to receive scholarships to attend better schools in nearby cities or other regions. If
these children choose to leave their home village then the children remaining in the village
will be less motivated than the average student and more likely to attend school for fewer
hours per week. If the children remaining in the village are not only less motivated but are
also more likely to forgo school to collect firewood then the coefficient estimates could be
biased downward, or larger in magnitude than if the estimates include the full sample of
children. In the KHDS, only 10 percent of households report having children ages 7 to 18
68
living away in each of the first four survey rounds and the majority of children that live
away from home do so because of custody issues. Indeed, less than 1.5 percent of children
are reported as migrating for schooling in each of the first four survey rounds (less than 20
total children). Because I do not have information on the weekly school hours attendance
of children living away from home, it is not possible to test for selection bias, but with such
a small proportion of the sample living away from home for schooling selection, bias due to
endogenous school selection is unlikely to be a problem.
Second, many household surveys contain a substantial amount of measurement error
(Glewwe and Kremer, 2006). Of concern is measurement error in the explanatory variables
(random or nonrandom) which will bias coefficient estimates. Most notably, in my analysis
there may be measurement error around observed annual household expenditures and fire-
wood collection trip time. By using the household average firewood collection trip time, I
remove some of the measurement error associated with this variable but coefficient estimates
should still be interpreted with caution.
Finally, unobserved child, household or school characteristics could cause omitted vari-
able bias in my coefficient estimates. Examples of such unobserved omitted variables include
child’s motivation, parents’ emotional support for their child’s education, and a teacher’s
ability. I use data from a panel survey and run a child fixed effects model that controls
for time invariant unobserved child characteristics (column 3 of Table 3.7). The coefficient
on firewood collection trip time is still negative and of similar magnitude to the original
estimates showing that these unobserved characteristics are not biasing my coefficient esti-
mates.
The three estimation problems noted above are important empirical issues that are diffi-
cult to address with retrospective data. Furthermore, the bias that results from these issues
could lead to both over- or under-estimation of the coefficients (Glewwe, 2002). Although
my results should be interpreted with these caveats in mind, the robustness of the coefficient
estimate on firewood collection trip time across all four model specifications, varying sample
specifications, and varying levels of variation provides strong evidence that an increase in
firewood collection trip time results in a reduction in children’s weekly school attendance.
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3.5 Long-Term School Completion Effects
The short-term analysis tells us the immediate effects that firewood collection trip time has
on a child’s weekly school attendance. In order to quantify the effects of collection time
on human capital formation, it is important to know how firewood collection trip time as a
child affects an individual’s completed level of education. With a 40 week school year the
short-term effect of 24 minutes less per week amounts to a child spending almost 17 fewer
hours in school per year. And the effect could be even larger for long-term outcomes such
as grades completed if children that spend less time in school when they are young are then
more likely to get held back a grade or to drop out of school altogether. In this section, I
investigate the extent to which firewood collection trip time when a child is young affects
his or her completed years of education 13 and 19 years after survey round 1.
3.5.1 Empirical Strategy
This estimation relies on firewood collection trip time data and individual, village, and
household characteristics from the initial survey round (round 1) and on completed education
levels from the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds. I use firewood collection trip time in round
1 in order to obtain the largest possible sample of individuals and because trip time in
round 1 is positively correlated with trip time in all three of the other initial survey rounds
(Table 3.8). I specify the number of grades completed as the outcome variable. I use the
same set of individual and household characteristics that are included in the short-term
analysis.10 I also include village-level fixed effects corresponding to an individual’s village
in the first four survey rounds. In addition, I include two indicators relating to migration
decisions for individuals who no longer live in the same village as they lived in during rounds
one through four. I include a dummy variable that equals one for individuals who moved
within the Kagera region and another dummy variable for individuals who moved outside
the Kagera region, either to another region in Tanzania or to Uganda.11
10These variables are age, gender, firewood collection trip time, mother’s education, father’s education,
gender of household head, household size, and annual household expenditures.
11Because of the possibility that these variables are endogenous and chosen simultaneously with school
enrollment, I also ran the regression without these two migration variables. The coefficient on firewood
collection trip time, however, is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of these two variables.
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The first regression that I run to test for long-run school completion effects is a simple
linear regression. For individual i initially from village v the regression is:
school yearsivt = β0 + β1trip timeiv,1 + xiv,1α+ γv + εivt (3.2)
with t equal to one of the two later survey periods, 2004 or 2010. Again, xivt denotes
the vector of explanatory variables, and γv indicates village fixed-effects corresponding to
the child’s reported village from the first four survey rounds. The term εivt is assumed
to be independent and identically distributed. Similar to the short-term analysis, in the
long-term analysis I am interested in the coefficient estimate on trip time. If forest access
has a negative effect on long-term human capital formation then β1 will be negative. The
magnitude of the coefficient can be used to derive the estimated loss in education years
as a result of increased firewood collection time. This loss in education years can then be
assigned a dollar value using estimates of the return to education. I estimate equation (3.2)
twice, using both the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds have 39 and 30 percent
attrition rates, respectively. If an individual’s attrition is non-random and correlated with
long-term education levels then these attrition rates will cause bias in the coefficient esti-
mates (Baulch and Quisumbing, 2011). In the Appendix, I test for non-random attrition
using a pooling test that tests whether the coefficients in equation (3.1) are equal for attri-
tors and non-attritors (Becketti et al., 1988). I perform the test for both the 2004 and 2010
survey rounds, and for the Poisson, tobit, and log-linear models. The p-value for the F-test
that is reported at the bottom of tables B.1 and B.2 has a null hypothesis that attrition
is random. This null hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level in all six estimates
providing strong evidence that attrition is non-random.
Very generally, survey attrition that is correlated with the outcome variable of interest
results in a sample selection problem. For the case of selection on unobservables, one can use
James Heckman’s two-stage selection model (Heckman, 1979). Heckman’s model, however,
requires the researcher to identify a set of exclusionary variables that are correlated with
attrition but not with εivt in equation (3.2). However, if no exclusionary variable exists or if
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it has weak explanatory power in terms of predicting attrition then the two-stage selection
model will not adequately adjust for sample selection from attrition (Wooldridge, 2010). An
appropriate exclusionary variable in the case of attrition is often hard to come by because
few variables affect attrition without also affecting education years (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk
and Moffitt, 1998). In contrast, if selection is based on observables then inverse probability
weights can be used to correct for sample selection. Inverse probability weights rely on
auxiliary variables to explain attrition and the auxiliary variables may be correlated to both
attrition and long-term education (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1998; Baulch and
Quisumbing, 2011).
The use of inverse probability weights results in a weighted least squares estimation
strategy. More specifically, assume a linear relationship as given in equation (3.2) and that
attrition is governed by the relationship:
A∗ikt = θ0 + x
′
iktθ1 + θ2zikt + νikt where A =
1 if A∗ ≥ 00 if A∗ < 0 (3.3)
and if A∗ ≥ 0 the individual is no longer in the sample at time t. The vector xikt corresponds
to the explanatory variables given in equation (3.2) and zikt is a new auxiliary variable. The
only requirement for this selection model is that νikt and εikit are independent given the
explanatory variables x – the auxiliary variable may be correlated with long-term education.
Under these assumptions, Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) show that a weighted
least squares approach can be used to estimate equation (3.2) where the weights are given
by:
w(z,x) =
Pr[A = 0|x]
Pr[A = 0|z,x] . (3.4)
In practice, these weights are estimated by running a probit model with and without the
auxiliary variable and using an individual’s predicted probabilities from the regressions to
estimate her weight that is then used in the weighted least squares estimation.
I follow the approach laid out in both Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) and
Baulch and Quisumbing (2011) and rely on lagged variables as my auxiliary variables.
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Specifically, I include all explanatory variables, except interview month and the outcome
variable, hours in school, from the baseline round 1 survey as my auxiliary variables. I con-
struct weights separately for both the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds by running a restricted
and unrestricted probit model for each round. These probit estimates are reported in Table
3.9 for both the restricted (without auxiliary variables) and the unrestricted (with auxiliary
variables) models for survey rounds 2004 and 2010. The long-term school completion effects
regression, equation (3.2), is then run using both ordinary least squares and weighted least
squares.
3.5.2 Results
Results from this long-term model are displayed in Table 3.10. This table shows the results
from both the ordinary least squares and weighted least squares approach. Table 3.10 also
reports the ordinary least squares regression results for the sample of individuals that are
present in both the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds (columns 5 and 6).
The coefficient of interest for this paper is the coefficient on firewood collection trip time
in round 1. The coefficient is negative with a similar marginal effect in all of the estimates
and is statistically significant in four of the six estimates. In all of the results using the 2010
survey round the coefficient on firewood collection trip time is negative and statistically
significant. In these 2010 results, a one hour increase in firewood collection trip time in
round 1 corresponds to an individual completing 0.21 fewer grades when she is older. When
I look at individuals that were in both the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds the coefficient is
still significant but slightly smaller in magnitude than the estimates in columns 3 and 4.
Overall, these results show evidence that increased firewood collection trip time when
a child is younger leads to a reduction in total grades completed 13 to 19 years older. The
significance of these results implies that an increase in firewood collection trip time has two
important effects on human capital: one, an immediate effect on a child’s school attendance
and, two, a long-term aggregated effect on the education completed by that child. This
aggregated effect could result from children that miss school at a young age due to increased
collection time having more difficulty successfully completing grades or being more likely to
eventually drop out of school.
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In all six of the estimates reported in Table 3.10, annual household expenditure has a
positive and significant effect on the years of education completed by an individual. In three
of the six estimates, household size has a negative and significant effect. The weighted least
squares estimation approach has little effect on the coefficient estimates; this result is partly
due to the small difference between the unrestricted and restricted probabilities, as shown
at the bottom of Table 3.10.
3.5.3 Caveats
The outcome variable in my long-term school completion analysis is the number of grades
completed by an individual. This variable does not take into account how many years an
individual has been in school which may be larger than the number of grades completed if she
had to repeat grades. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
estimates that primary school repetition rates in Tanzania averaged 3.3 percent between 1991
and 1994, with similar rates for boys and girls. Therefore, the effect of environmental access
on human capital formation may be larger than my estimates were it to take into account
the 3 percent of children repeating grades. But given that 3 percent is a relatively low
repetition rate, the change in effect size is likely to be small.
In addition to the above-mentioned measurement error in grades completed, all of the
estimation problems described in subsection 3.4.4 continue to hold. Because this survey
tracked individuals that moved either to Uganda or another region in Tanzania, I have
information on the years of education completed for children that left their home villages
between 1994 and 2004 or 2010 in order to attend school. In contrast, in the first four
initial survey rounds no attempt was made to track individuals that moved abroad or to
other regions in Tanzania. Thus, there is likely to be less bias due to sample selection
in the long-term analysis relative to the short-term analysis since I have information on
both the children that stayed in their home villages and children that left. Measurement
error, however, may still be present in the explanatory variables and unobservable individual
characteristics could cause omitted variable bias.
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3.5.4 Quantifying the Effects
In the previous subsection I show that individuals from households with shorter firewood
collection trip times in round 1 had completed more years of education by 2010. Specifically,
individuals that took one less hour to make a firewood collection trip in round 1 had, on
average, almost a fifth of a year more of education. Combining return to education values
with the results in Table 3.10 produces a monetary value of the costs of more restricted forest
access on human capital.12 These values are displayed in Table 3.11 for ten different return
to education values ranging from one percent to ten percent. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2004) show an estimated rate of return of 7.9 and 8.8 percent to primary and secondary
schooling, respectively, in Tanzania. These numbers are in line with Duflo’s (2001) estimates
of annual returns to education in Indonesia between 6.8 and 10 percent. Thus, I focus on the
estimated value of the cost of increased firewood collection trip time with an assumed eight
percent return to education. With an assumed annual return of eight percent to education,
a one hour increase in firewood collection trip time translates into a 1.7 percent reduction in
income per year. Average household expenditure for the 2010 survey round is approximately
2.5 million Tanzania shillings so this one hour increase in trip time corresponds to household
expenditures being 42,400 Tanzanian shillings per year lower in 2010 ($30 in 2010 USD).
Assuming that individuals work, on average, 30 years and using a five percent interest rate
this loss in earnings has a net present value of $475 2010 USD.13
3.6 Conclusion
My findings show evidence that more restricted access to forests diminishes human capital
formation. I measure forest access as the average time a household member spends making
one firewood collection trip, which is positively correlated with distance to forest (Amacher
et al., 2004; Kohlin and Amacher, 2005). For the analysis, I focus on children who are 7 to
12For all of these quantifications I rely on the firewood collection trip time coefficient estimate in column
3 of Table 3.10.
13A 2010 exchange rate of 1,409.27 Tanzanian shillings to the dollar is used for all conversions. An interest
rate of 5.33 percent is used to calculate the net present value. This interest rate is the average real interest
rate in Tanzania for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. All figures come from the 2010 World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2010).
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15 years old in 1991 and 26 to 34 years old in 2010. In the short-run, an additional hour
required to collect firewood is associated with a child spending 25 minutes less in school
per week. In the long-run, an additional hour required to collect firewood when the child
is young is associated with the child completing 0.21 fewer grades 19 years later. Assuming
an average return to education of eight percent a year, this long-term result translates into
$475 2010 USD in lost earnings over 30 years, equal to roughly 1.7 percent of income.
This paper highlights one of the non-market benefits of forests, an important component
of natural capital, to households in Tanzania. Deforestation and forest degradation that
limit a household’s access to forests may negatively impact human capital formation and,
consequently, an individual’s potential earnings when she is older. In 2010, Tanzania had
approximately 15 million children ages 0 to 14 years living in rural areas and approximately
334,000 square kilometers of forest (World Bank, 2010). If, for the sake of illustration, all
households in Tanzania suffered from the same loss in access to these forests then Tanzania
would incur approximately 3 million cumulative years of lost education and $7 billion in lost
lifetime earnings. Consequently, even though a 1.7 percent loss income is not necessarily
economically significant at an individual level, the effect is large when aggregated to the
country-level.
In the future, researchers should continue to examine how forest access, and access to
other natural resources, such as water, affects human capital formation. Future studies can
provide additional evidence on both the direction and magnitude of the relationship between
environmental access and human capital formation. In addition, future studies should move
beyond self-reported forest access data and instead rely on land use and land cover geospatial
data. Firewood collection trip time is an endogenous variable to the extent that households
have a choice as to where they collect firewood. In contrast, observed forest land cover
data is exogenous and provides a clearer picture of how households respond to their natural
environment.
Both the short- and long-term estimates presented in this paper are some of the first
empirical analyses to link forest access and human capital formation in developing countries
(see DeGraff, Levison and Dungumaro (2014) for another recent paper on the topic). Papers
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of this kind are timely given the current high levels of forest use and deforestation in sub-
Saharan Africa and the current international focus on forest conservation policies. In the
region, an estimated 90 percent of the population is reliant on firewood for cooking and
human activity is one of the leading causes of deforestation (Agyei, 1998). An understanding
of the link between forest access and human capital formation is helpful for understanding
not only the full magnitude of program costs but also how best to design forest conservation
programs to prevent increases in firewood collection trip times that may then lower school
completion levels.
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Table 3.1: Kagera Summary Statisticsa
Households with children ages 7 to 15 in round 1.
1991–1994
1 2 3 4
Household farms 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.93
(0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.25)
Household herds livestock 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.66
(0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Firewood is primary source of cooking fuel 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.15)
Household collects firewood 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.89
(0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31)
Household is urban 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19
(0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
Observations 620 602 594 577
Standard deviation in parentheses.
aAll statistics reported are proportions with a 1 denoting a “yes” response and 0 a “no” response.
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Table 3.2: Education Summary Statistics
Sample of children ages 7 to 15 in round 1.
1991–1994
1 2 3 4
Enrollment rate 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.61
Males 0.60 0.66 0.66 0.64
Females 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.57
Completed years of education 2.60 2.48 2.85 2.91
(2.04) (2.12) (2.29) (2.33)
Males 2.42 2.28 2.67 2.71
(2.02) (2.05) (2.20) (2.21)
Females 2.78 2.70 3.04 3.13
(2.05) (2.17) (2.36) (2.44)
Weekly hours spent in school 14.33 14.23 15.04 15.51
(16.60) (16.26) (16.42) (16.71)
Males 14.12 14.65 15.01 16.20
(16.10) (15.96) (16.09) (16.51)
Females 14.54 13.81 15.07 14.79
(17.12) (16.56) (16.75) (16.89)
Days attended school in last week 2.22 2.22 2.29 2.30
(2.40) (2.35) (2.32) (2.33)
Males 2.28 2.34 2.34 2.43
(2.40) (2.34) (2.32) (2.32)
Females 2.17 2.11 2.24 2.16
(2.40) (2.35) (2.33) (2.32)
Observations 1,442 1,396 1,378 1,341
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Sample Summary Statistics, KHDS, Tanzania
Sample of children ages 7 to 15 in round 1.
1991–1994 2004 2010
1 2 3 4 5 6
Weekly hours spent in school 14.33 14.23 15.04 15.51
(16.60) (16.26) (16.42) (16.71)
Highest grade completed 6.90 7.26
(2.12) (2.52)
Age (years) 11.04 11.47 12.10 12.56 23.40 29.59
(2.57) (2.61) (2.58) (2.61) (2.63) (2.58)
Gender (1=female) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Firewood collection trip time (hours) 1.76 1.63 1.54 1.45
(1.15) (1.04) (0.93) (0.96)
Mother: some primary education 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.33
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.45) (0.47)
Mother: completed primary education or above 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.39 0.39
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.49) (0.49)
Father: some primary education 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.42 0.43
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.49) (0.49)
Father: completed primary education or above 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.48 0.49
(0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.50) (0.50)
Gender of household head (1=female) 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.13
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.50) (0.34)
Household size 7.84 7.53 7.48 7.39 4.80 4.57
(3.47) (3.39) (3.56) (3.56) (2.76) (2.18)
Annual household expenditure (TSh, log)a 12.75 11.87 11.82 11.79 14.37 14.53
(0.71) (0.77) (0.71) (0.75) (0.65) (0.65)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – continued from previous page
1991–1994 2004 2010
1 2 3 4 5 6
Moved within Kagera region 0.38 0.40
(0.49) (0.49)
Moved outside Kagera region 0.11 0.21
(0.32) (0.41)
Number of household deaths since last interview 1.20 0.38
(1.19) (0.65)
Number of very good years in household since last interview 0.17 0.09
(0.29) (0.21)
Number of very bad years in household since last interview 0.64 0.28
(0.57) (0.35)
Observations 1,442 1,396 1,378 1,341 881 1,008
Standard deviation in parentheses.
aAnnual household expenditure measured in 1991 Tanzanian shillings (TSh) for survey rounds 1 through 4 and 2010 TSh for the 2004 and 2010 survey
rounds.
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Table 3.4: Two-Way Tabulation: Firewood Collection and Other Household Work
Sample of children ages 7 to 15 in round 1.
Other household work
No Yes
Collects
Firewood
Round 1 (N=1,442)
No 220 547
(15.32) (38.09)
Yes 51 618
(3.55) (43.04)
Collects
Firewood
Round 2 (N=1,396)
No 143 489
(11.24) (38.44)
Yes 37 603
(2.91) (47.41)
Collects
Firewood
Round 3 (N=1,378)
No 102 454
(8.55) (38.06)
Yes 36 601
(3.02) (50.38)
Collects
Firewood
Round 4 (N=1,341)
No 96 369
(8.82) (33.88)
Yes 36 588
(3.31) (53.99)
Relative frequencies in parentheses.
Note: Other household work includes: fetching water, preparing meals, cleaning the house, doing
laundry, caring for other household members, other paid work, or helping neighbors with work.
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Table 3.5: Short-Term School Attendance Effects: Hours
Dependent variable: Number of hours spent in school last week
Poisson Tobit (log) Trimmed LAD (log) OLS (log)
βˆ ∂E[school|x]∂x βˆ
∂E[school|x]
∂x βˆ
∂E[school|x]
∂x βˆ
∂E[school|x]
∂x
Age (years) 1.148*** 13.85*** 2.202***23.08*** 1.250***18.45*** 1.025*** 15.13***
(0.095) (0.191) (0.135) (0.083)
Age squared (years) −0.044***−0.52*** −0.087***−0.91*** −0.050***−0.73*** −0.040*** −0.59***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
Gender (1=female) −0.041 −0.50 −0.188** −1.97** −0.096** −1.42** −0.087* −1.28*
(0.037) (0.086) (0.048) (0.045)
Firewood collection trip time (hours) −0.034* −0.41* −0.074* −0.77* −0.047** −0.69** −0.041** −0.60**
(0.017) (0.042) (0.024) (0.020)
Household size 0.014* 0.17* 0.045*** 0.47*** 0.016* 0.24* 0.021*** 0.31***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008)
Annual household expenditures (TSh, log) 0.123*** 1.48*** 0.274*** 2.87*** 0.199*** 2.93*** 0.151*** 2.22***
(0.036) (0.087) (0.042) (0.044)
Interviewed in February (1=yes) 0.245*** 2.96*** 0.371*** 3.88*** 0.279*** 4.12*** 0.210*** 3.10***
(0.076) (0.130) (0.097) (0.077)
Interviewed in June (1=yes) −0.439** −5.30** −0.929** −9.73** −0.951***−14.05*** −0.443** −6.55**
(0.190) (0.426) (0.232) (0.206)
Interviewed in July (1=yes) −0.568** −6.85** −0.981**−10.28** −1.101***−16.25*** −0.512*** −7.56***
(0.224) (0.393) (0.175) (0.177)
Interviewed in August (1=yes) 0.220*** 2.65*** 0.593*** 6.21*** 0.391** 5.77** 0.257*** 3.79***
(0.062) (0.139) (0.159) (0.069)
Interviewed in December (1=yes) −1.245***−15.02*** −2.566***−26.89*** −1.630***−24.06*** −1.059*** −15.64***
(0.337) (0.546) (0.147) (0.174)
Village fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
Poisson Tobit (log) Trimmed LAD (log) OLS (log)
βˆ ∂E[school|x]∂x βˆ
∂E[school|x]
∂x βˆ
∂E[school|x]
∂x βˆ
∂E[school|x]
∂x
Observations 5,557 5,557 5,557 5,557
Log-likelihood -55,753.38 -7,819.91 -8,779.05
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in paranthesis. Cluster robust standard errors used for poisson, tobit and OLS models.
Bootstrapped standard errors used for trimmed LAD model (500 replications).
Marginal effects are calculated at the mean for all three analyses. For the Poisson model the marginal effects are calculated as ∂E[school|x]/∂xk =
βk exp(x¯
′β). For the tobit model the marginal effects are calculated as ∂E[school|x]/∂xk = Φ
(
x¯′β/σ
)
βk ¯school where Φ(·) is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function. And, for the trimmed LAD and OLS models the marginal effects are calculated as ∂E[school|x]/∂xk = βk ¯school.
Additional controls include: Mother has some primary education, mother completed primary education, father has some primary education, father
completed primary education, and female is head of household.
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Table 3.6: Short-Term School Attendance Effects: Sample Size Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: Number of hours spent in school last week
GLM-LL Poisson estimation
Original
model
Households
that collect
Children
that collect
Zero
hours
Age (years) 1.148*** 1.152*** 0.918*** 1.148***
(0.095) (0.102) (0.091) (0.095)
Age squared (years) −0.044*** −0.043*** −0.034*** −0.043***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender (1=female) −0.041 −0.051 −0.029 −0.042
(0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.037)
Firewood collection trip time (hours) −0.034* −0.030* −0.044* −0.024*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014)
Household size 0.014* 0.010 −0.006 0.014*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Annual household expenditures (TSh, log) 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.119***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.036)
Interviewed in February (1=yes) 0.245*** 0.266*** 0.330*** 0.244***
(0.076) (0.079) (0.068) (0.077)
Interviewed in June (1=yes) −0.439** −0.452** −0.440** −0.438**
(0.190) (0.191) (0.204) (0.191)
Interviewed in July (1=yes) −0.568** −0.640*** −0.565** −0.567**
(0.224) (0.231) (0.268) (0.225)
Interviewed in August (1=yes) 0.220*** 0.206*** 0.211*** 0.220***
(0.062) (0.060) (0.066) (0.062)
Interviewed in December (1=yes) −1.245*** −1.290*** −1.152*** −1.247***
(0.337) (0.354) (0.350) (0.337)
Village fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,557 5,098 2,568 5,557
Log-likelihood -55,753.38 -50,963.79 -24,047.31 -55,769.08
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parantheses.
Note: All coefficient estimates rely on a Poisson estimation approach. Additional controls include:
Mother has some primary education, mother completed primary education, father has some primary
education, father completed primary education, and female is head of household.
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Table 3.7: Short-Term School Attendance Effects: Source of Variation Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: Number of hours spent in school last week
GLM-LL Poisson estimation
Intra-village
variation
Inter-village
variation
Temporal
variation
Age (years) 1.148*** 1.726** 1.335***
(0.095) (0.722) (0.112)
Age squared (years) −0.044*** −0.064** −0.049***
(0.004) (0.030) (0.004)
Gender (1=female) −0.041 0.133 −0.038
(0.037) (0.399) (0.051)
Firewood collection trip time (hours) −0.034* −0.001 −0.022
(0.017) (0.061) (0.016)
Household size 0.014* −0.026 0.051***
(0.007) (0.033) (0.010)
Annual household expenditures (TSh, log) 0.123*** 0.271*** −0.004
(0.036) (0.096) (0.026)
Interviewed in February (1=yes) 0.245*** 0.249*** 0.226***
(0.076) (0.080) (0.035)
Interviewed in June (1=yes) −0.439** −0.305 −0.416***
(0.190) (0.187) (0.060)
Interviewed in July (1=yes) −0.568** −0.541** −0.555***
(0.224) (0.240) (0.074)
Interviewed in August (1=yes) 0.220*** −0.036 0.185***
(0.062) (0.085) (0.036)
Interviewed in December (1=yes) −1.245*** −1.329*** −1.251***
(0.337) (0.363) (0.099)
Child fixed-effects No No Yes
Village fixed-effects Yes No No
Survey round fixed-effects Yes Yes No
Village averages No Yes No
Observations 5,557 5,557 5,557
Log-likelihood -55,753.38 -21,399.32 -34,289.35
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parantheses.
Note: All coefficient estimates rely on a Poisson estimation approach. Additional controls include:
Mother has some primary education, mother completed primary education, father has some primary
education, father completed primary education, and female is head of household..
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Table 3.8: Cross-Correlation: Firewood Collection Trip Time
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Round 1 1.00
Round 2 0.20 1.00
Round 3 0.19 0.18 1.00
Round 4 0.18 0.27 0.15 1.00
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Table 3.9: Attrition Probit Model
Dependent variable: Individual interviewed in survey round 2004/2010 (1=yes)
2004 Round 2010 Round
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Age in round 1 (years) −0.016 0.026 0.363**
(0.158) (0.155) (0.162)
Age squared in round 1 0.001 −0.001 −0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Gender (1=female) −0.046 −0.016 0.067 0.068
(0.081) (0.080) (0.084) (0.084)
Weekly hours spent in school in round 1 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firewood collection trip time in round 1 (hours) −0.008 −0.041 −0.006 −0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Gender of household head in round 1 (1=female) 0.071 0.005 0.170 0.166
(0.101) (0.099) (0.110) (0.110)
Age of household head in round 1 (years) −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household size in round 1 0.062*** 0.010 0.013
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Annual household expenditures in round 1 (TSh, log) −0.226** 0.010 −0.006
(0.089) (0.088) (0.087)
Mother: some primary education in round 1 −0.147 −0.248** −0.196 −0.099
(0.129) (0.125) (0.136) (0.131)
Mother: completed primary education or above in round 1 0.044 −0.005 −0.229*
(0.120) (0.116) (0.119)
Father: some primary education in round 1 0.061 0.087 −0.182 −0.214
(0.145) (0.142) (0.139) (0.140)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.9 – continued from previous page
2004 Round 2010 Round
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Father: completed primary education or above in round 1 −0.179 −0.136 −0.006 −0.093
(0.111) (0.109) (0.121) (0.116)
Number of household deaths since last interview −0.013 −0.001 −0.056 −0.074
(0.040) (0.036) (0.063) (0.062)
Average village attrition rate −2.107*** −1.256**
(0.579) (0.565)
Urban village (1=yes) 0.298** −0.105 −0.261**
(0.134) (0.124) (0.111)
Number of primary schools in village in round 1 0.043 0.091 −0.079 −0.076
(0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080)
Number of very good years in household since last interview 0.247 0.344* 0.320 0.375
(0.177) (0.184) (0.256) (0.250)
Number of very bad years in household since last interview 0.013 0.003 −0.114 −0.105
(0.069) (0.069) (0.123) (0.122)
Observations 1,334 1,346 1,319 1,319
Pseudo-R2 0.035 0.013 0.032 0.018
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.094
Baseline predicted probability 0.818 0.816 0.840 0.840
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.10: Long-Term School Completion Effects
Dependent variable: Years of education completed
2004 Round 2010 Round Individuals in both2004 and 2010 (OLS)
OLS WLS OLS WLS 2004 2010
Age in round 1 (years) −0.152 −0.197 −0.048 −0.053 −0.092 −0.232
(0.298) (0.295) (0.248) (0.250) (0.307) (0.305)
Age squared in round 1 0.007 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Gender (1=female) 0.041 0.034 −0.335** −0.342** 0.009 −0.215
(0.113) (0.115) (0.153) (0.152) (0.123) (0.144)
Firewood collection trip time in round 1 −0.157 −0.158 −0.212** −0.215*** −0.162* −0.184**
(0.095) (0.095) (0.079) (0.080) (0.084) (0.071)
Mother: some primary education in round 1 −0.760*** −0.733*** −0.563** −0.573*** −0.656*** −0.529***
(0.199) (0.203) (0.216) (0.214) (0.200) (0.192)
Mother: completed primary education or above in round 1 −0.161 −0.175 0.098 0.104 0.033 0.142
(0.203) (0.203) (0.226) (0.229) (0.205) (0.204)
Father: some primary education in round 1 −0.437* −0.452* −0.614* −0.596* −0.375 −0.234
(0.235) (0.234) (0.317) (0.318) (0.265) (0.245)
Father: completed primary education or above in round 1 0.418** 0.371* 0.133 0.150 0.605*** 0.505**
(0.198) (0.207) (0.209) (0.209) (0.203) (0.233)
Gender of household head in round 1 (1=female) 0.192 0.227 0.168 0.161 0.205 0.113
(0.197) (0.203) (0.194) (0.196) (0.186) (0.192)
Household size in round 1 −0.065* −0.068* −0.059 −0.057 −0.055 −0.078*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042)
Annual household expenditures in round 1 (TSh, log) 0.996*** 1.019*** 0.791*** 0.787*** 1.107*** 0.969***
(0.187) (0.189) (0.186) (0.186) (0.168) (0.169)
Moved within Kagera region −0.043 −0.040 0.204 0.218 −0.007 0.252
Continued on next page
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Table 3.10 – continued from previous page
2004 Round 2010 Round Individuals in both2004 and 2010 (OLS)
OLS WLS OLS WLS 2004 2010
(0.149) (0.152) (0.198) (0.199) (0.162) (0.172)
Moved outside Kagera region 1.218*** 1.243*** 2.201*** 2.218*** 1.200*** 1.933***
(0.171) (0.173) (0.283) (0.283) (0.261) (0.306)
Village fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 949 949 1011 1011 820 820
Log-likelihood -1,959.76 -1,960.712 -2,203.451 -2,206.361 -1,647.967 -1,654.863
Inverse probability weight (mean) 1.00 1.00
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.11: Quantifying the Effects
Return to education (annual)
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Lost school-days 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41 42.41
Lower bound 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52 10.52
Upper bound 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30
Lost income (percent) 0.21 0.42 0.64 0.85 1.06 1.27 1.48 1.70 1.91 2.12
Lower bound 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.53
Upper bound 0.37 0.74 1.11 1.49 1.86 2.23 2.60 2.97 3.34 3.72
Lost income, annual (100’s TSh) 53.01 106.03 159.04 212.05 265.07 318.08 371.09 424.10 477.12 530.13
Lower bound 13.15 26.30 39.44 52.59 65.74 78.89 92.04 105.18 118.33 131.48
Upper bound 92.88 185.76 278.63 371.51 464.39 557.27 650.15 743.03 835.90 928.78
Lost income, annual (USD) 3.76 7.52 11.29 15.05 18.81 22.57 26.33 30.09 33.86 37.62
Lower bound 0.93 1.87 2.80 3.73 4.66 5.60 6.53 7.46 8.40 9.33
Upper bound 6.59 13.18 19.77 26.36 32.95 39.54 46.13 52.72 59.31 65.91
Net present value (30 yrs, USD) 59.48 118.95 178.43 237.90 297.38 356.85 416.33 475.81 535.28 594.76
Upper bound 104.20 208.40 312.60 416.80 521.00 625.20 729.41 833.61 937.81 1,042.01
Lower bound 14.75 29.50 44.25 59.00 73.75 88.51 103.26 118.01 132.76 147.51
Note: Calculations are done assuming an income of 2.5 million shillings. The lower bound estimates use a β estimate of -0.053 and the upper bound
estimates use a β estimate of -0.372, i.e. the 95% confidence interval from the OLS estimates in column 3 of Table 3.10.
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Figure 3.1: Kagera Region, Tanzania
Chapter 4
Food Market Constraints and
Households’ Food and Nutrient
Consumption: Evidence from
Tanzania∗
4.1 Introduction
Households have access to foods both through the local marketplace and through home
production. If food markets work perfectly, then households are able to produce crops to
maximize agricultural profits and then purchase food in the local marketplace to maximize
household utility. An increase in the price of cash crops indirectly affects household food
consumption through a positive effect on household income; as the price of cash crops rises,
farmers will produce more cash crops and less food crops. But, because food markets work
perfectly, home produced food and purchased food are perfect substitutes and households
can supplement any drop in home-consumed food with purchased food. If food markets do
not work perfectly, however, then an increase in the price of cash crops may negatively impact
∗This paper was written in collaboration with Helen Markelova, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota
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household welfare. With imperfect food markets, home-produced food and purchased food
are no longer perfect substitutes. If an increase in the price of cash crops causes farmers to
produce more cash crops and less food crops then household food consumption may decline
because they can no longer supplement a decrease in home-produced food consumption with
purchased food consumption. In this scenario, an increase in the price of cash crops affects
food consumption both indirectly, through an increase in household agricultural profits, and
directly, through a decrease in home-produced food. In this paper, we focus on empirically
testing for the presence of food market constraints and non-separability in household food
demand.
We test for the presence of constraints in the market for food using a household dataset
from Tanzania and applying it in the context of the traditional agricultural household model.
Specifically, we test whether a household’s demand for food and a household’s demand for
nutrients are affected by the price of cash crops.1 We construct regional-level prices for five
food groups (staples, pulses, fruits/vegetables, animal products, and meal complements),
cash crops, and non-food market goods to be able to estimate a food demand system for the
five food groups, measured in kilocalories, and for eight different nutrients (protein, iron,
zinc, vitamin A, riboflavin, folate vitamin B12, and vitamin C). The latter is an innovative
approach of this paper–examining the demand for food using not just the available weight
measures, but decomposing the food groups into measures of key nutrients. Earlier papers
focused on household energy demand (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996), but few papers have
extended the analysis to include household nutrient consumption (see Abdulai and Aubert
(2004) and Ecker and Qaim (2011) from some exceptions). Ultimately, we provide evidence
for the presence of food market constraints in Tanzania and their effects on a household’s
food consumption.
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. It is one of the first stud-
ies to empirically test for the inter-dependencies between household food consumption and
household agricultural production by estimating households’ demand for food. Previous
1By "cash crops" we refer to non-food agricultural crops that are traditionally only sold in the market
place (not consumed). These markets may include local market (sales at the farm gate), national markets
(for example, supermarkets), and export-oriented production. All three types of markets can be accessed by
farming households in developing countries (Barrett, 2008).
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studies that have tested for separability have focused on households’ agricultural produc-
tion (Benjamin, 1992; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1997;
Grimard, 1997; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Le, 2010). With the exception of Tekgüç (2012),
little effort has been made to testing for separability using household food demand. Thus
this paper is important not only for corroborating the findings of previous papers (the ma-
jority of which find evidence of nonseparability) but also for providing an alternative test
that can be used to test for nonseparability. In contrast to the previous tests that rely on
extensive household agricultural production data, this test requires only limited agricultural
data (input and output prices) and data on household food consumption.
Second, this paper provides evidence on the effects of nonseparability on household food
demand. Previous literature widely acknowledges that nonseparability causes household
food demand to depend directly on agricultural prices (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1985; de Jan-
vry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991; Taylor and Adelman, 2003; Duflo and Udry, 2004).
But, previous food demand estimates in developing countries do not include any agricul-
tural prices as explanatory variables (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Abdulai and Aubert,
2004; Ecker and Qaim, 2011). We show that in the presence of food market constraints,
agricultural prices significantly affect household food demand and consequently should be
included as explanatory variables in future food demand analyses.
The results of this paper are relevant to two ongoing policy discussions. First, under-
standing the effects of food market constraints on households’ food consumption is useful
for understanding how households obtain key nutrients. Micronutrient malnutrition is now
being labeled as “the hidden hunger,” with consequences lasting for decades for children as it
leads to delayed cognitive development, increased susceptibility to diseases, and overall poor
physical development (Asare-Marfo et al., 2013). These health issues caused by micronutri-
ent deficiencies affect individual welfare and national economic growth – improved nutrition
has been linked to higher levels of human capital accumulation and increased productiv-
ity on the labor market (Deolalikar, 1988; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Welch and Graham,
1999; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006). This paper is one of the few empirical stud-
ies to emphasize that not only does health affect agricultural productivity but agricultural
production also potentially affects health (Grossman, 1972).
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Second, the traditional emphasis of development programs remains on agricultural inten-
sification and commercializations (Barrett, 2008; Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994). Beginning
in the 1950s with the onset of the Green Revolution, development programs have predom-
inately involved the introduction and promotion of new agricultural technologies, such as
high-yield crops, irrigation systems, fertilizers and pesticides. The primary focus of these
technologies and programs was on increasing both the production and sale of staples (i.e.
maize and rice) and cash crops (i.e. cotton and tobacco) in the market (Borlaug, 2007).
More recently, Feed the Future, the U.S. Government’s Global Food Security and Hunger
Initiative, focuses primarily on increasing maize and rice production in Tanzania for the
market (Bernard, Taffesse and Gabre-Madhin, 2008; U.S. Government’s Global Hunger and
Food Security Initiative, 2014). If food markets are constrained, however, then agricultural
intensification programs that generate incentives for households to produce more crops for
the market, which improve households’ income but do not address agricultural production
for home consumption, could lower household consumption of high-nutrient low-profit agri-
cultural crops and increase household micronutrient deficiency levels. To date, none of these
programs have considered the potential adverse effects that market-oriented agricultural
production may have on household health and nutrition. As shown in this paper, in the
presence of food market constraints, household food consumption, and subsequent nutrient
consumption, is affected by a household’s agricultural production decisions. Thus, agri-
culture plays a dual role in farming households in Tanzania; agricultural production not
only contributes to households’ profits but also their nutritional status (Welch and Graham,
1999).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature and further high-
lights the contributions made by this paper. In Section 4.3 we present the theoretical set-up
for the scenarios of fully-functioning and constrained markets for food. The empirical ap-
proach is discussed in the next section, followed by sections that describe the data and the
methodology used for the analyses. Then, in Section 4.6 we present the results from esti-
mating the demand systems and interpret both the statistical and economic significance of
the coefficient estimates. We then discuss in more detail the agricultural policy implications
of our results and provide some concluding remarks in Section 4.7.
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4.2 Literature Review
The conceptual foundations of this paper are rooted in the traditional agricultural household
model that describes how agricultural households in developing countries make production
and consumption decisions. The main underlying principle in this model is that, under
certain assumptions, a household’s production and consumption decisions are made inde-
pendently (see Bardhan and Udry (1999) for more details on this model). In the presence of
separability agricultural output and input prices will affect a household’s consumption deci-
sions only via their effect on farm prices (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1985; de Janvry, Fafchamps
and Sadoulet, 1991; Taylor and Adelman, 2003; Duflo and Udry, 2004). The separability
hypothesis, however has been widely tested (and rejected) by estimating a household’s agri-
cultural production behavior and testing the null hypothesis that household characteristics
do not affect farm profits (Benjamin, 1992; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Bhattacharyya and
Kumbhakar, 1997; Grimard, 1997; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Le, 2010). With nonsepara-
bility agricultural output and input prices have a direct effect on households’ consumption
decisions. Despite the evidence for nonseparability, almost no food demand models in-
clude agricultural prices as explanatory variables (for example, see Subramanian and Deaton
(1996), Abdulai and Aubert (2004), and Ecker and Qaim (2011)).
In this paper, we investigate whether cash crop prices affect consumption decisions and,
subsequently, reveal market constraints in purchasing food (and thus nutrients) on the local
market. To date, only Tekgüç (2012) has tested for nonseparability by estimating a house-
hold food demand model. In his paper, Tekgüç (2012) estimates an almost ideal demand
system for household food demand for eleven food groups.2 He then tests for separability
by including the home-produced food budget share as an additional explanatory variable; if
home-produced food is significant then there is evidence of nonseparability. In this paper, we
estimate household food demand using both household consumption and agricultural pro-
duction data. Unlike Tekgüç (2012), we use a direct measure of agricultural output prices
and do not proxy for agricultural data using self-produced food, an endogenously chosen
2The eleven food groups are: bread, cereals, meat and meat products, vegetable oils, vegetables, fruits,
dairy products and eggs, sugar, confectionary and jams, tea and coffee, non-alcoholic beverages, and other
food products.
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variable. In addition, instead of estimating food budget shares we estimate household de-
mand for energy and key micronutrients and thus provide additional information on the
implications of nonseparability for household health and nutrition.
The separability property holds only in the context of complete markets (Bardhan and
Udry, 1999). However, due to the institutional, economic, legal, and political environments
in many developing countries, households face limitations or even failures in local markets.
An earlier study by de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) provided several theoretical
arguments for the existence of pervasive food market imperfections in developing countries
as a result of poor infrastructure, high transportation costs, and price volatility; de Janvry,
Fafchamps and Sadoulet’s (1991) theoretical results have been elaborated on and empiri-
cally confirmed by findings in more recent papers as well (Fafchamps, 1992; Omamo, 1998;
Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; Barrett, 2008). In particular, through a series of simu-
lations de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) show that in the presence of food market
constraints an increase in the price of cash crops reduces household food consumption; a
10 percent increase in the price of cash crops reduces household food consumption by 0.8
percent. In this paper, following de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991), we investigate
the effects of food market constraints on household food consumption but, in contrast to de
Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991), we rely on household survey data for the analysis.
In Tanzania, there are several reasons to believe that food markets are constrained. First,
households may face food market constraints because of poor infrastructure or incomplete
market access; poor infrastructure not only makes it more costly to transport goods but also
reduces the amount of information that a farmer has on the market for a specific crop, making
transactions more risky. In Tanzania, there is substantial subjective evidence supporting the
existence of poor infrastructure; Tanzania ranked 104 out of 153 ranked countries in 2012
for the “logistics performance index” which ranks the quality of its trade and transportation.
Additionally, Tanzania has only 9 km of road per 100 km2 of land relative to the United
States’ 66 km of road per 100 km2 (Tanzania ranked 80 out of 92 ranked countries in 2011)
(World Bank, 2010).
Second, households may also face constraints in their local food markets because of their
limited ability to purchase food storage technology, such as refrigerators, combined with
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limited household access to food markets. Without refrigerators, households cannot store
perishable food items, including meats and leftovers, and will need to make daily trips to
the market in order to consume these food items (The Economist, 2014). According to
Tanzania’s most recent National Panel Survey (2010-2011) only three percent of farming
households own a refrigerator and only 25 percent have access to a daily market within their
village; households without a market in their village must travel, on average, 22 km to reach
the nearest daily market. Either one of these two situations could create a situation where
agricultural production decisions and household consumption decisions are made jointly,
leading to a breakdown in the separability property (Bardhan and Udry, 1999).
Consequently, this paper follows in the footsteps of Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985) by not
assuming separability between production and consumption decisions and then empirically
tests the validity of that assumption. Our main proposition is that in developing countries,
one of the missing or imperfect markets is the market for food, which ultimately affects a
household’s ability to purchase nutritious food.
4.3 Household Food Demand
Our conceptual framework is based on the classic agricultural household model used in
development economics (see Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Our model, however, emphasizes
household demand for food in the presence of food market imperfections, similar to the model
laid out in de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991). To begin, we consider the simple case
of household demand for food when all markets are perfectly functioning. Households receive
utility, u, from food consumption, denoted by z ≥ 0, and an aggregate non-food good c ≥ 0.
We assume that the utility function is concave in both of its arguments. Households purchase
both z and c in the local market for prices pz > 0 and pc > 0, respectively. Households
choose to produce two types of crops: a food crop, F (αzLz, βzEz, δzfz), and a cash crop,
F (αaLa, βaEa, δafa), both of which are functions of labor, Lj , land, Ej , and fertilizer, fj ,
for j = z, a. Households can choose to hire labor Lhj or work on the farm themselves L
f
j so
that Lhj + L
f
j = Lj for j = z, a. Hired labor is paid at the rate w and households have a
fixed amount of labor given by L¯ = Lfz + Lfa + Lm where Lm is household marketed labor.
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The terms αj , βj , δj for j = z, a are scalars that reflect differences in input efficiency across
food and cash crops.3 Aside from these two efficiency scalars, the agricultural production
process governing both food and cash crop production is the same and is assumed to be
strictly concave in labor, land, and fertilizer.4
For simplicity, we assume that hired and home labor are perfectly substitutable and that
labor markets are fully functioning so that the households do not face any labor constraints
in agricultural production decisions. We assume that there are no land rental markets and
that households also have a fixed amount of agricultural land, E¯, that they can choose to
plant with either food crops (for example, orange flesh sweet potatoes), or cash crops (such
as tobacco).5 Finally, cash crop agricultural production can be sold in the market for the
price pa > 0, food crops can be sold for pz > 0, and fertilizer is bought at the price pf > 0.
Thus, the full household problem is given by:
max
z,c,Lhz ,L
f
z ,Lha ,L
f
a ,Ez ,Ea,f,Lm
u(z, c)
subject to:
pzz + pcc = pzF (αzLz, βzEz, δzfz) + paF (αaLa, βaEa, δafa)−
∑
j=z,a
(
wLhj + pffj
)
+ wLm + y
E¯ = Ez + Ea
Lj = L
h
j + L
f
j for j = z, a
L¯ = Lfz + L
f
a + L
m
z, c, Lhz , L
f
z , L
h
a, L
f
a , Ez, Ea ≥ 0
where y is exogenously-determined non-labor household income. With perfectly functioning
labor markets, if the household buys labor it does not sell labor (i.e.
∑
j=z,a L
h
j > 0 then
Lm = 0) and if the household sells labor it will not buy labor (i.e. Lm > 0 then
∑
j=z,a L
h
j =
0). As long as Lfj > 0 for j = z, a the theoretical implications of the effects of imperfect
3The distinction between food and cash crop production is important because it allows households to
grow crops that they can’t consume but that have high market value (e.g. tobacco or cotton).
4In addition, we assume that ∂F/∂Lj(0, Ej , ·) = ∞ and ∂F/∂Ej(Lj , 0, ·) = ∞ for j = z, a to avoid the
case of a corner solution where the household will choose to produce only one of the two goods.
5This assumption is in line with observed land use in Tanzania. Only 1 percent of farming households
(30 households) report renting out land and only 6 percent of households (122) report renting in land.
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food markets are unchanged. Therefore, we consider the case of the household selling labor,
Lm > 0, and not buying labor,
∑
j=z,a L
h
j = 0 and let Lj = L
f
j for j = z, a so that
L¯ = Lz + La + L
m. The alternative case of the household buying labor is derived in
Appendix C.
For the case of the household selling labor, the associated Lagrangian is:
L = u(z, c)− λ
(
pzz + pcc− pzF (αzLz, βzEz, δzfz)− paF (αaLa, βaEa, δafa) +
∑
j=z,a
pffj
− wLm − y
)
− φ(E¯ − Ez − Ea)− η(L¯− Lz − La − Lm)
Assuming an interior solution for all choice variables, the first order conditions and the
constraints are a system of twelve equations (including the budget constraint, the land con-
straint, and the home labor constraint) and twelve variables (including the three Lagrange
multipliers λ, φ, and η), and so they can be used to solve for optimal household consumption
and production levels. Specifically, the first order conditions determining optimal household
consumption and agricultural production levels are given by:
∂u
∂i
= λpi for i = z, c (4.1)
pjαj
∂F
∂Lj
= −η
λ
for j = z, a (4.2)
pjβj
∂F
∂Ej
= −φ
λ
for j = z, a (4.3)
pjδj
∂F
∂fj
= pf for j = z, a. (4.4)
w = −η
λ
(4.5)
From equation (4.1) households’ consumption decisions are determined by the prices of the
consumed goods pz and pc up until their marginal utilities are equal:
1
pc
∂u
∂c
=
1
pz
∂u
∂z
. (4.6)
And first order conditions (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) imply that land and labor are allocated
between household-produced food and cash crop production up until the point where the
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value of their marginal products are equal:
pzαz
∂F
∂Lz
= paαa
∂F
∂La
, pzβz
∂F
∂Ez
= paβa
∂F
∂Ea
, and pzδz
∂F
∂fz
= paδa
∂F
∂fa
. (4.7)
As long as pz, pc, and pa are exogenously determined prices, these first order conditions im-
ply that a household’s agricultural production and consumption decisions are not linked
and that the decisions can be made sequentially. Specifically, households first choose
agricultural land and labor inputs to satisfy (4.7) and then choose food and non-market
good consumption levels to maximize utility subject to the income constraint y + Π∗ =
pzF (αzL
∗
z, βzE
∗
z , δzf
∗
z ) + paF (αaL
∗
a, βaE
∗
a, δaf
∗
a )− pf (f∗z + f∗a ) + wLm∗, an exogenous vari-
able in the household consumption problem. Total household food consumption is given
by:
z∗ = z(pz, pc,Π∗ + y).
Most importantly, in this separable household model the price of cash crops has no direct
effect on household food consumption decisions. The sequential nature of this separable
model implies that a household’s food consumption decisions is equivalent to solving the
simplified problem:
max
z,c
u(z, c)
subject to:
pzz + pcc = Π
∗(pz, pa, pf , w, E¯) + y.
Thus, an increase in the price of cash crops will affect household food consumption decisions
only through it’s affect on Π∗ but will have no direct effect on food consumption.
4.3.1 Food Market Failures
Following de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991), we now consider household food de-
mand with a food market failure. We assume that there is no food market but that there
are complete markets for cash crops and the non-food good. Although a total failure in the
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food market is unlikely to be present, this exaggerated model best highlights a household’s
adjustments in food demand that would result even from a less severe constraint in the
food market. With a food market failure food is no longer traded in the market and the
household must meet all of its food needs through the production of food crops. Again,
we assume that the household sells labor and does not hire labor – the alternative case of
the household hiring labor and marketing no labor is derived in Appendix C. The adapted
household model is:
max
z,c,Lz ,La,Ez ,Ea,f,Lm
u(z, c)
subject to:
pcc = paF (αaLa, βaEa, δafa)−
∑
j=z,a
pffj + wL
m + y
E¯ = Ez + Ea
Lj = L
f
j for j = z, a
L¯ = Lz + La + L
m
z ≤ F (αzLz, βzEz, δzfz)
z, c, Lz, La, Ez, Ea ≥ 0.
The adapted Lagrangian for this constrained household problem is:
L = u(z, c)− λ
(
pcc− paF (αaLa, βaEa, δafa) +
∑
j=z,a
pffj − wLm − y
)
− φ(E¯ − Ez − Ea)− η(L¯− Lz − La − Lm)− µ
(
z − F (αzLz, βzEz, δzfz)
)
.
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At an interior solution, the first order conditions governing food consumption and agricul-
tural production decisions are now:
∂u
∂z
= µ (4.8)
∂u
∂c
= λpc (4.9)
αz
∂F
∂Lz
= −η
µ
(4.10)
paαa
∂F
∂La
= −η
λ
(4.11)
βz
∂F
∂Ez
= −φ
µ
(4.12)
paβa
∂F
∂Ea
= −φ
λ
(4.13)
δz
∂F
∂fz
=
λ
µ
pf (4.14)
paδa
∂F
∂fa
= pf (4.15)
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A household’s decision of how much food crops to produce is now directly affected by the
household’s food consumption preferences through first order conditions (4.8), (4.9), (4.10),
and (4.11):
∂u
∂z
=
pa
pc
∂u
∂c
βa∂F/∂Ea
βz∂F/∂Ez
. (4.17)
Consequently, in this constrained problem the price of cash crops now affects household
food consumption both through it’s direct effect on z and it’s indirect effect on household
agricultural profits. Total household food consumption is given by:
z∗ = z
(
pc, pa, pf ,Π + y
)
where Π(pz, pa, pf , w, E¯) = paF (αaLa, βaEa, δafa) − pf (fz + fz) + wLm is still household
agricultural profits.
If the food market constraint does not cause a complete food market failure then some
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trade in food at the price pz is still possible but food demand will continue to also be a
function of the price of cash crops. In the case of an incomplete food market with partial
food trade household food demand is given by:
z∗ = z
(
pz, pc, pa, pf ,Π + y
)
. (4.18)
In this paper, we proceed by not assuming the complete failure of food markets and instead
estimate equation (4.18).
Since one of the objectives of the paper is to test for the existence of constrained food
markets, we take advantage of the fact that, controlling for income, household demand for
food is a function of the price of cash crops in the presence of constrained food markets
but not with perfectly functioning markets. Empirically, we estimate household demand for
food and test for the significance of the price of cash crops. In our main analysis we do not
include the price of fertilizer in our estimates because we have limited and unreliable data
on the price of fertilizers, as explained in Section 4.4.
Ex-ante, the effects of the price of cash crops on food consumption in the presence of
constrained markets is ambiguous. An increase in the price of cash crops raises income
which increases household demand for food (under the standard assumption that food is
a normal good), we call this positive effect the income effect. But, at the same time, an
increase in pa also shifts household agricultural production away from home-production
which, with constrained markets, reduces household food consumption, we call this negative
effect the agricultural substitution effect. This paper is one of the first to explicitly test for
the existence of constraints in the market for food. We believe that an understanding of
these market constraints is extremely important for informing both agricultural and health
policies.
In the following section we describe the data used for this demand analysis. In Section
4.5 we describe the estimation and in Section 4.6 we present the estimation results and
interpret both the statistical and economic significance of the coefficient estimates. We then
discuss in more detail the policy implications of our results and provide some concluding
remarks in Section 4.7.
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4.4 Data
The socio-economic data for this paper come from the 2010-2011 Tanzania National Panel
Survey. The survey contains individual, household, and community level information on
3,924 households and produces nationally representative estimates of agricultural production
and poverty for Tanzania. Because we are concerned with the relationship between household
agricultural production and food consumption, we use only households that participate in
farming. Additionally, we drop households that have unreasonable daily caloric per capita
estimates. These two restrictions leave us with a final sample size of 2,337 households.6
Most notably for the purposes of this paper, the survey contains a comprehensive food
consumption questionnaire. This questionnaire asks households for the total amount con-
sumed in the last seven days for 46 food items, including cereals, pulses, nuts, vegetables,
fruits, meats and fish, as well as the source of food consumed, including purchased and
home-produced food. In order to understand the degree to which households are nutrient
poor, we use the food consumption questionnaire to derive nutrient consumption values for
each household. In addition, we use the food consumption questionnaire to derive weekly
household food consumption values, measured in kilocalories, for five different aggregate
food groups – staples, pulses, vegetables and fruits, animal products, and meal complements
– and we construct price indices for each of the five food groups. In what follows, we describe
both the nutrient decomposition methodology and the construction of the price indices.
4.4.1 Nutrient Decomposition
In motivating this paper, we claim that identifying the presence of food market constraints
that affect household food demand is important because food is the primary source of nu-
trients. In order to better understand household nutrient consumption and the prevalence
of nutrient deficiencies in Tanzania we decompose the household food consumption data
6Roughly 38 percent of households do not participate in farming (1,416 households). We define unrea-
sonable daily caloric per capita consumption as being less than 500 kilocalories per day (29 households).
Finally, another 142 households have no observed consumption data and are dropped from the analysis. In
total, 1,587 households are dropped and the observations that could bias our results (171) only account for
seven percent farming households.
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into nutrient consumption levels. For the decomposition, we use both the FAO food de-
composition table for Kenya, Senegal, and Mexico and the United States Department of
Agriculture’s National Nutrient Database for Standard Reference.7 All of the 46 food items
were measured in grams.8 For food items in the consumption survey that contain multiple
specific foods, such as “onions, tomatoes, carrots, and green pepper,” the average nutrient
value per gram of those foods was used as the nutrient conversion rate.
To obtain population-level nutrient deficiency rates, we use data from multiple sources
to create an individual-specific data set of both recommended and required nutrient levels.
Recommended and required daily nutrient levels are created for energy (kcal), protein (g),
iron (mg), zinc (mg), vitamin A (µg RE), riboflavin (mg), folate (µg), vitamin B12 (µg) and
vitamin C (mg).9 An individual is labeled as deficient in a particular nutrient if his or her
derived nutrient consumption level is below his or her required level.
Recommended and required energy levels come from the FAO,WHO, and United Nations
University technical report “Human energy requirements” (2001). Recommended energy
levels are the amount of kilocalories necessary to maintain a normal lifestyle with a physical
activity level (PAL) of 1.75 and a body mass index (BMI) of 21. Required energy levels
are the amount of kilocalories necessary to maintain a normal lifestyle with a PAL of 1.45
and a BMI of 18.5. Ultimately, food and nutrient consumption levels are reported as daily
per capita consumption values where individual specific weights are calculated based on
kilocalorie requirement levels relative to adult males.10
Recommended and required protein levels come from the FAO and WHO technical
report “Energy and Protein Requirements” (1985). Recommended protein levels are defined
as the “safe level of protein intake” which is the protein level recommended to meet protein
needs for 97.5% of individuals in the associated age- and gender-specific population group.
Required protein levels are the “average protein intake” which is equivalent to subtracting
two standard deviations of the average protein intake from the “safe level of protein intake.”11
7The authors gratefully acknowledge Olivier Ecker for help in obtaining the FAO conversion tables. The
USDA National Nutrient Database was used only to obtain nutrient levels of standard foods, e.g. spaghetti
and canned milk.
8Each egg consumed was given a weight of 45 grams.
9The symbol µg denotes microgram, RE retinol equivalence, and mg milligram.
10The average individual weight in the survey is 0.785 adult males.
11The formula used to relate average and safe levels of protein intake is: safe = average+ (2× SD).
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The FAO (1985) reported both recommended and required protein levels in terms of grams
per kilogram of body mass. To convert these levels to grams of protein per day this reported
rate was multiplied by an individual’s weight.
For the remaining seven vitamins and minerals the recommended nutrient intake (RNI)
was reported as the recommended level of these nutrients. The RNI is the daily intake
which meets the nutrient requirements of 97.5% of individuals in the age- and gender-
specific population group. All RNI levels were taken directly from the “Vitamin and Mineral
Requirements” report published jointly by WHO and FAO (2004). The required nutrient
level was reported as the estimated average requirements (EAR), which is equivalent to two
standard deviations below the RNI. The conversion rates for converting the RNI to the EAR
were found in the “Guidelines on Food Fortification with Micronutrients” report published
by WHO and FAO (2006).
Per capita daily food and nutrient consumption levels for the 2,337 households in the
2010-2011 Tanzania survey are reported in Table 4.1.12 This table shows that many Tanza-
nians are deficient in a number of different nutrients, most notably iron, zinc, and vitamin
B12. Our nutrient decomposition reveals that 37 percent of Tanzanians are undernourished
– a statistic that is in line with the FAO (2008) estimate of undernourishment in Tanzania at
44 percent for 2001-2003. In addition, the table shows that, on average, almost 75 percent
of an individual’s daily energy needs are met through consumption of staple foods, with
maize and rice being the two largest sources of nutrients – both of which are poor sources
of vitamins A, B12, and C.
4.4.2 Food Group Price Construction
In order to perform a demand analysis for household food demand we also need to construct
food price indices. We estimate household demand for five mutually exclusive food groups –
staples, pulses, fruits/vegetables, animal products, and meal complements – and, therefore
we require a group-specific price index for each of these five food groups measured in Tan-
zanian shillings (TSh) per kilocalorie. In addition, we also calculate an overall food price
12Households that reported consuming more than 5,000 kilocalories per day were assigned nutrient con-
sumption levels equal to the 99th percentile for any food group where reported nutrient consumption was in
excess of the 99th percentile level.
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index measuring the price of kilocalories. In this subsection, we explain the steps taken to
construct these six price indices.
To begin, each household in the survey is assigned a price per gram of food for each
of the 46 food items in the consumption questionnaire. The price per gram is equal to the
regional average of the observed district price from the price questionnaire. For the 17 food
items where no price data were collected, the price is measured as the regional average of
the household-reported purchase cost and purchase amount values from the consumption
questionnaire. Any remaining households with missing price data were assigned the sample
average price.
A food-specific price per kilocalorie was then created by dividing the price per gram
by the amount of kilocalories per gram for each food item, obtained from the FAO food
decomposition tables described above. The price per kilocalorie is measured in terms of
Tanzanian shillings per kilocalorie for food item k:
pk,kcal =
pk
kcalk
=
TSh
gram
× gram
kcal
=
TSh
kcal
.
From the nutrition decomposition, we know the amount of kilocalories that household n in
village v consumed through food k, kcalknv. This amount is then multiplied by the price per
kilocalorie of food k, pk,kcal to obtain a measure of household expenditures on kilocalories
from food k, piknv = kcalknvpk,kcal.
After having obtained food-specific prices measured in Tanzanian shillings per kilocalorie
we construct a price index for each of the five food groups using a Stone index (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980). We use the Stone price index instead of the Paasche, Laspeyres, or
Fisher index because we have prices from only one point in time and it is the only one of
these four indices to not require a set of base period prices in its construction. With the
Stone index, the price of food group i is a weighted average of the price per kilocalorie for
each of the K food items in food group i:
pi = exp
(
K∑
k=1
w¯jk∑
j w¯jk
pk,kcal
)
(4.19)
where w¯jk is the mean household budget share spent on food j, measured in kilocalorie
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expenditures.13 Ultimately, this Stone index price construction results in six food related
price indices: price per kilocalorie of food, price per kilocalorie of staples, price per kilocalorie
of pulses, price per kilocalorie fruits and vegetables, price per kilocalorie of animal products,
and price per kilocalorie of meal complements.
4.4.3 Market and Agricultural Prices
In addition to the food price indices, household food demand estimation also requires price
indices for non-food market goods and for cash crops. In this subsection, we describe the con-
struction of these two final price indices and the derivation of the price of three agricultural
inputs – organic fertilizer, inorganic fertilizer, and pesticides.
Non-Food Market Goods Price Index
Non-food market goods consist of all goods in the community price questionnaire that are
not food items. This restriction results in the inclusion of three goods into this price index:
kerosene, charcoal, and maize grinding costs. All costs are expressed in Tanzanian shillings
per gram before being indexed together. We obtain the prices for all three of these goods
from the price questionnaire and again use the regional average price as a household’s price.
Household expenditures on each of the three goods were obtained directly from the household
non-food expenditure questionnaire. We then construct the price index for non-food market
goods using a Stone price index identical to the index formula in equation (4.19).
Cash Crops Price Index
To construct the cash crop price index, we focus on agricultural crops that households
produce solely for sale in the market and that are never consumed at home. Ultimately, only
three crops meet these criteria and are used in the construction of the cash crop price index:
cotton, sesame, and tobacco. Overall, nine percent of households (214) report selling at
least one of these three crops and they account for 13 percent of total household agricultural
sales.
13Using the notation from above and, assuming the survey has N different households, we have:
w¯jk =
1
N
∑
v
∑
n
piknv
Πnv
=
1
N
∑
v
∑
n
kcalknvpk,kcal
Πnv
where Πnv denotes total household expenditure for household n in village v.
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The selling price per gram harvested for each crop is defined as the household-reported
value of sales divided by the household-reported quantity (in grams) of sales. All households
receive the regional average of these derived sale prices. We again use a Stone index to
construct the price index but for this construction the weights are no longer household
budget shares. For the cash crop price index, the weight used for crop k in the Stone index
construction is the share of crop k sold, in Tanzanian shillings, out of the total value of all
crops sold.
Agricultural Input Prices
Finally, the theoretical model displayed in equation (4.18) shows that in the presence of food
market constraints household food demand is a function of both the price of cash crops and
the price of agricultural inputs, including the price of fertilizer. Although the survey collects
information on the amount of organic fertilizer, inorganic fertilizer, and pesticide used there
is no direct question on the price of these purchased inputs. We calculate the price of an
input as the amount spent on the input divided by the total amount used. Households are
then assigned the regional average of these constructed prices. The survey, however, asks
households for how much of each input was used and the total amount spent to purchase
each input but not on the amount of each input that was received at a subsidized price or
with a voucher. Because almost 50 percent of households report receiving vouchers these
prices may be significantly overstated. Consequently, we include the price of fertilizers and
pesticides as a sensitivity check but not as explanatory variables in the main estimation
results.
The prices and weights (budget and harvest share weights) for all eight price indices are
displayed in Table 4.2 along with the prices of the three agricultural inputs. Overall, food
costs, on average, 0.8 Tanzanian shillings per kilocalorie. The most expensive food group
per kilocalorie is vegetables and fruits, with an average price of 3.5 Tanzanian shillings per
kilocalorie. Staple foods are the cheapest source of energy, with a price of 0.3 Tanzanian
shillings per kilocalorie. The average price (per gram) of non-food marketed goods is 0.5
and the average price of cash crops is 1.7 Tanzanian shillings per gram.
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Data Limitations
The nutrient decomposition method outlined above has certain drawbacks that could lead to
measurement error in our observed food and nutrient consumption levels. In this subsection,
we highlight some of those drawbacks and explain in what ways they may or may not affect
our results.
All household surveys must deal with the issue of identifying the appropriate recall
period. A long recall period increases the chance of an error in response by the household
while a short recall period does not provide an accurate picture of a household’s average food
consumption (Clarke, Fiebig and Gerdtham, 2008). The Tanzania National Panel Survey
uses a seven-day recall period for the food consumption questionnaire, which should limit
measurement error from recall bias. Finally, households in the survey are questioned over all
12 months of the year so even with the seven-day recall period the survey will still provide an
accurate picture of annual household nutrient consumption levels (Ecker and Qaim, 2011).
Second, the food decomposition process involves assumptions about the amount of food
being consumed and the type of food. While we adjust food consumption for non-household
members who ate inside the home, we still assume that all food reported on the consumption
questionnaire is consumed by the household. If households store food or give food to neigh-
bors then this assumption will lead to an overestimation of total food consumption (Bouis,
1994; Ecker and Qaim, 2011). We also have information only on total household food con-
sumption, so in order to construct per capita consumption levels we assume that food is
distributed equally among household members based on caloric needs. This intra-household
food distribution method could lead to an over or underestimation of per capita consumption
depending on the true intra-household distribution of food (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990).
Finally, the 46 food items reported in the food consumption questionnaire contain groups
of foods whose nutrients need to be aggregated together for the nutrient decomposition. For
example, the food consumption questionnaire asks households for the amount of “onions,
tomatoes, carrots and green pepper” that the household consumed in the last seven days.
In order to decompose this response into nutrients we assume that the household consumed
equal amounts of onions, tomatoes, carrots, and green pepper and average together the nu-
tritional makeup of each of the four foods. If, in reality, the households diet was unbalanced
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then this methodology will lead to erroneous nutrient consumption levels. A more detailed
food consumption questionnaire could decompose these food item groups further but is also
likely to suffer from more measurement error due to recall bias.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the nutrient decomposition methodology em-
ployed in this paper, and previously in Ecker and Qaim (2011), is an important step in
gathering more detailed information on household nutrient deficiencies and food consump-
tion patterns. From this decomposition method we can assess not only which nutrients
household members are over- or under-consuming but also the food sources on which house-
holds rely to obtain different nutrients.
4.5 Empirical Setup
To empirically test for the presence of constrained food markets we estimate households’
demand for food. Food demand estimates are typically performed in one of two ways. First,
food demand is estimated based on the share of a household’s budget spent on food using
an almost ideal demand system (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Ecker and Qaim, 2011;
Tekgüç, 2012). While this approach follows a standardized demand analysis, estimating a
household’s food budget share is less accurate when households consume food that is grown
at home and never purchased in the market. As shown in Figure 4.1, households in Tanzania
consume a large amount of home-produced food: close to 60% of staple food consumption
is obtained from home production. With large amounts of home-produced food a more
accurate way to measure household food demand is by estimating household demand for
energy, measured in kilocalories directly. In this paper, we estimate household demand for
energy using an approach similar to the one laid out by Subramanian and Deaton (1996);
household kilocalorie demand is a function of household income, household characteristics,
market prices and, unlike Subramanian and Deaton (1996), agricultural output prices. In
Section 4.6.3, we also estimate household demand for nine micronutrients to test for the
differential effects that food market constraints may have on micronutrient consumption.
We divide food into five categories - staples, pulses, fruits and vegetables, animal prod-
ucts, and meal complements - and estimate the demand for each food group. We estimate
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demand for household daily per capita food consumption measured in kilocalories for each
of the five groups. We chose this unit of measurement because kilocalorie consumption is
highly correlated with total food consumption, measured in grams (see Table 4.3), is pos-
itively correlated to consumption of all other household nutrients (Table 4.3), and is one
of the components of food that a household can most easily judge when making food con-
sumption decisions.14 The coefficient estimates are also more comparable across food groups
when using kilocalorie consumption as the outcome variable because a kilocalorie of energy
from staple foods is equivalent to a kilocalorie of energy from pulses. In Section 4.6.3, we
explore the the effect of food market constraints on a household’s nutrient consumption by
estimating households’ demand for nutrients.
In our main estimates, the outcome variable is measured as the daily per capita kilo-
calorie consumption from food group i by household n in village v, and the demand for
kilocalories is given by:
calinv = βi0 + p
′
cal,vβ1 + βi2pnonfood,v + βi3pcash crops,v + βi4income
+ βi5household characteristicsnv + βi6village characteristicsv + inv (4.20)
As shown in Section 4.3, constrained food markets exist if, after controlling for household
income, βi3 6= 0. As noted in Section 4.3, the effect could be positive or negative depending
on whether the agricultural substitution effect or income effect dominates. If there are no
constraints in the local food market then after controlling for household income the price of
cash crops will have no effect on per capita household food consumption.
The three price variables included in equation (4.20) correspond to the notation from
Section 4.3, with the omission of the price of agricultural inputs. The price of food, pcal,
is a five unit vector containing the five food group price indices: staples, pulses, fruits and
vegetables, animal products, and meal complements. The price of aggregate non-food market
goods, pnonfood, is the price index of the three most commonly purchased non-food items:
kerosene, charcoal, and maize grinding costs. Finally, the price of cash crops, pcash crops, is a
price index of the three most commonly sold non-food crops: cotton, sesame, and tobacco.
14For example, households might also make food consumption decisions based on personal taste preferences
but this component of food choice is unobserved.
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Exact construction of these price indices is given in Section 4.4.2.
For the entire demand system, we use the same set of explanatory variables to control
for household, village, and market characteristics. We use annual household expenditures
as a proxy for both a household’s agricultural profits and non-labor income because annual
expenditures is highly correlated to annual income but suffers from less measurement error
(Deaton, 1997). Additional household controls include household size (kilocalorie adjusted
based on an individual’s kilocalorie requirement relative to adult males), proportion of chil-
dren in the household, and a dummy equal to one if the household head is female. We
also include month of interview dummies to control for seasonality in prices. Unfortunately,
because the variation in the prices is at the regional level we cannot include any village
fixed-effects. In order to control for village-level variables that will also affect prices we
include a dummy equal to one if the household lives in an urban area, household distance
to the nearest trunk road, and household distance to the nearest town of 20,000 or more
people.15
Summary statistics for all household, village, and market characteristics are displayed in
Table 4.4. These summary statistics show that the average household size is 5 individuals,
with a calorie-adjusted size of 4. On average, 40 percent of household members are children
and roughly 25 percent of household heads are female. In terms of geographic location, only
15 percent of households are classified as living in urban areas, the average distance to the
nearest town of 20,000 or more people is 51 kilometers and, on average, households live 22
kilometers away from the nearest trunk road.
To estimate this demand system we use a system feasible generalized least squares ap-
proach (Zellner, 1962; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The major advantage of using an SFGLS
approach is not only that it estimates the full variance-covariance matrix associated with
our demand system but that we can use this matrix to test cross-equation restrictions. This
feature is especially beneficial for this paper because we wish to test for the joint significance
of the price of cash crops for all five food groups, i.e. βˆ1,3 > 0, βˆ2,3 > 0, . . . , βˆ5,3 > 0. In
the analysis, we run this test for joint significance of the home-production variables using a
15We also tested all estimation results without these village-level variables in case they are significantly
correlated with the price of cash crops. The coefficient on price of cash crops is not significantly different
with the inclusion or exclusion of these controls.
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Wald test (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 172).
Ultimately, we rely on a seemingly unrelated regression but estimate it using an SFGLS
approach so that we can obtain the full variance-covariance matrix. System feasible gen-
eralized least squares (SFGLS) is more efficient than equation by equation ordinary least
squares if components of the error vector, [1nv, 2nv, . . . , nv9], are correlated. In a system of
demand equations, like the ones estimated in this paper, it is likely that any random shock
to household k in village v that affects the demand for staples will also affect the demand
for pulses, leading to correlation of the error terms. If, however, the same set of explana-
tory variables are used in all estimated equations, as in this paper, then SFGLS reduces to
equation by equation ordinary least squares estimates.
With the SFGLS approach, the vector of coefficients is estimated as:
βˆ =
(∑
v
∑
n
x′nvΩˆ
−1
nvxnv
)−1∑
v
∑
n
x′nvΩˆ
−1
nv calnv
For our analysis we use a two-step SFGLS approach, where Ωˆ = 1/N
∑
n
∑
v ˆnvˆ
′
nv, with
cluster robust standard errors:
Var[βˆ] =
(∑
v
∑
n
x′nvΩˆ
−1
nvxnv
)−1∑
v
∑
n
x′nvΩˆ
−1
nv ˆnvˆ
′
nvΩˆ
−1
nvx
′
nv
(∑
v
∑
n
x′nvΩˆ
−1
nvxnv
)−1
.
In the analysis, we report standard errors from a 500 replication block bootstrap. We
block bootstrap the robust standard errors at the cluster level to account for any additional
heteroskedasticity in the data and the sampling procedure where first-stage sample selection
was done at the cluster level.
4.6 Results
Overall, these results provide evidence for the presence of constraints in the market for
staple foods and little evidence of constraints in the other four food markets. Results
from the main SFGLS estimation are presented in Table 4.5. The price of cash crops is
significant in household demand for staple foods only, and the Wald test fails to reject
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the null hypothesis that the price of cash crops is not significant across all five equations.
This significance provides some evidence for the non-separability of food consumption and
agricultural production decisions, but stronger evidence for the non-separability of staple
consumption and agricultural production decisions. Constraints in the market for staple
foods and not other food groups are plausible because staple foods are the food group that
accounts for the largest share of households’ energy consumption (75 percent) and the largest
share of households’ agricultural harvest (30 percent), measured in value harvested.
Because the coefficient on the price of cash crops is negative for staples, these results
provide evidence that for staples the agricultural substitution effect dominates the income
effect. As the price of cash crops rises households produce more cash crops, less home-
produced food, and, because of food market constraints, total consumption of staples falls.
A direct interpretation of the coefficient estimates shows us that a doubling in the price of
cash crops from 1.771 to 3.542 Tanzanian shillings per kilocalorie results in a reduction in
staple food consumption by 177 kilocalories per day.
Examining the additional control variables in Table 4.5 we see that an increase in house-
hold size is associated with a reduction in daily per capita food consumption across all five
food groups. This result supports the findings of Deaton and Paxson (1998), who showed
evidence for no economies of scale in households and that larger households do not consume
more per capita. Urban households also consume less food, but households with higher
annual expenditures consume more food. Finally, household distance to the nearest town
is positively associated with consumption of staples and pulses – as households live farther
away from town they obtain, on average, more energy from the consumption of staples and
pulses.
Finally, we see that, in contrast to standard demand theory, the own price coefficients
for staples, pulses, and vegetables and fruits are positive and none of the five own price
coefficients are statistically significant. Both de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991)
and Taylor and Adelman (2003) show that in the presence of food market constraints the
impact of food prices on food demand is muted. Specifically, for staples and pulses a large
share of households are net sellers of staples and pulses. Table 4.6 displays the proportion
of households that buy and sell, and that are net buyers and net sellers, for each of the food
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groups that are also agricultural crops (staples, pulses, vegetables/fruits). Almost 30 percent
of households are net sellers of staple foods and pulses. For these households, an increase in
the price of staples or pulses could have a positive effect on household food demand because
the price increase raises their incomes. For vegetables and fruits, however, over 95 percent
of households are net buyers and the own-price coefficient is also positive but insignificant.
The positive price for vegetables and fruits can partially be explained by the difference in
consumption patterns for the food group; urban households consume more vegetables and
fruits than rural households (75 kilocalories per day versus 66, significant at the five percent
level) and there is little difference in the price of the food group between the two areas. In
addition, urban households purchase 70 percent of their vegetables and fruits while rural
households purchase only 50 percent. Therefore, one explanation for the positive own-price
coefficient on vegetables and fruits in the presence of food market constraints is that it is
driven by urban households that not only consume more of the good but that also purchase
more of the good.
4.6.1 Agricultural Input Prices
In Table 4.5 we tested for non-separability by examining whether the price of cash crops
significantly affects household food demand. As shown in Section 4.3, if household con-
sumption and production decisions are non-separable then agricultural input prices will also
affect household food demand. We did not include the price of fertilizers and pesticides in
our initial estimation results because we believe these price data are not reliable. In this
subsection, however, we run an additional test for non-separability (see Table 4.7) where
food demand is a function of the price of cash crops and the price of three agricultural
inputs: organic fertilizer, inorganic fertilizer, and pesticides.
Table 4.7 corroborates the findings in Table 4.5. The coefficient estimates for the price
of cash crops are almost identical to those reported in Table 4.5 and estimates for the other
explanatory variables in Table 4.5 are also unaffected. Of the three input price variables, the
price of organic fertilizers is the largest in magnitude and is also significant in the demand for
staple foods. Again, we reject the null hypothesis that these agricultural prices are jointly
significant across all five demand estimates. Even though these results tell a similar market
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constraint story to the one told by Table 4.5, we rely on Table 4.5 as our main results. Not
only are the input prices overestimated but also only 31 percent of households report using
either organic or inorganic fertilizer and only 13 percent of households use pesticides.
4.6.2 Household Expenditures and Measurement Error
In Section 4.5 we mention that we use household expenditures to proxy for household annual
income because household expenditures suffers from less measurement error. In reality,
annual household expenditures may still contain substantial measurement error. It is difficult
for any individual or household to accurately report the correct amount of all education, non-
food, household, and food costs that they have incurred over the last week, month, or year.
With this classical measurement error in one explanatory variable coefficient estimates from
the initial estimates in Table 4.5 will be biased towards zero (Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz,
2001). In order to account for this measurement error in household expenditures we run an
additional estimate instrumenting for annual household expenditures.
To attempt to remove the measurement, we estimate the system of five equations with
instrumental variables using a generalized method of moments three-stage least squares
estimator (GMM 3SLS) (Wooldridge, 2010). In order for our instruments to be plausible we
need them to explain some of the variation in household expenditures but to be uncorrelated
with the error term, inv. For our instruments, we focus on vectors of fixed assets that
are highly correlated with household expenditures but that do not affect household food
demand. Specifically, we use instruments that measure a household’s resource endowment for
agricultural production, such as the number of adult males, adult females, girls, boys, acres
of land cultivated, number of livestock owned, home ownership, water source, light source,
cooking fuel, and sewage disposal (Jacoby, 1993).16 These resource endowment variables are
fixed endowments that are not correlated with short-term agricultural production shocks but
are correlated with expected agricultural profits. The second set of instruments are asset
holdings which take time to accumulate and are not easily sold in the short-run (Pattanayak
16The exact set of of these resource endowment instruments are: number of males 16 and older, number of
females 16 and older, number of males 15 and younger, number of females 16 and younger, number of acres
of land cultivated, number of livestock owned, home ownership dummy (1 if own, 0 otherwise), water source
dummy (0 if from river lake, or rainwater, 1 otherwise), light source dummy (1 if electric, 0 otherwise),
cooking fuel dummy (0 if firewood, 1 otherwise), and sewage disposal dummy (0 if none, 1 otherwise).
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et al., 2004). Specifically, we include the number of phones and the number of televisions
owned by a household. These two assets are not expected to directly affect food demand
but are the first two assets that households buy once they have more expendable income
(The Economist, 2014).
The GMM 3SLS is a GMM estimator with the weighting matrix:
wˆ =
(
1
N
∑
v
∑
n
z′nv
(
1
N
∑
v
∑
n
uˆnvuˆ
′
nv
)
znv
)−1
where uˆnv are the residuals from the first stage equation (see Table D.1 in the Appendix
D). And, the coefficient estimates are given by:
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This GMM 3SLS is asymptotically efficient as it places no restrictions on the unconditional
and conditional variance matrix of unv, i.e E[unv] and E[unv|znv], respectively (Wooldridge,
2010). To account for heteroskedasticity in the error terms, we estimate the demand system
using block bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). In the case that our instru-
ments contain no measurement error, or that any measurement error in the instruments is
uncorrelated with the measurement error in annual household expenditures, estimates from
this three-stage least squares estimate will be unbiased.
Estimation results for the instrumental variable model are displayed in Table 4.8. The
cash crop price index is still significant and negative in household demand for staple foods
but, as expected, is now larger in relative magnitude. In this new set of estimates a doubling
in the price of cash crops results in a reduction in staple food consumption by 240 kilocalories
per day.
These results show that even after controlling for the endogeneity of income the price
of cash crops significantly affects household staple food demand. Thus, market constraints
appear to play a role in a household’s agricultural and consumption patterns. In the following
subsection we test for the presence of market constraints in household nutrient consumption
and discuss the health implications of our results.
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4.6.3 Household Nutrient Consumption
As noted in the Introduction, one of the primary reasons why policy-makers will care about
the presence of food market constraints is that they may have negative health and devel-
opment repercussions. In the literature review, we cite evidence for the link between poor
health, specifically nutrient deficiencies, and delayed or stunted cognitive and physical de-
velopment. In this subsection we test for non-separability between a household’s nutrient
consumption and agricultural production decisions. Specifically, we run a series of nine de-
mand estimates for kilocalorie, protein, iron, zinc, vitamin A, riboflavin, folate, vitamin B12,
and vitamin C. All explanatory variables are identical to the variables used in Table 4.5.
Results, displayed in Table 4.9, show that the price of cash crops significantly affects a
household’s daily per capita kilocalorie and vitamin A consumption. For these estimates the
price of cash crops is also jointly significant at the five percent level. These results provide
a final piece of evidence for the presence of food market constraints in Tanzania. Even after
controlling for household income, an increase in the price of cash crops results in households
consuming less total kilocalories per day. These results are especially relevant to current
health policies because over 80% of households in Tanzania are estimated to be iron deficient
and anemia affects over 25% of the global population (1.6 billion people) (HarvestPlus,
2014). Although understanding the exact mechanisms of this food substitution is beyond
the scope of this paper these results provide an important first-step into understanding the
link between food consumption, the types of foods consumed, and nutrient consumption
in Tanzania, and developing countries more broadly, where an estimated 40 percent of the
population does not meet their daily caloric needs and even more individuals suffer from
micro-nutrient deficiencies (see Table 4.1).
4.7 Conclusion
Globally, Africa is frequently identified as a region with an agricultural production “yield-
gap.” To address this yield-gap, the majority of agricultural development programs currently
operating in Tanzania, such as Feed the Future, focus on intensification through increased
production of maize, rice, or tobacco or through commercialization of agricultural crops (see
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a 2006 special issue of European Journal of Development Research). The overall focus of
these programs has been on increasing agricultural production for the market with little
focus on health and nutrition (see Hawkes and Ruel (2012) for the one exception). Climate
change further complicates this issue; scientists have recently provided substantial evidence
that wheat, rice, field peas, soybeans, and maize grown in areas with higher levels of CO2
have lower concentrations of iron and zinc (Myers et al., 2014). As shown in this paper,
however, a household’s agricultural production decisions are intimately linked to its food
consumption levels, and subsequently nutrient consumption. Indeed, households in Tanzania
make agricultural production decisions based not only on maximizing farm profits but also
on household food needs. Consequently, this “yield-gap” in African agricultural production
may not be so much a productivity gap but rather a rational response by households to food
market constraints.
To test for the presence of constraints in local food markets, we estimate the demand
of Tanzanian households for five food groups—staples, pulses, vegetables and fruits, animal
products, and meal complements—as a function of cash crop prices. It is one of only two
papers to test for food market constraints using household food demand estimates. Unlike
Tekgüç (2012), we incorporate both food consumption and agricultural production data.
Our results show that there is a significant effect of the price of cash crops on demand for
staples, which points to the presence of imperfections in the market for food. These results
are robust to both incorporating the price of fertilizers and pesticides and to instrument-
ing for household income. In all of these additional estimates, an increase in the price of
cash crops significantly reduces household consumption of staple foods. Overall, we show
evidence for the presence of market constraints in Tanzania that create inter-dependencies
between household food consumption and agricultural production. This result is in contrast
to previous estimates that have not included agricultural prices as explanatory variables
in a household’s demand for food (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Abdulai and Aubert,
2004; Ecker and Qaim, 2011). Future analyses that estimate food demand in Tanzania, and
perhaps sub-Saharan Africa more broadly, should account for this nonseparbaility in their
demand estimates with the inclusion of agricultural prices.
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Table 4.1: Daily Per Capita Food and Nutrient Consumption and Prevalence of
Nutritional Deficiencies (N=2,337)
Quantity
(g)
Calories
(kcal)
Protein
(g)
Iron
(mg)
Zinc
(mg)
Staple foods 785.3 2026.0 39.8 14.2 8.0
Maize 343.4 1026.2 23.6 9.7 5.1
Rice 111.1 403.2 7.4 0.7 1.2
Other cereals 110.5 171.3 3.2 1.4 0.6
Cereal products 23.7 64.4 1.6 0.2 0.1
Cassava 124.5 291.6 2.4 1.8 0.7
Potatoes 72.1 69.3 1.5 0.5 0.3
Pulses 72.8 202.0 12.0 3.0 1.6
Regular beans 58.6 120.2 8.6 2.4 1.2
Groundnuts 11.4 64.7 2.9 0.5 0.4
Other nuts 2.7 17.1 0.5 0.1 0.1
Vegetables and fruits 212.5 79.3 2.5 1.3 0.4
Onions and tomatoes 82.5 24.8 0.9 0.4 0.2
Green leafy vegetables 61.5 15.5 1.1 0.7 0.1
Bananas 14.5 13.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
Fruits 47.2 25.6 0.4 0.1 0.1
Animal products 126.7 274.9 25.3 1.3 2.2
Eggs 1.6 2.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
Fish 23.3 26.1 5.0 0.2 0.1
Red meat 17.7 50.5 3.8 0.4 0.6
White meat 40.6 115.6 10.9 0.6 0.7
Other meat 8.6 15.5 1.2 0.1 0.2
Milk and dairy products 35.1 64.9 4.3 0.1 0.5
Meal complements 120.1 311.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
Fat and oil 20.9 184.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar and sweets 48.9 109.9 0.0 0.1 0.0
Condiments 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Beverages 39.2 16.7 0.2 0.0 0.0
Total 1239.7 2686.5 79.8 19.9 12.2
Recommendations 2677.4 42.8 40.6 15.1
Requirements 2216.9 34.3 27.2 12.6
Prevelance of deficiency (%) 37.1 11.4 79.7 64.4
Continued on next page
124
Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Vit. A
(µg RE)
Riboflavin
(mg)
Folate
(µg DFE)
Vit. B12
(µg)
Vit. C
(mg)
Staple foods 60.6 0.8 173.2 0.0 88.3
Maize 0.0 0.6 96.1 0.0 4.0
Rice 0.0 0.1 6.7 0.0 0.0
Other cereals 46.7 0.1 23.2 0.0 8.6
Cereal products 0.8 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0
Cassava 13.1 0.0 33.4 0.0 66.8
Potatoes 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.0 8.8
Pulses 12.0 0.1 170.4 0.0 5.3
Regular beans 11.8 0.1 154.3 0.0 5.2
Groundnuts 0.0 0.0 14.4 0.0 0.0
Other nuts 0.2 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.1
Vegetables and fruits 587.5 0.1 68.8 0.0 60.3
Onions and tomatoes 289.2 0.0 13.8 0.0 19.5
Green leafy vegetables 256.7 0.1 41.4 0.0 16.8
Bananas 1.2 0.0 2.8 0.0 1.3
Fruits 40.3 0.0 10.7 0.0 22.6
Animal products 551.6 0.4 20.5 3.8 1.9
Eggs 3.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
Fish 10.0 0.0 2.6 0.3 0.0
Red meat 486.7 0.1 7.7 2.8 0.4
White meat 15.8 0.1 2.0 0.1 0.0
Other meat 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.2
Milk and dairy products 35.8 0.2 6.8 0.5 1.3
Meal complements 0.2 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.0
Fat and oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar and sweets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Condiments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Beverages 0.2 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.0
Total 1211.9 1.5 435.5 3.8 157.8
Recommendations 677.9 1.3 435.0 2.6 51.1
Requirements 484.2 1.1 348.0 2.2 41.7
Prevelance of deficiency (%) 36.9 41.6 47.7 65.4 17.7
Note: All amounts are sample means of daily per capita food and nutrient consumption levels.
125
Table 4.2: Price Index Summary Statistics
Price Budget/Harvest Share
Food group price indices (TSh/kcal)
All foods 0.820
(0.093)
Staple foods 0.325
(0.031)
Maize 0.258 0.195
(0.060) (0.199)
Rice 0.309 0.066
(0.026) (0.087)
Other cereals 0.510 0.051
(0.122) (0.124)
Cereal products 0.697 0.019
(0.155) (0.040)
Cassava 0.248 0.062
(0.041) (0.144)
Potatoes 0.631 0.025
(0.102) (0.059)
Pulses 0.546
(0.091)
Regular beans 0.610 0.052
(0.132) (0.075)
Groundnuts 0.350 0.015
(0.043) (0.042)
Other nuts 0.608 0.006
(0.181) (0.044)
Vegetables and fruits 3.519
(0.833)
Onions and tomatoes 4.750 0.069
(1.258) (0.898)
Green leafy vegetables 2.652 0.034
(0.957) (0.056)
Bananas 0.927 0.006
(0.264) (0.021)
Fruits 1.427 0.018
(0.490) (0.047)
Animal products 1.961
(0.343)
Eggs 3.674 0.004
(0.334) (0.012)
Fish 3.508 0.051
(0.990) (0.112)
Red meat 1.449 0.031
(0.265) (0.060)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
Price (TSh/g) Budget/Harvest Share
White meat 1.843 0.092
(0.454) (3.258)
Other meat 2.367 0.017
(0.303) (0.066)
Milk and dairy products 0.507 0.016
(0.127) (0.047)
Meal complements 1.305
(0.152)
Fat and oil 0.336 0.036
(0.039) (0.325)
Sugar and sweets 0.565 0.032
(0.058) (0.040)
Beverages 3.948 0.020
(0.666) (0.060)
Non-food market goods price index (TSh/g)
Non-food market goods 0.486
(0.056)
Kerosene 1.595 0.070
(0.235) (0.075)
Charcoal 0.386 0.022
(0.102) (0.075)
Maize grinding 0.057 0.044
(0.016) (0.053)
Cash crops price index (TSh/g)
Cash crops 1.771
(0.632)
Cotton 0.570 0.061
(0.040) (0.227)
Sesame 1.172 0.036
(0.382) (0.175)
Tobacco 54.413 0.032
(81.153) (0.173)
Agricultural input prices (TSh/g)
Organic fertilizer 0.090
(0.092)
Inorganic fertilizer 1.078
(0.362)
Pesticides 228.949
(545.856)
Observations 2.337 2.337
Note: Standard deviations in paranthesis.
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Table 4.3: Cross-Correlation: Daily Per Capita Nutrient Consumption (N=2,337)
Grams Calories Protein Iron Zinc Vitamin A Riboflavin Folate Vitamin B12 Vitamin C
Grams 1.000
Calories 0.814 1.000
Protein 0.127 0.126 1.000
Iron 0.324 0.370 0.914 1.000
Zinc 0.212 0.234 0.989 0.958 1.000
Vitamin A 0.187 0.162 0.173 0.358 0.253 1.000
Riboflavin 0.223 0.222 0.981 0.941 0.992 0.282 1.000
Folate 0.597 0.521 0.299 0.562 0.396 0.625 0.400 1.000
Vitamin B12 0.311 0.317 0.476 0.454 0.512 0.310 0.552 0.233 1.000
Vitamin C 0.283 0.216 0.033 0.251 0.104 0.842 0.116 0.672 0.017 1.000
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Table 4.4: Sample Summary Statistics
Household controls, village controls, and instruments
Mean Standard deviation
Household characteristics
Household size 5.45 3.16
Household size (calorie adjusted) 4.19 2.18
Children in household (fraction) 0.42 0.24
Household head (1 if female) 0.23 0.42
Household expenditures (log) 14.50 0.70
Village characteristics
Urban household (1 if urban) 0.15 0.36
Household distance to nearest trunk road 21.83 24.09
Household distance to nearest town (> 20,000) 51.49 40.47
Instrumental variables
Number of adult males (16 and older) 1.35 1.03
Number of adult females (16 and older) 1.48 0.91
Number of boys (15 and younger) 1.30 1.35
Number of girls (15 and younger) 1.33 1.36
Agricultural land (acres) 6.66 12.42
Number of livestock owned 5.69 20.06
Home ownership (1 if own, 0 otherwise) 0.89 0.32
Water source (0 if river, lake, or rainwater, 1 otherwise) 0.56 0.50
Light source (1 electric, 0 otherwise) 0.07 0.25
Cooking fuel (0 if firewood, 1 otherwise) 0.10 0.30
Sewage disposal (0 if none, 1 otherwise) 0.77 0.42
Number of mobile phones owned 0.82 1.09
Number of televisions owned 0.09 0.33
Observations 2,337
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 4.5: Food Demand Models: Kilocalories
Dependent variable: Daily per capita kilocalorie consumption
Staples Pulses Vegetables & Fruit Animal Products Complements
Household size (calorie adjusted) −165.55*** −25.10*** −10.38*** −72.61* −62.65***
(19.23) (4.30) (2.85) (37.53) (17.39)
Children in household (fraction) −413.99*** −98.59*** −56.44** 41.55 −72.17
(107.75) (28.04) (24.44) (164.27) (83.11)
Household head (1 if female) 20.89 25.48* 40.07 −161.02 −35.58
(53.72) (15.41) (36.96) (165.35) (44.66)
Household expenditures (log) 600.23*** 89.51*** 69.71** 267.63*** 206.57***
(43.59) (13.12) (28.29) (70.82) (20.21)
Urban household (1 if urban) −333.95*** −70.75*** −38.19 −222.67 −8.24
(71.17) (19.55) (30.14) (176.26) (43.96)
Household distance to nearest trunk road −1.58 0.41 −0.34 −3.46 2.68
(1.09) (0.48) (0.31) (3.66) (2.98)
Household distance to nearest town (> 20,000) 1.74*** 1.10*** −0.01 2.36 −1.61
(0.68) (0.26) (0.17) (2.55) (1.36)
Price of staples (TSh/kcal) 117.47 −703.58** −307.16 −2612.46 −1157.15
(835.81) (326.54) (246.62) (2754.88) (1069.92)
Price of pulses (TSh/kcal) −213.67 50.49 −9.41 −626.82 −33.32
(327.07) (105.90) (57.33) (664.92) (159.57)
Price of fruits/vegetables (TSh/kcal) 80.65** −21.17* 23.07 −73.81 16.28
(34.94) (11.83) (15.07) (54.87) (65.97)
Price of animal products (TSh/kcal) −1.34 95.27*** 35.82 −86.98 −34.58
(83.31) (32.75) (45.22) (96.52) (71.01)
Price of meal complements (TSh/kcal) 175.53 232.89*** 3.20 298.84 −222.67
(198.97) (64.41) (26.41) (193.12) (413.70)
Cash crops price index (TSh/g) −99.83** −6.20 15.96 213.69 7.63
(50.07) (16.15) (11.16) (200.89) (20.01)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Staples Pulses Vegetables & Fruits Animal Products Complements
Non-food market goods price index (TSh/g) 1062.34** −312.46** 41.38 −1741.23 −273.88
(480.16) (136.11) (59.71) (1938.86) (346.35)
Observations 2,337
Wald test (p-value) 0.176
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Block bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).
Note: Regression also contains month of interview dummies. Coefficients not reported.
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Table 4.6: Net buyers vs Net Sellers
Net Net
Count Buyer Seller buyer seller
Staple foods 2,029 0.850 0.450 0.684 0.316
(0.357) (0.498) (0.465) (0.465)
Maize 1,299 0.645 0.444 0.610 0.390
(0.479) (0.497) (0.488) (0.488)
Rice 1,123 0.877 0.167 0.850 0.150
(0.328) (0.374) (0.358) (0.358)
Other cereals 394 0.919 0.112 0.901 0.099
(0.274) (0.315) (0.299) (0.299)
Cassava 349 0.980 0.023 0.977 0.023
(0.140) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Potatoes 609 0.920 0.122 0.890 0.110
(0.272) (0.327) (0.313) (0.313)
Pulses 1,352 0.803 0.331 0.714 0.286
(0.398) (0.471) (0.452) (0.452)
Regular beans 1,217 0.811 0.277 0.759 0.241
(0.392) (0.448) (0.428) (0.428)
Groundnuts 343 0.752 0.283 0.726 0.274
(0.432) (0.451) (0.447) (0.447)
Vegetables and fruits 1,978 0.994 0.036 0.970 0.030
(0.074) (0.187) (0.170) (0.170)
Onions and tomatoes 1,887 0.992 0.031 0.971 0.029
(0.092) (0.174) (0.168) (0.168)
Green leafy vegetables 776 0.992 0.010 0.990 0.010
(0.088) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Bananas 240 0.996 0.008 0.992 0.008
(0.065) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Fruits 424 1.000 0.002 0.998 0.002
(0.000) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Note: Count refers to the number of households that report consuming that food item and report either
purchasing the food or selling it. Net buyer refers to households that report buying more of the food
than they sell while a net seller is households that report selling more of the food than they buy.
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Table 4.7: Food Demand Models: Kilocalories with Agricultural Input Prices
Dependent variable: Daily per capita kilocalorie consumption
Staples Pulses Vegetables & Fruit Animal Products Complements
Household size (calorie adjusted) −168.55*** −25.74*** −10.90*** −69.55** −65.01***
(19.87) (4.42) (2.50) (34.87) (20.77)
Children in household (fraction) −405.30*** −97.93*** −55.51** 35.54 −78.15
(107.95) (28.26) (23.76) (160.13) (83.00)
Household head (1 if female) 22.57 22.93 36.88 −156.18 −39.61
(53.34) (15.12) (35.48) (161.71) (53.00)
Household expenditures (log) 606.34*** 90.25*** 69.50** 262.61*** 217.08***
(44.28) (13.16) (28.86) (66.39) (28.66)
Urban household (1 if urban) −308.06*** −66.61*** −34.35 −245.69 −4.03
(69.89) (19.81) (27.46) (196.48) (36.74)
Household distance to nearest trunk road −0.81 0.31 −0.51 −3.62 2.49
(1.19) (0.52) (0.36) (3.95) (2.76)
Household distance to nearest town (> 20,000) 1.53** 1.11*** 0.03 2.45 −1.81
(0.67) (0.26) (0.16) (2.68) (1.47)
Price of staples (TSh/kcal) 1095.81 −668.73** −308.10 −3209.10 −1208.74
(912.01) (339.41) (206.70) (3230.51) (922.06)
Price of pulses (TSh/kcal) −201.83 39.00 −17.19 −606.33 −132.66
(326.30) (105.76) (62.49) (645.89) (207.19)
Price of fruits/vegetables (TSh/kcal) 105.57*** −18.76 21.02 −93.00 63.66
(39.61) (12.62) (16.04) (75.07) (105.88)
Price of animal products (TSh/kcal) −60.50 87.64*** 26.27 −38.95 −5.48
(92.10) (32.94) (38.47) (89.63) (85.90)
Price of meal complements (TSh/kcal) 13.64 246.97*** 38.11 354.62 −310.11
(222.01) (72.82) (31.41) (255.36) (447.14)
Price of organic fertilizer (TSh/g) −815.00** −57.39 28.81 569.96 −748.18
(326.34) (82.50) (57.30) (692.60) (858.82)
Continued on next page
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Staples Pulses Vegetables & Fruits Animal Products Complements
Price of inorganic fertilizer (TSh/g) −47.02 41.58 50.06* −68.75 100.75
(79.23) (27.95) (26.63) (120.40) (163.45)
Price of pesticides (TSh/g) 0.10** −0.00 −0.00 −0.04 −0.12
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08)
Cash crops price index (TSh/g) −104.31** −3.64 17.88 210.12 28.59
(49.66) (16.51) (12.16) (197.34) (30.01)
Non-food market goods price index (TSh/g) 1104.30** −337.72** 31.03 −1703.49 −583.42
(492.15) (144.16) (63.24) (1893.03) (576.22)
Observations 2,337
Wald test (p-value)
Wald test (organic fertilizer) 0.140
Wald test (inorganic fertilizer) 0.366
Wald test (pesticides) 0.166
Wald test (cash crops) 0.114
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Block bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).
Note: Regression also contains month of interview dummies. Coefficients not reported.
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Table 4.8: Food Demand Models: Kilocalories with Household Expenditures Instrumented
Dependent variable: Daily per capita kilocalorie consumption
Staples Pulses Vegetables & Fruit Animal Products Complements
Household size (calorie adjusted) −303.44*** −45.66*** −26.40*** −134.09** −110.11***
(37.77) (7.51) (4.73) (56.02) (25.62)
Children in household (fraction) −337.38** −87.17*** −47.54** 75.70 −45.81
(132.21) (29.54) (22.58) (178.38) (90.18)
Household head (1 if female) 209.13*** 53.55*** 61.94 −77.09 29.20
(65.39) (17.48) (44.39) (145.72) (39.45)
Household expenditures (log) 1471.18*** 219.40*** 170.87*** 655.96*** 506.30***
(163.53) (33.29) (64.74) (187.72) (74.48)
Urban household (1 if urban) −702.93***−125.78*** −81.05* −387.18* −135.22**
(107.83) (24.54) (45.14) (219.98) (60.62)
Household distance to nearest trunk road −1.83 0.37 −0.37 −3.58 2.59
(1.31) (0.51) (0.34) (3.70) (2.99)
Household distance to nearest town (> 20,000) 2.69*** 1.24*** 0.10 2.78 −1.29
(0.81) (0.29) (0.15) (2.68) (1.31)
Price of staples (TSh/kcal) 25.22 −717.34** −317.88 −2653.59 −1188.90
(939.83) (338.85) (252.68) (2769.70) (1077.47)
Price of pulses (TSh/kcal) −634.85* −12.33 −58.33 −814.61 −178.27
(384.50) (111.56) (78.92) (726.84) (163.35)
Price of fruits/vegetables (TSh/kcal) 169.71*** −7.89 33.41* −34.10 46.93
(46.03) (13.46) (18.98) (51.19) (69.50)
Price of animal products (TSh/kcal) 124.37 114.02*** 50.42 −30.93 8.69
(103.36) (35.19) (50.27) (95.81) (67.94)
Price of meal complements (TSh/kcal) 132.17 226.42*** −1.84 279.51 −237.59
(231.97) (70.77) (30.95) (196.77) (417.25)
Cash crops price index (TSh/g) −135.25** −11.48 11.84 197.89 −4.56
(60.12) (17.53) (10.63) (198.05) (21.39)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 – continued from previous page
Staples Pulses Vegetables & Fruits Animal Products Complements
Non-food market goods price index (TSh/g) 969.82* −326.26** 30.63 −1782.48 −305.72
(543.95) (149.89) (66.38) (1951.40) (351.13)
Observations 2,337
Wald test (p-value) 0.115
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Block bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).
Note: Regression also contains month of interview dummies. Coefficients not reported. Household expenditure instruments: number of males 16 and
older, number of females 16 and older, number of males 15 and younger, number of females 16 and younger, number of acres cultivated, number of
livestock, home ownership dummy (1 if own, 0 otherwise), water source dummy (0 if from river lake, or rainwater, 1 otherwise), light source dummy (1
if electric, 0 otherwise), cooking fuel dummy (0 if firewood, 1 otherwise), sewage disposal dummy (0 if none, 1 otherwise), number of cell phones, and
number of televisions.
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Table 4.9: Household Nutrient Consumption: Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: Daily per capita nutrient consumption
Calories Protein Iron Zinc
Household size (calorie adjusted) −248.98*** −11.56*** −1.57*** −1.32***
(26.31) (3.69) (0.28) (0.28)
Children in household (fraction) −542.27*** −11.66 −4.37*** −2.70**
(106.09) (16.02) (1.33) (1.21)
Household head (1 if female) 23.22 −12.83 0.35 −0.52
(48.64) (15.81) (1.16) (1.14)
Household expenditures (log) 986.03*** 41.67*** 5.00*** 5.20***
(41.40) (6.98) (0.71) (0.57)
Urban household (1 if urban) −406.71*** −31.25* −5.20*** −3.46***
(62.42) (16.95) (1.26) (1.23)
Household distance to nearest trunk road −1.55 −0.39 −0.04* −0.04
(1.05) (0.35) (0.02) (0.02)
Household distance to nearest town (> 20,000) 2.39*** 0.30 0.04** 0.03*
(0.62) (0.24) (0.02) (0.02)
Price of staples (TSh/kcal) −600.23 −279.34 −27.35* −21.20
(791.21) (262.93) (16.35) (18.06)
Price of pulses (TSh/kcal) −142.18 −63.83 −4.18 −6.04
(310.69) (64.18) (5.32) (4.84)
Price of fruits/vegetables (TSh/kcal) −10.68 −5.66 −0.78 −0.72*
(32.93) (5.13) (0.53) (0.40)
Price of animal products (TSh/kcal) 36.86 −7.47 −1.61 −1.17
(82.62) (9.44) (1.29) (0.85)
Price of meal complements (TSh/kcal) 557.37*** 28.06 15.79*** 9.09***
(165.60) (19.49) (2.26) (1.66)
Cash crops price index (TSh/g) −84.77* 18.63 0.35 1.03
(47.57) (19.23) (1.16) (1.32)
Non-food market goods price index (TSh/g) 883.16** −168.41 −4.94 −7.10
(398.39) (183.38) (10.61) (12.48)
Observations 2,337
Wald test (p-value) 0.033
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Table 4.9 – continued from previous page
Vit. A Riboflavin Folate Vit. B12 Vit. C
Household size −177.34*** −0.18*** −44.46*** −0.82*** −12.81***
(35.76) (0.04) (5.34) (0.12) (2.77)
Children in household −1150.47*** −0.42** −162.11*** −3.40*** −64.32***
(288.30) (0.17) (28.60) (0.67) (24.66)
Household head 474.47 −0.06 55.26** 0.07 50.41
(435.46) (0.16) (27.39) (0.37) (31.21)
Household expenditures 1179.73*** 0.78*** 161.42*** 4.52*** 63.66***
(338.30) (0.08) (19.95) (0.37) (22.66)
Urban household −324.47 −0.46***−123.39*** 0.13 −70.93***
(353.15) (0.16) (28.01) (0.48) (26.38)
Distance to nearest trunk road −3.66 −0.00 −0.77 −0.00 0.06
(3.60) (0.00) (0.51) (0.01) (0.38)
Distance to nearest town −1.31 0.00 1.16*** −0.00 0.16
(1.76) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.21)
Price of staples −5281.89* −2.45 −484.23 −7.80 −370.88
(2899.04) (2.38) (319.33) (5.57) (275.66)
Price of pulses −127.39 −0.39 376.19*** 1.13 124.75
(705.16) (0.61) (135.96) (2.35) (93.66)
Price of fruits/vegetables 23.29 −0.16*** −11.75 −1.03*** 33.56**
(179.78) (0.06) (16.80) (0.22) (16.95)
Price of animal products 313.88 −0.24** 41.67 −1.33*** 113.76**
(524.98) (0.11) (46.03) (0.49) (45.19)
Price of meal complements 1444.10*** 1.50*** 220.76*** 5.61*** −38.88
(319.36) (0.22) (69.14) (1.19) (48.04)
Cash crops price index 216.12* 0.20 9.10 0.29 −9.27
(130.35) (0.17) (20.25) (0.36) (14.59)
Non-food market goods price index −144.09 −0.50 −59.19 1.35 57.01
(728.44) (1.67) (142.72) (3.67) (97.07)
Observations 2,337
Wald test (p-value) 0.033
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Block bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).
Note: Regression also contains household distance to nearest trunk road, household distance to nearest
town, and month of interview dummies. Coefficients not reported.
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Figure 4.1: Food Group Kilocalorie Consumption by Source of Food (N=2,337)
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this dissertation, I have used household-level data from Tanzania to empirically investigate
the ways in which local populations interact with their natural environments. In all three
essays, my findings show that households in Tanzania intimately rely on and use their local
natural environments to meet important daily needs. Overall, this dissertation provides
one of the first sets of comprehensive analyses aimed at monetizing the benefits of natural
resources in developing countries.
In the first two essays, I demonstrate that households derive significant non-market ben-
efits from forest access in Kagera, Tanzania. In Chapter 2, I estimate that households are
willing to pay approximately 25 percent of their annual household expenditure, or $200
(2012 USD) a year for access to local community forests for firewood collection. In Chapter
3, I show evidence that restricted access to forests diminishes human capital formation; an
additional hour required to collect firewood when a child is young results in the child com-
pleting 0.21 fewer grades of school 19 years later. Assuming an average return to education
of eight percent a year, this result translates into $475 2010 USD in lost earnings over 30
years, equal to roughly 1.7 percent of annual income – a cost that aggregates to $7 billion
in lost income if the program affects all 15 million rural children in Tanzania.
In the third essay, I show evidence of a strong inter-dependency between households’
food consumption and agricultural production. I find that the price of cash crops signifi-
cantly affects households’ demand for food, which points to the present of imperfections in
the market for food. This chapter highlights that in the presence of market constraints a
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household’s agricultural production decisions are intimately linked to its food consumption
levels, and subsequent nutrient consumption. If an agricultural household must produce food
not only to maximize profits but also to meet nutritional needs then a perceived “yield-gap”
may be the household’s rational response to local market conditions.
The results in this dissertation have many potential policy implications for natural re-
source management. Effective management of the natural environment requires that all of
the benefits of the a given resource are measured and monetized in a common unit. While
many benefits can be easily measured and quantified, such as agricultural profits from cleared
land, some benefits are experienced outside of the formal marketplace and are much harder
to measure. In Chapters 2 and 3 I have measured two such benefits and in Chapter 4 I
showed that local market imperfections can affect households’ food consumption decisions.
The results presented in this dissertation, however are only a small subset of the possible
benefits that households in Tanzania derive from their local environments. To date, the
literature in this area is sparse but it is increasingly important given the current state of
our environment and and current policy focus on the effective management of local natural
environments.
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Appendix A
Perfect Labor Market Separability
Test
In the case of perfect labor markets in Subsection 2.4.1 observed market wages represent for
both household member types’ true opportunity costs of time. Following Jacoby (1993) I
test for perfect labor markets by running the regression:
shadow wagej,kvt = a0 + a1sample wagej,vt + ekv + et
where ekv is a household fixed effect and et is an independent and identically distributed
error term. The null hypothesis of efficient labor markets is the joint test that a0 = 0 and
a1 = 1. I run this regression using OLS fixed effects and then run a joint Wald test to
test the null hypothesis. The test is run to test separability both for adults and teenagers.
Test results are displayed below in Table A.1. The perfect labor market scenario is soundly
rejected both in the estimates for adult sand teenagers providing more evidence that the
estimated shadow wage is the appropriate opportunity cost of time measure.
151
152
Table A.1: Perfect Labor Market Test: OLS with Household Fixed Effects
Test for equality of observed sample wage and estimated shadow wage
Dependent variable: Shadow wage estimates
Adults Teenagers
Sample wage −0.252*** −0.052
(0.082) (0.060)
Constant 22.509*** 8.666***
(1.721) (1.042)
Observations 3337 3337
F-test 171.00 69.11
Two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates are from an ordinary least squares model with household fixed effects.
Appendix B
Becketti et al. (1988) Pooling Tests
Table B.1: Becketti et al. (1988) Pooling Test (2004)
Dependent variable: Number of hours spent in school last week
Poisson Tobit OLS (log)
Age (years) 1.13*** 26.71*** 1.04***
(0.07) (1.62) (0.09)
Age squared (years) −0.04*** −1.03*** −0.04***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Gender (1=female) −0.06** −2.19*** −0.11**
(0.03) (0.84) (0.05)
Firewood collection trip time (hours) −0.05*** −1.25*** −0.05**
(0.02) (0.44) (0.02)
Mother: some primary education −0.10* −2.51 −0.13
(0.06) (1.55) (0.12)
Mother: completed primary education or above −0.05 −1.83 −0.09
(0.04) (1.21) (0.08)
Father: some primary education −0.21*** −4.99*** −0.22*
(0.06) (1.56) (0.11)
Father: completed primary education or above 0.01 0.35 0.02
(0.04) (1.21) (0.09)
Gender of household head (1=female) 0.00 0.14 0.02
(0.04) (1.16) (0.09)
Household size 0.00 0.19 0.01
(0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
Annual household expenditures (TSh, log) 0.13*** 3.52*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.71) (0.05)
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Poisson Tobit OLS (log)
Interviewed in February (1=yes) 0.22*** 4.59*** 0.16*
(0.05) (1.61) (0.09)
Interviewed in June (1=yes) −0.41*** −11.05*** −0.44**
(0.07) (1.98) (0.22)
Interviewed in July (1=yes) −0.48*** −10.98*** −0.47**
(0.08) (1.95) (0.19)
Interviewed in August (1=yes) 0.24*** 6.97*** 0.27***
(0.06) (1.74) (0.08)
Interviewed in December (1=yes) −1.24*** −30.46*** −1.10***
(0.12) (2.18) (0.18)
Individual attrited (1=yes) −1.34 −26.58 −0.50
(1.08) (25.27) (1.03)
Age x Attrition 0.08 0.53 −0.07
(0.17) (3.70) (0.17)
Age squared x Attrition −0.01 −0.06 0.00
(0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
Gender x Attrition 0.11 2.58 0.08
(0.07) (1.86) (0.12)
Trip time x Attrition 0.05 1.27 0.05
(0.04) (0.93) (0.05)
Mother: some primary education x Attrition 0.38*** 10.84*** 0.48***
(0.11) (2.92) (0.17)
Mother: primary education or above x Attrition 0.20** 6.47*** 0.30**
(0.09) (2.48) (0.13)
Father: some primary education x Attrition −0.19 −6.33* −0.21
(0.14) (3.63) (0.20)
Father: primary education or above x Attrition −0.07 −2.02 −0.12
(0.09) (2.43) (0.11)
Gender of household head x Attrition 0.05 1.43 0.05
(0.09) (2.37) (0.12)
Household size x Attrition 0.04*** 1.09*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.30) (0.01)
Annual household expenditures x Attrition 0.04 0.98 0.04
(0.04) (1.26) (0.05)
Interviewed in February x Attrition 0.12 5.15* 0.28**
(0.10) (3.09) (0.11)
Interviewed in June x Attrition −0.12 −1.28 −0.01
(0.15) (3.63) (0.14)
Interviewed in July x Attrition −0.58*** −8.88** −0.20
(0.21) (4.05) (0.16)
Interviewed in August x Attrition −0.12 −2.12 −0.07
Continued on next page
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Poisson Tobit OLS (log)
(0.13) (3.46) (0.14)
Interviewed in December x Attrition 0.00 0.92 0.17
(0.25) (4.52) (0.14)
Village fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Survey round fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,557 5,557 5,557
Log-likelihood -55,179 -14,782 -8,740
F-test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: F-test tests for the joint significance of the attrition dummy and all 13 attrition
interaction terms. All regressions include village and survey round fixed-effects.
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Table B.2: Becketti et al. (1988) Pooling Test (2010)
Dependent variable: Number of hours spent in school last week
Poisson Tobit OLS (log)
Age (years) 1.20*** 28.30*** 1.10***
(0.07) (1.64) (0.08)
Age squared (years) −0.05*** −1.10*** −0.04***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Gender (1=female) −0.07** −2.43*** −0.13**
(0.03) (0.83) (0.05)
Firewood collection trip time (hours) −0.04** −1.05** −0.05**
(0.02) (0.44) (0.02)
Mother: some primary education −0.02 −0.61 −0.04
(0.05) (1.47) (0.10)
Mother: completed primary education or above −0.05 −1.66 −0.08
(0.04) (1.24) (0.08)
Father: some primary education −0.21*** −5.37*** −0.24**
(0.06) (1.62) (0.12)
Father: completed primary education or above −0.03 −0.85 −0.03
(0.04) (1.20) (0.10)
Gender of household head (1=female) 0.01 0.32 0.02
(0.04) (1.14) (0.09)
Household size 0.01 0.27* 0.01
(0.01) (0.15) (0.01)
Annual household expenditures (TSh, log) 0.12*** 3.43*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.69) (0.05)
Interviewed in February (1=yes) 0.21*** 4.45*** 0.16*
(0.06) (1.62) (0.08)
Interviewed in June (1=yes) −0.42*** −11.12*** −0.43*
(0.07) (1.91) (0.22)
Interviewed in July (1=yes) −0.51*** −11.64*** −0.48**
(0.08) (1.93) (0.19)
Interviewed in August (1=yes) 0.22*** 6.43*** 0.25***
(0.06) (1.74) (0.08)
Interviewed in December (1=yes) −1.26*** −31.08*** −1.10***
(0.12) (2.16) (0.18)
Individual attrited (1=yes) 1.23 36.27 1.70*
(1.05) (25.70) (1.00)
Age x Attrition −0.31** −8.42** −0.36**
(0.16) (3.64) (0.17)
Age squared x Attrition 0.01** 0.35** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.15) (0.01)
Gender x Attrition 0.17** 3.83* 0.18
(0.07) (1.97) (0.11)
Continued on next page
157
Table B.2 – continued from previous page
Poisson Tobit OLS (log)
Trip time x Attrition 0.00 0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.93) (0.05)
Mother: some primary education x Attrition 0.05 2.07 0.09
(0.12) (3.14) (0.18)
Mother: primary education or above x Attrition 0.13 4.37* 0.23*
(0.09) (2.40) (0.13)
Father: some primary education x Attrition −0.19 −3.59 −0.08
(0.14) (3.46) (0.17)
Father: primary education or above x Attrition 0.12 2.98 0.07
(0.09) (2.52) (0.14)
Gender of household head x Attrition 0.03 0.64 0.01
(0.09) (2.49) (0.16)
Household size x Attrition 0.04*** 1.04*** 0.04*
(0.01) (0.33) (0.02)
Annual household expenditures x Attrition −0.00 −0.25 −0.02
(0.05) (1.36) (0.06)
Interviewed in February x Attrition 0.18* 5.36* 0.23**
(0.10) (3.08) (0.10)
Interviewed in June x Attrition −0.15 −1.95 −0.09
(0.18) (4.12) (0.16)
Interviewed in July x Attrition −0.38* −5.59 −0.16
(0.22) (4.22) (0.14)
Interviewed in August x Attrition −0.01 0.87 0.04
(0.13) (3.57) (0.16)
Interviewed in December x Attrition 0.10 3.73 0.22*
(0.25) (4.52) (0.12)
Village fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Survey round fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,557 5,557 5,557
Log-likelihood -55,366 -14,796 -8,754
F-test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.015
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: F-test tests for the joint significance of the attrition dummy and all 13 attrition
interaction terms. All regressions include village and survey round fixed-effects.
Appendix C
Household Food Demand with Hired
Labor
If households are buying labor then they are not selling labor,
∑
j=z,a L
h
j > 0 and L
m = 0.
In this case, agricultural labor is made up of both household labor and hired labor. The
associated Lagrangian is:
L = u(z, c)− λ
(
pzz + pcc− pzF
(
αz(L
h
z + L
f
z ), βzEz, δzfz
)− paF (αa(Lha + Lfa), βaEa, δafa)
+
∑
j=z,a
(
wLhj + pffj
)− y)− φ(E¯ − Ez − Ea)− η(L¯− Lfz − Lfa − Lm)
This problem now has thirteen equations (including the budget constraint, land, constraint,
and home labor constraint) and thirteen variables (including the three Lagrange multipliers
λ, φ, and η), and so the first order conditions can be used to solve for the optimal levels of
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household food consumption and agricultural production:
∂u
∂i
= λpi for i = z, c
pjαj
∂F
∂Lj
= −η
λ
for j = z, a
pjαj
∂F
∂Lj
= w for j = z, a
pjβj
∂F
∂Ej
= −φ
λ
for j = z, a
pjδj
∂F
∂fj
= pf for j = z, a.
Similar to the case of household’s selling labor, household consumption decisions are again
determined by the prices of consumed goods up until the point where their marginal utilities
are equal:
1
pc
∂u
∂c
=
1
pz
∂u
∂z
.
Land and labor are allocated between household-produced food and cash crop production
up until the point where the value of their marginal products are equal:
pzαz
∂F
∂Lz
= paαa
∂F
∂La
, pzβz
∂F
∂Ez
= paβa
∂F
∂Ea
, and pzδz
∂F
∂fz
= paδa
∂F
∂fa
These first order conditions are identical to those given in equations (4.6) and (4.7) and
imply that household consumption and production decisions can be made sequentially. Total
household food consumption is still given by:
z∗ = z(pz, pc,Π∗ + y)
where now y+Π∗ = pzF (αzLh∗z +L
f∗
z , βzE
∗
z , δzf
∗
z )+paF (αaL
h∗
a +L
f∗
a , βaE
∗
a, δaf
∗
a )−w(Lh∗z +
Lh∗a )− pf (f∗z + f∗a ).
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In the case of food market failures with hired labor, the associated Lagrangian is:
L = u(z, c)− λ
(
pcc− paF
(
αa(L
h
a + L
f
a), βaEa, δafa
)
+
∑
j=z,a
(
wLhj + pffj
)− y)
− φ(E¯ − Ez − Ea)− η(L¯− Lfz − Lfa − Lm)− µ
(
z − F (αz(Lhz + Lfz ), βzEz, δzfz)).
And the first order conditions governing household food consumption and agricultural pro-
duction decisions are:
∂u
∂z
= µ
∂u
∂c
= λpc
αz
∂F
∂Lz
=
λ
µ
w αz
∂F
∂Lz
= −η
µ
paαa
∂F
∂La
= w paαa
∂F
∂La
= −η
λ
βz
∂F
∂Ez
= −φ
µ
paβa
∂F
∂Ea
= −φ
λ
δz
∂F
∂fz
=
λ
µ
pf paδa
∂F
∂fz
= pf .
These first order conditions produce the same relationship governing household food con-
sumption decisions as displayed in equation (4.17):
∂u
∂z
=
pa
pc
∂u
∂c
βa
βz
∂F/∂Ea
∂F/∂Ez
.
Thus, the result that the price of cash crops only directly affects household food consumption
decisions in the case of food market imperfections does not depend on whether or not
households are buyers or sellers of labor.
Appendix D
GMM 3SLS: First Stage Results
Table D.1: Household Expenditures Instrument: First Stage Results
Dependent variable: Annual household expenditures, TSh (log)
Household expenditure (log)
Number of adult males (16 and older) 0.046**
(0.022)
Number of adult females (16 and older) 0.035*
(0.021)
Number of boys (15 and younger) −0.062***
(0.017)
Number of girls (15 and younger) −0.074***
(0.019)
Agricultural land (acres) −0.000
(0.002)
Number of livestock owned 0.000
(0.002)
Home ownership (1 if own, 0 otherwise) 0.053*
(0.031)
Water source (0 if river, lake, or rainwater, 1 otherwise) 0.021
(0.019)
Light source (1 electric, 0 otherwise) 0.209***
(0.061)
Cooking fuel (0 if firewood, 1 otherwise) 0.305***
(0.044)
Sewage disposal (0 if none, 1 otherwise) 0.029
(0.027)
Number of mobile phones owned 0.200***
(0.025)
Continued on next page
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Number of televisions owned 0.112**
(0.054)
Household size (calorie adjusted) 0.150***
(0.024)
Children in household (fraction) 0.682***
(0.138)
Household head (1 if female) −0.130***
(0.027)
Urban household (1 if urban) 0.110***
(0.036)
Household distance to nearest trunk road 0.001
(0.001)
Household distance to nearest town (> 20,000) −0.001
(0.000)
Price of staples (TSh/kcal) 0.297
(0.401)
Price of pulses (TSh/kcal) 0.326**
(0.144)
Price of fruits/vegetables (TSh/kcal) −0.039
(0.026)
Price of animal products (TSh/kcal) −0.125***
(0.045)
Price of meal complements (TSh/kcal) −0.042
(0.114)
Cash crops price index (TSh/g) 0.073***
(0.026)
Non-food market goods price index (TSh/g) 0.151
(0.260)
Daily per capita staple consumption (kcal) 0.000***
(0.000)
Daily per capita pulse consumption (kcal) 0.000***
(0.000)
Daily per capita vegetable & fruit consumption (kcal) 0.000
(0.001)
Daily per capita animal product consumption (kcal) 0.000
(0.000)
Daily per capita meal complement consumption (kcal) 0.000
(0.000)
Observations 2,337
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Block bootstrapped standard errors.
Note: Regression also contains month of interview dummies. Coefficients not reported.
